An Investigation Of Social Cognition Using Psilocybin and MDMA by Gabay, Anthony Stuart
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 

















AN INVESTIGATION OF SOCIAL COGNITION 







Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology & Neuroscience, 









A thesis submitted in part fulfilment for the degree 






Impairments of social function are increasingly thought to be fundamental to the 
psychopathology of psychiatric disorders. Current treatments are not assessed 
against these social domains and the effects of medication are poorly 
understood. Furthermore, the neural mechanisms and psychopharmacology 
underlying these functions in the healthy population are poorly understood.  
This thesis addresses this knowledge gap. A meta-analysis of antipsychotic 
treatment effects on emotion processing in schizophrenia confirms the lack of 
efficacy of current treatments in treating these social deficits. Following this, the 
thesis largely focuses on social decision-making, investigating tasks which 
model trust, cooperation and social norm violations. A meta-analysis of 
neuroimaging studies investigating the Ultimatum Game (UG) provides robust 
evidence of regions underlying the processing of social norms. 
Results are presented from two psychopharmacological studies, utilising 
serotonergic agonists to investigate their effects on social decision-making and 
emotion processing. The first study administered psilocybin with an open-label 
design. This study additionally investigated the efficacy of a src-kinase inhibitor 
to attenuate any psilocybin effect; this followed a placebo-controlled, double-
blind design. The second study investigated 3,4-
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) with a placebo-controlled, double-
blind design. Both MDMA and psilocybin caused a decrease in rejection of 
unfair offers in the UG. MDMA increased cooperation with trustworthy, but not 
untrustworthy, partners in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), as well as 
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reducing recognition of negative facial affect. Increased cooperation in the PD 
was accompanied by increased activation in the superior temporal sulcus, 
cingulate cortex and insula, during feedback of other player’s decisions. 
The findings of these studies suggest that serotonergic mechanisms are 
fundamental to the processing of normative behaviour during interpersonal 
interactions. Manipulation of this neurotransmitter system produced context-
sensitive changes in behaviour. These behavioural alterations were 
accompanied by changes in activity of brain regions proposed to be involved in 
the processing and appraisal of other’s intentions and motivations. It is 
hypothesised that this was largely achieved through activity at the serotonin 2A 
receptor. These findings provide insight for the development of new treatment 





My supervisors, Mitul Mehta and Matthew Kempton, have been a great source 
of inspiration, guidance, and light-hearted relief over the course of my PhD. I 
cannot thank them enough. Matthew successfully got me hooked on the 
statistics underlying meta-analyses, providing a gateway to stats obsession I 
hadn’t realised was possible. I’m grateful to Mitul for giving me the freedom to 
develop this PhD, and for letting me find and follow my scientific interests. 
Beyond the rigorous training they have provided, I think the most valuable 
lesson my supervisors have taught me is that no matter how much pressure or 
stress there is there’s rarely a reason not to laugh your way through it. 
I extend my gratitude to the Medical Research Council and Institute of 
Psychiatry, Psychology & Neuroscience, King’s College London, for their joint 
funding of this PhD under the MRC-IoPPN Excellence scheme. 
I also owe a debt of gratitude to Ndaba Mazibuko and Stephanie Stephenson, 
the medical team on the studies reported in this thesis. Their humour and 
support made the data collection process a joy, even when it seemed like it 
would never end. Thank you. I would also like to share my appreciation of all 
the participants who took part in these studies. Their genuine interest in the 
subject, and willingness to spend so many hours sitting around with me was a 
pleasant surprise. I hope you all enjoyed yourselves. 
A number of people have provided invaluable advice over the last few years, 
from analysis challenges to task design to general wisdom. Specific thanks 
5 
 
must go to Owen O’Daly, Fernando Zelaya, Alex Popescu, Molly Crockett, 
Robin Carhart-Harris, Richard Joules, James Gilleen and Ottavia Dipasquale. 
I have made some fantastic friends at King’s and had the pleasure of sharing an 
office with some of the best people I could have hoped for. I’ll never forget some 
of the ridiculous times we’ve shared.  
Last but not least, my parents. For everything, thank you.  
6 
 
Declaration of work 
This thesis presents two meta-analyses and data collected from two separate 
experimental studies, as well as two test-retest task validation studies. The 
meta-analyses presented are my own work, including the literature review and 
analysis. The study reported in Chapter 3 was initially conceived of and 
designed by Professor Mitul Mehta and Professor David Nutt (Imperial College 
London). I designed the social decision-making task completed after the 
scanning session of this study with the aid of Alex Popescu, paradigm 
developer at the Centre for Neuroimaging Sciences, KCL. The study reported in 
Chapter 4 was conceived of and designed by me, in collaboration with my 
supervisor, Dr Mitul Mehta. The social decision-making tasks used in this study 
were again designed by me, with the aid of Alex Popescu. For all studies 
presented in this thesis, I was solely responsible for participant recruitment, 
data collection and data analysis. 
The pre-processing and de-noising steps of the multi-echo resting-state MRI 
data described in Chapter 3, Section 3.4.4.4 were carried out by Dr Ottavia 
Dipasquale (Department of Neuroimaging, Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology & 





Table of Contents 
Abstract ............................................................................................................... 2 
Acknowledgments ............................................................................................... 4 
Declaration of work ............................................................................................. 6 
Table of tables .................................................................................................. 13 
Table of figures ................................................................................................. 15 
List of abbreviations .......................................................................................... 22 
Chapter 1 Introduction ...................................................................................... 24 
1.1 Overview ................................................................................................. 24 
1.2 Introduction to social cognition ................................................................ 25 
1.3 Social cognition deficits in psychiatric illness ........................................... 29 
1.4 Treatment of social cognitive deficits (meta-analysis) ............................. 33 
1.4.1 Abstract of meta-analysis .................................................................. 33 
1.4.2 Introduction to meta-analysis ............................................................ 34 
1.4.3 Results of meta-analysis ................................................................... 35 
1.4.4 Discussion of meta-analysis ............................................................. 39 
1.4.5 Conclusion of meta-analysis ............................................................. 42 
8 
 
1.5 Social decision-making ............................................................................ 43 
1.5.1 What is social decision-making? ....................................................... 43 
1.5.2 Evidence for cooperation and altruistic punishment .......................... 47 
1.5.3 Social decision-making in psychiatric illness ..................................... 55 
1.5.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................ 65 
1.6 The psychopharmacology of social cognition .......................................... 67 
1.7 The serotonin system .............................................................................. 75 
1.8 3,4-methylenedioxy-methamphetamine and psilocybin ........................... 78 
1.8.1 3,4-methylenedioxy-methamphetamine ............................................ 78 
1.8.2 Psilocybin .......................................................................................... 80 
1.9 Aims and hypotheses .............................................................................. 85 
1.9.1 Meta-analysis of Ultimatum Game neuroimaging studies ................. 85 
1.9.2 Social cognition following the administration of psilocybin ................ 85 
1.9.3 Social cognition following the administration of MDMA ..................... 86 
Chapter 2 The Ultimatum Game and brain: a meta-analysis of neuroimaging 
studies .............................................................................................................. 87 
Chapter 2 ...................................................................................................... 87 
2.1 Overview ................................................................................................. 87 
9 
 
2.2 Abstract ................................................................................................... 87 
2.3 Introduction .............................................................................................. 88 
2.4 Methods ................................................................................................... 94 
2.4.1 Literature search ............................................................................... 94 
2.4.2 Effect Size-Signed Differential Mapping (ES-SDM) .......................... 95 
2.4.3 Analyses ........................................................................................... 96 
2.5 Results .................................................................................................... 99 
2.5.1 Included studies ................................................................................ 99 
2.5.2 Behavioural results ......................................................................... 103 
2.5.3 Fairness meta-analysis ................................................................... 104 
2.5.4 Response meta-analysis ................................................................. 105 
2.5.5 Comparison of Fairness and Response activations ........................ 106 
2.5.6 Meta-regression to assess the influence of unfair offer definition ... 106 
2.6 Discussion ............................................................................................. 111 
2.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................. 119 
2.8 Acknowledgement ................................................................................. 119 
Chapter 3 The effect of psilocybin on social cognition .................................... 121 
10 
 
Chapter 3 .................................................................................................... 121 
3.1 Overview ............................................................................................... 121 
3.2 Introduction ............................................................................................ 121 
3.3 Validation of the Ultimatum Game task design ...................................... 129 
3.3.1 Abstract ........................................................................................... 129 
3.3.2 Introduction ..................................................................................... 130 
3.3.2 Methods .......................................................................................... 131 
3.3.3 Results ............................................................................................ 136 
3.3.4 Discussion ...................................................................................... 141 
3.4 The effect of psilocybin on social cognition ........................................... 143 
3.4.1 Abstract ........................................................................................... 143 
3.4.2 Introduction ..................................................................................... 144 
3.4.3 Methods .......................................................................................... 145 
3.4.4 Results ............................................................................................ 156 
3.4.5 Discussion ...................................................................................... 164 
Chapter 4 The effect of MDMA on social cognition ......................................... 174 
Chapter 4 .................................................................................................... 174 
11 
 
4.1 Overview ............................................................................................... 174 
4.2 Introduction ............................................................................................ 175 
4.3 Validation of the Ultimatum Game and Prisoner’s Dilemma .................. 181 
4.3.1 Abstract ........................................................................................... 181 
4.3.2 Introduction ..................................................................................... 182 
4.3.3 Methods .......................................................................................... 183 
4.3.4 Results ............................................................................................ 193 
4.3.5 Discussion ...................................................................................... 207 
4.4 The effect of MDMA on social cognition ................................................ 213 
4.4.1 Abstract ........................................................................................... 213 
4.4.2 Introduction ..................................................................................... 214 
4.4.3 Methods .......................................................................................... 215 
4.4.4 Results ............................................................................................ 229 
4.4.5 Discussion ...................................................................................... 256 
Chapter 5 Overall discussion .......................................................................... 285 
Chapter 5 ....................................................................................................... 285 
5.1 Overview of the work reported in this thesis .......................................... 285 
12 
 
5.2 The effect of MDMA and psilocybin on social decision-making ............. 286 
5.3 The effect of psilocybin and MDMA on facial affect recognition ............ 289 
5.4 Limitations ............................................................................................. 290 
5.5 Implications and future directions .......................................................... 292 
5.6 Overall conclusion ................................................................................. 295 
References...................................................................................................... 297 
Appendix A Methods for Chapter 1, Section 1.4 ............................................. 335 
Appendix B Task instructions .......................................................................... 340 
Appendix C Full list of offers in the Ultimatum Game version used in the MDMA 
study ............................................................................................................... 347 
Appendix D Social value orientation questionnaire (Van Lange, 1999) .......... 351 
Appendix E Social reward questionnaire (Foulkes et al., 2014) ...................... 354 
Appendix F Exploratory analyses on the UG fMRI data .................................. 356 
Appendix G Consent form, information sheet and ethical approval for both test-
retest studies................................................................................................... 359 
Appendix H Consent form, information sheet and ethical approval for psilocybin 
study ............................................................................................................... 367 
Appendix I Consent form, information sheet and ethical approval for MDMA 




Table of tables 
Table 1-1: Summary of behavioural findings from studies investigating social 
decision-making in psychiatric conditions. MDD: major depressive disorder; 
ASD: autism spectrum disorders; UG: ultimatum game; PD: prisoner’s dilemma; 
TG: trust game. UUnmedicated sample;NMedication status not reported .......... 56 
Table 2-1: Details of included studies. For studies whose t-maps were not 
available, the reported results were thresholded as follows: Sanfey et al (2003) 
– p < 0.001, cluster size >= 10 voxels; Kirk et al (2009) – p < 0.05, FDR-
corrected, extend threshold > 10 v voxels; Harlé & Sanfey, 2012 – corrected for 
cluster-wise significance: p < 0.05, cluster size >= 5 ...................................... 101 
Table 2-2: Meta-analytic results for the Fairness contrast (n = 11, k ≥ 25) ..... 109 
Table 2-3: Meta-analytic results for the Response contrast (n = 5, k ≥ 25) ..... 110 
Table 3-1: Number of each offer level and the fairness level assigned for the 
sake of analysis .............................................................................................. 133 
Table 3-2: Repeatability (R) estimates with 95% CIs in brackets for each 
condition across fairness levels. NV = Not enough variation: almost all 
participants accepted all offers in both sessions ............................................. 139 
Table 3-3:Clusters showing changes in functional connectivity across 
experimental sessions .................................................................................... 163 
14 
 
Table 4-1: Number of each offer level and the fairness level assigned for the 
sake of analysis .............................................................................................. 185 
Table 4-2: Repeatability (R) estimates of UG responses across runs within 
session one, with 95% CIs in brackets for each condition across fairness levels. 
NV = Not enough variation: almost all participants accepted all offers in both 
sessions .......................................................................................................... 194 
Table 4-3: Repeatability (R) estimates between sessions, with 95% CIs. N/V = 
Not enough variation ....................................................................................... 196 
Table 4-4: ICC for the Trust ratings for each category of opponent, both within- 
and between-sessions .................................................................................... 201 
Table 4-5: Repeatability estimates of the proportion of Compete decisions, both 
within- and between-sessions. Note that the GLMM failed to converge, 
rendering these estimates unreliable. ............................................................. 203 
Table 4-6: fMRI activations in the fairness by treatment 2x2 flexible factorial 
model, restricted to the FP condition. Regions identified by the Harvard-Oxford 
probabilistic atlas (Desikan et al., 2006) ......................................................... 238 
Table 4-7: fMRI activations in the for the PD. Regions identified by the Harvard-
Oxford probabilistic atlas (Desikan et al., 2006) .............................................. 249 
Table 4-8: Post-hoc paired t-tests comparing facial affect recognition across 
experimental sessions for each emotion ......................................................... 252 




Table of figures 
Figure 1-1: Forest plot and table displaying results of the meta-analysis. Data 
identified by study first author and antipsychotic investigated. X-axis displays 
Hedge’s g. Orange data points are atypical antipsychotics, blue represent 
typical antipsychotics. The red diamond gives the weighted overall effect size.
 .......................................................................................................................... 38 
Figure 1-2: Explanation of four commonly used social decision-making tasks 
(continues on the next page) ............................................................................ 44 
Figure 1-3: A) Diagram showing serotonergic projections from the raphe nuclei 
to the PFC, striatum, thalamus and other subcortical regions B) Reproduced 
with permission from Beliveau et al (2017), Figure 2: displays average density 
maps for five 5-HT targets on the common FreeSurfer surface; C) Reproduced 
with permission from Beliveau et al (2017), Figure 3: displays average density 
maps for five 5-HT targets on the common MNI152 space (coronal, upper, z = 
8mm and sagittal, lower, x = - 3 mm) ................................................................ 77 
Figure 1-4: Diagram illustrating hypothesised mechanisms underlying 
hallucinogenic (HC) and non-hallucinogenic (NHC) compound activation of the 
5-HT2A receptor. A) Unbound 5-HT2A receptor; B) Shows conformational 
changes following NHC binding. This allows initiation of phospholipase C-β 
(PLC- β ) cascade; C) Shows hypothesised additional downstream mechanisms 
of HC binding .................................................................................................... 84 
16 
 
Figure 2-1: Contrast diagram.  NB: No ‘Fair reject’ as the frequency of this 
outcome was negligible ..................................................................................... 94 
Figure 2-2: Flow chart showing study selection for the meta-analysis .............. 98 
Figure 2-3: Responder rejection rates from behavioural data of the included 
studies. NB: Civai et al (2012) and Wei et al (2013) not included due to rejection 
rates not being given for individual offers.  Vieira et al (2013) not included 
because data not available ƚData from Harlé and Sanfey (2012) reported 
separately for two participant groups, a Young (18-27) and b Older (55-78).  
Error bars: ± 1 SEM (standard error of the mean) ........................................... 103 
Figure 2-4:A) Fairness contrast results, with small area of between-study 
heterogeneity labelled on sagittal slice with a dotted outline and arrow B) 
Response contrast results C) Fairness and Response contrasts binarised; 
orthogonal views to highlight overlap. Col Colour bars represent z values ..... 107 
Figure 2-5: Binarised maps of Jack-knife analyses.  Colour bars represent 
number of overlapping jack-knife maps. A) Fairness contrast B) Response 
contrast ........................................................................................................... 108 
Figure 3-1: Diagram illustrating hypothesised mechanisms underlying 
hallucinogenic (HC) and non-hallucinogenic (NHC) compound activation of the 
5-HT2A receptor. A) Unbound 5-HT2A receptor; B) Shows conformational 
changes following NHC binding. This allows initiation of phospholipase C-β 
cascade; C) Shows hypothesised additional downstream mechanisms of HC 
binding ............................................................................................................ 126 
17 
 
Figure 3-2: A single round from the UG version tested here. First participants 
are told who is making the offer, they are then told what the offer is, before 
being asked to either accept or reject that offer .............................................. 134 
Figure 3-3: Rejection rates from session one of the validation study of the 
psilocybin study's version of the Ultimatum Game. A) Rejection rates per offer, 
error bars: ±1SE; FP: First person condition, GS: Random number generator; B) 
Rejection rates when grouped into unfair (10-20%), fair, (50%) and hyper-fair 
(80-90%) offers. Boxes represent the interquartile range, with a bold line at the 
median. Whiskers extend to data points within the range*interquartile range. 
Individual points are represented by dots. Green dots: FP; orange dots: GS. 138 
Figure 3-4: Change in rejection rate for each participant in each condition 
across fairness levels. A) Unfair; B) Fair; C) Hyper-fair .................................. 140 
Figure 3-5: Graphical representation of the study day. ASL: arterial spin 
labelling; Moving dots: visual processing task; phMRI: pharmacological MRI; RT 
task: reaction time task ................................................................................... 149 
Figure 3-6: A) Reproduced from Carhart-Harris (2011): “The 0–10 ratings were 
anchored with 0 being ‘no noticeable drug effects’ and 10 being ‘extremely 
intense effects’. Time zero corresponds to the end of the 60 s injection” B) 
Gamma variate function. The connectivity analysis looked for changes in 
connectivity values which fit this function ........................................................ 155 
Figure 3-7: Seeds used in the connectivity analysis. ACCg: anterior cingulate 
gyrus (MNI 6, 10, 30); AI: anterior insula (right MNI 40, 11, 10; left MNI -42, 13, 
8); left fusiform MNI -26, -73, -4; right cerebellum MNI 26, -71, -34. ............... 156 
18 
 
Figure 3-8: Boxplot displaying rejection rates of unfair offers in the Ultimatum 
Game across conditions. OR: odds ratio. Blue dots: FP condition; Orange dots: 
GS condition ................................................................................................... 158 
Figure 3-9: Affective Bias results. A) Comparison of accuracies of affective and 
control conditions, B) Affective bias (proportion of happy correct minus sad 
correct, C) Bias of wrong responses i.e. when given an incorrect answer, what 
was chosen. All error bars: +/- 1 SE ............................................................... 160 
Figure 3-10: OFC cluster whose change in connectivity with the right anterior 
insula and left fusiform gyrus covaried with change in rejection rate across 
sessions .......................................................................................................... 163 
Figure 4-1: Diagram depicting the three conditions of the UG task. Green 
writing: first person condition; red writing: third-party condition; blue writing: 
game server condition ..................................................................................... 187 
Figure 4-2: The Prisoner’s Dilemma. A) Diagram depicting the paradigm with 
timings; B) payoff matrix ................................................................................. 189 
Figure 4-3: Within-session change in rejection rate for each participant in each 
condition across fairness levels. A) Unfair; B) Fair; C) Hyper-fair ................... 195 
Figure 4-4: Between-session change in rejection rate for each participant in 
each condition across fairness level. A) Unfair; B) Fair; C) Hyper-fair ............ 197 
Figure 4-5: Rejection rates combined across runs in session one. A) Rejection 
rate per offer; B) Rejection rates when grouped into Unfair (10-20%), Fair (50%) 
19 
 
and Hyper-fair (80-90%) offers. Error bars: +/- 1 SE. FP: First-person condition; 
TP: third-person condition; GS: game server .................................................. 198 
Figure 4-6: Histogram of mean offer in session one ....................................... 200 
Figure 4-7: Change in trust ratings for each category of opponent. A) Within-
session changes; B) Between-session changes. Points below the x-axis are the 
mean for that category with 95% CIs .............................................................. 201 
Figure 4-8: Change in the percentage of Compete for each category of 
opponent. A) Within-session changes; B) Between-session changes. Points 
below the x-axis are the median for that category, error bars: interquartile range
 ........................................................................................................................ 204 
Figure 4-9: PD outcome of session one, averaged across runs. A) average trust 
rating over the final eight rounds; B) percentage Compete decisions; C) 
histogram of mean trust ratings for the game server. All p-values Bonferroni 
corrected. Error bars: +/- 1 SE ........................................................................ 206 
Figure 4-10: Diagram showing study timeline. ASL: arterial spin labelling ...... 217 
Figure 4-11: Boxplots displaying rejection rates across conditions in the placebo 
session. A) First person, B) Third party, C) Game server ............................... 232 
Figure 4-12: Boxplots of rejection rates across all conditions, separated by A) 
run and B) high/low utility ................................................................................ 233 
Figure 4-13: Boxplots displaying rejection rates. The left column displays both 
the placebo session (green dots) and MDMA session (orange dots) for each 
20 
 
condition. The right column represents the change in rejection rate from placebo 
to MDMA session. A) Unfair offers, B) Fair offers, C) Hyper-fair offers Ultimatum 
Game fMRI results .......................................................................................... 236 
Figure 4-14: Main effect of fairness in treatment x fairness ANOVA restriced to 
FP condition. Colour bar represents Z values. Image thresholded at height 
threshold of FEW-corrected p < 0.05 .............................................................. 239 
Figure 4-15: Barplots displaying the mean trust rating for each opponent type 
across experimental sessions. All p-values are Bonferroni-corrected. Error bars: 
±1SE ............................................................................................................... 241 
Figure 4-16: Boxplots displaying A) Prisoner's Dilemma Cooperation rates with 
each type of opponent. Green dots: placebo session, orange dots: MDMA 
session. B) Change in rates of cooperation from placebo to MDMA. NB: These 
plots present the percentage of cooperate decisions because they are 
graphically intuitive. The analysis described in this section is not based on 
proportions, but is a logistic regression implemented by GEE, using the trial-by-
trial data. ......................................................................................................... 243 
Figure 4-17: Breaking down PD behaviour trial by trial. A) Lining up decisions 
across runs: in order to account for the jitter in opponent responses the last trial 
of the first run and first trial of the final run were removed. ‘C’ indicates where 
opponents were congruous with their trustworthiness. ‘D’ indicates where they 
deviated from this. B) Proportion of cooperate decisions on each round, 
averaged across participants, for the trustworthy opponent. C) Proportion of 
cooperate decisions on each round, averaged across participants for the 
21 
 
untrustworthy opponent. D) Proportion of cooperate decisions on each round 
plotted as scatterplots with the line of best fit for each session; for the 
trustworthy opponent, there is a steady decline in cooperative decisions during 
the placebo session, which does not occur during the MDMA session (see text 
below; GEE round-by-experimental session interaction: χ2(1,19) = 16.79, OR = 
1.08, 95% CI 1.043 – 1.13, p < 0.001). Error bars: ±1SE ................................ 244 
Figure 4-18: Increased activations in the MDMA compared to placebo session 
when receiving feedback from the trustworthy opponent. Colour bar represents 
Z values. Image thresholded at FWE-corrected p < 0.05 ................................ 250 
Figure 4-19: Barplot displaying results from the Affective Bias. Error bars: ±1SE
 ........................................................................................................................ 252 
Figure 4-20: reproduced with permission from Beliveau et al (2017): Average 
density (Bmax) maps for five 5-HT targets on the common FreeSurfer surface 
(left hemisphere; lateral view, upper and medial view, lower). Color [sic] scaling 





List of abbreviations 
5-HT   Serotonin  
ACC   Anterior cingulate cortex 
ADHD   Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
ALE   Activation likelihood estimation 
aMCC   Anterior midcingulate cortex 
ASD   Autism spectrum disorders 
ATD   Acute trytophan depletion 
BOLD   Blood-oxygen-level dependent 
BPD   Borderline personality disorder 
DA   Dopamine 
DLPFC  Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
ES-SDM  Effect-sized signed differential mapping 
fMRI   Functional magnetic resonance imaging 
FP   First person 
GCPR   G-coupled protein receptors 
GS   Games server 
HC   Hallucinogenic compound 
ICC   Intraclass correlation coefficient 
MDD   Major depression disorder 
MDMA   3,4-methylenedioxy-methamphetamine 
MET   Multifaceted empathy test 
NA   Noradrenaline 
NHC   Non-hallucinogenic compound 
OFC   Orbital frontal cortex 
23 
 
PANSS  Positive and negative symptom scale 
PD   Prisoner's dilemma 
PFC   Prefrontal cortex 
PGG   Public goods game 
SANS   Scale for the assessment of negative symptoms 
SAPS   Scale for the assessment of positive symptoms 
SMA   Supplementary motor area 
SRQ   Social reward questionnaire 
SSRI   Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor 
STS   Superior temporal sulcus 
SVO   Social value orientation 
TG   Trust game 
TP   Third party 
UG   Ultimatum game   
24 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction  
1.1 Overview 
This chapter will begin with a brief introduction to social cognition and some of 
the cognitive mechanisms which fall under this umbrella term. It will then move 
on to discuss how alterations in social cognition appear to be a hallmark of a 
wide number of psychiatric illnesses. Following this I will present data from a 
meta-analysis of antipsychotic treatment effects on facial affect processing, 
highlighting the lack of efficacy in managing social cognitive deficits in 
schizophrenia1.  
Having identified the need for a more complete understanding of how the brain 
processes social information, I will then introduce in detail the social decision-
making field, the emphasis of this thesis. A review of the current state of 
knowledge of the psychopharmacology of social cognition will then precede an 
introduction to the compounds used in the studies that make up the majority of 
this thesis, followed by a statement of the aims and hypotheses of these 
studies. 
                                            
1 This section will include work published in the Journal of 
Psychopharmacology: Gabay AS, Kempton MJ, Mehta MA (2015) Facial affect 
processing deficits in schizophrenia: a meta-analysis of antipsychotic treatment 
effects. J Psychopharmacol vol. 29 (2) 224-229. 
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1.2 Introduction to social cognition 
Humans have evolved a collection of mechanisms which enable us to navigate 
a highly complex, social world. Every day we interact with others and with each 
interaction rely on these cognitive mechanisms. They enable us to recognise 
the other as an ‘other’, to infer their thoughts and beliefs, recognise the 
emotions they may be feeling, and perhaps put ourselves in their shoes and feel 
what they feel. Many interactions involve a level of trust, be it mundane or 
deeply personal; and we often rely on others’ cooperation to achieve shared 
goals, and work on an assumption that people will comply with basic social 
norms. These abstract concepts of trust, cooperation and fairness also implicitly 
involve the understanding of others’ expectations, intentions and motivations. 
Collectively these mechanisms have become known as ‘social cognition’, and it 
has been argued that social pressures resulting from increasing group sizes 
partly contributed to both primate evolution and the evolutionary development of 
the human neocortex (Brothers, 2002; Dunbar, 2003).  
Social cognition includes a number of low-level processes which are by-and-
large not restricted to human cognition, as well as higher level processes 
(Adolphs, 2009; Gertz et al., 2016; Parr et al., 2005; Parr, 2011; Puce and 
Perrett, 2003; Watson and Platt, 2012). The low level processes include 
distinguishing biological from non-biological motion, aspects of social 
judgement, and facial affect recognition. Experiments investigating the ability to  
distinguish different types of motion use point-light animations of, for example, 
people moving; neural correlates of viewing these images are compared to 
viewing random point-light movements or an inverted human-like animation 
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(e.g. Grossman et al., 2005; Puce and Perrett, 2003; Saygin et al., 2010). In 
addition to some higher level processes, which will be discussed in detail later 
in this chapter, of these low level processes this thesis is concerned with facial 
affect recognition. Charles Darwin conducted a simple, single-blind experiment 
of emotion recognition, published as part of his 1872 book, ‘The Expression of 
the Emotions in Man and Animals’ (Darwin, 1872). From this he posited that 
there are a set of universal emotions, recognisable from the facial expressions 
of those experiencing them (Snyder et al., 2010).  Building on this work a 
number of decades later, Paul Ekman demonstrated that six core emotional 
expressions were recognisable across cultures: sadness, fear, anger, happy, 
disgust and surprise (Ekman et al., 1969). This work precipitated a wealth of 
research into facial affect recognition. While this model of six universal emotions 
has been questioned, the premise of some universality across cultures is not 
challenged (e.g. Jack et al., 2016, 2012). Recognition of other’s emotional 
expression plays a key role in successful interpersonal interactions, facilitating 
aspects of other social cognitive skills such as empathy and theory of mind 
(more on these below). A large meta-analysis of functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) studies identified a network of brain regions involved in facial 
affect recognition, including limbic and insular regions (Fusar-Poli et al., 2009). 
The ability to correctly identify the emotion being expressed by another 
individual is clearly important to social interactions. Equally, being able to 
consider the thoughts and intentions of another individual as being different 
from one’s own plays an essential role. Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to 
infer the beliefs, emotions and intentions of another agent, to have a 
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representation of an other’s thoughts; it is an ability which typically developing 
humans are able to display from age four or five (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; 
Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Wimmer and Perner, 1983). It is a central 
mechanism on which much social interaction relies, enabling one to track 
others’ points of view, beliefs and false beliefs, as well as being a key ability for 
both cooperation and deception (Frith and Frith, 2012). ToM has been 
described as having a cognitive and affective component, with inferring complex 
emotional states being reliant on the affective component while representation 
of someone’s false-beliefs being an example of the cognitive component 
(Bodden et al., 2013; Molenberghs et al., 2016).  
A recent meta-analysis of 127 neuroimaging studies revealed a core network of 
regions which are consistently activated during both cognitive and affective ToM 
tasks. These included areas of the medial prefrontal cortex, bilateral temporal-
parietal junction, precuneus and the middle temporal gyrus (Molenberghs et al., 
2016; Schurz et al., 2014).  
The affective component of ToM has been equated with the cognitive 
component of empathy (Walter, 2012). Empathy is a construct of which there 
are numerous proposed definitions (Bernhardt and Singer, 2012). Chief among 
the themes which empathy covers is the idea of experiencing the emotions 
which another individual may be feeling. This involves being able to identify and 
understand the emotional content of the other’s experience, which can be 
considered equivalent to affective ToM, and is termed cognitive empathy 
(Walter, 2012). Importantly, cognitive empathy does not necessarily evoke the 
same feelings in the individual. Affective empathy does evoke these feelings, 
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providing not only an understanding of how someone else feels, but viscerally 
experiencing those same emotions. Meta-analyses of empathy studies have 
identified a core network of brain regions involved in empathic response. Key 
among these are the dorsal anterior and mid-cingulate cortex, anterior insula, 
and supplementary motor area (Fan et al., 2011). 
Social interactions often require a balance between emotional and ‘rational’ 
cognitive motivations, sometimes referred to as hot and cold cognition (Kluwe-
Schiavon et al., 2016; Roiser et al., 2009; Zimmerman et al., 2016). The ability 
to resolve these conflicting, social motivations may have become a key factor in 
evolutionary fitness.  The conflict between emotional, social and cognitive 
motivation has been studied using social decision-making tasks (Rilling and 
Sanfey, 2011; Stallen and Sanfey, 2013). Social decision-making tasks are an 
important model of the interplay between social and emotional cognition and 
reasoned, self-interest judgments, as well as illuminating how trust and 
cooperation play a role in our interactions with one another. These tasks are 
believed to involve psychological processes key to effective functioning.  
The social decision-making field uses a number of tasks adapted from 
behavioural economics to investigate the influence of social pressures on 
decision-making.  These include the Trust Game, Ultimatum Game, Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, Public Goods Game and the Dictator Game (Rilling and Sanfey, 
2011). In each of these games, the ‘rational’, optimal strategy for the player is to 
maximise their individual pay-off, but participants are routinely seen to play non-
optimal strategies (Camerer, 2003; Güth et al., 1982). Social decision-making, 
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including alterations seen in psychiatric illness, will be discussed in greater 
depth in Section 1.5. 
1.3 Social cognition deficits in psychiatric illness 
For many people deficits in social cognition are epitomised by autism spectrum 
disorders (ASD). What is less appreciated in the general population is that 
social cognition deficits are a hallmark of a number of psychiatric disorders. 
ASD, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), major depressive disorder 
(MDD), borderline personality disorder, and psychotic disorders such as 
schizophrenia and bipolar have all had social cognitive deficits identified as key 
components of their presentation and have attracted considerable research 
attention (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Collin et al., 2013; Dziobek et al., 
2011; Kupferberg et al., 2016; Nuechterlein et al., 2004).  
ToM deficits have repeatedly been shown in ASD (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 
1985; Begeer et al., 2012; Li et al., 2010; Peterson, 2014). A number of tasks 
are used to investigate these deficits. False-belief tasks require participants to 
correctly predict what an actor believes about a situation when that belief is 
different from the knowledge of the participant themselves (Wimmer and 
Perner, 1983). Happé’s Strange Stories task requires participants to explain 
why characters in a story say something which is not literally true (Happé, 
1994). The Reading the Mind in the Eyes task (RMET) asks participants to infer 
mental states from pictures just of someone’s eyes (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). 
What these and other ToM tasks have in common is the requirement that 
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individuals understand that other agents have different beliefs, thoughts, 
emotions and intentions to themselves.  
These deficits are not unique to ASD. A recent meta-analysis of 34 studies 
showed a robust ToM impairment in bipolar disorder compared to healthy 
controls, with a moderate effect size (Cohen’s d = 0.63; Bora et al., 2016). A 
meta-analysis examining ToM deficits in ADHD and ASD found a small 
impairment in ADHD (Cohen’s d = 0.45), although it should be noted that this 
effect was almost entirely driven by studies looking at children rather than adults 
(Cohen’s d = 0.56 and 0.04, respectively; Bora and Pantelis, 2016). When 
comparing these deficits to ASD, the authors found ASD deficits to be much 
larger than ADHD (Cohen’s d = 0.77), but it is clear that ToM deficits are 
present in ADHD. Furthermore, a meta-analysis of ToM impairments in MDD in 
18 studies also found a moderate effect size (Cohen’s d = 0.58), and that ToM 
impairments were significantly related to severity of depressive symptoms (Bora 
and Berk, 2016). Finally, a recent meta-analysis comparing ToM in ASD to 
schizophrenia patients found a very similar level of deficit in both conditions 
(Bliksted et al., 2016). The studies included in this analysis looked at the false 
attribution of intentionality to non-biological animations, so differs to those used 
in the other analyses described here. However, a meta-analysis of ToM in first-
episode psychosis and ultra-high risk for psychosis found a large impairment 
(Cohen’s d = 1.0) and small impairment (Cohen’s d = 0.45) respectively, looking 
at studies using tasks more similar to the other analyses discussed above (Bora 
and Pantelis, 2016). In summary, it is clear that ToM deficits exist in a range of 
disorders, with the largest deficits seen in psychosis. 
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Changes in empathic response have also been seen in a number of psychiatric 
conditions. A meta-analysis of 37 studies showed that schizophrenia patients 
score lower than healthy controls in affective empathy tasks, with an effect size 
of g = 0.36 (Hedge’s g is equivalent to Cohen’s d, with an added correction for 
small sample size). Studies have found cognitive empathy deficits in Asperger’s 
syndrome and ASD, and affective empathy deficits specific to emotions of 
negative valence in ASD (Dziobek et al., 2008; Mazza et al., 2014). Both 
affective and cognitive empathy deficits were seen in borderline personality 
disorder (Dziobek et al., 2011). It is interesting that while a number of conditions 
show alterations in empathic response, the nature of these differ across 
conditions. This could be a sign of the difficulty in defining empathy (Bernhardt 
and Singer, 2012), a difference in the illness-specific mechanisms underlying 
the deficits, or both. 
Facial affect recognition deficits have also been demonstrated in a number of 
psychiatric conditions. Meta-analyses of MDD, ADHD and ASD have all found 
deficits in patients compared to healthy controls (Bora and Pantelis, 2016; Dalili 
et al., 2015; Lozier et al., 2014). Dalili et al. (2015) provided evidence for a 
deficit of recognising five of the six ‘basic’ emotions (happy, anger, fear, 
surprise, disgust; Hedge’s g range: -0.17 to -0.42), but not for the recognition of 
sadness, in patients with MDD. Bora and Pantelis (2016) demonstrate a small 
deficit in the recognition of emotions in ADHD, with the strongest deficits being 
for anger and fear. Anger, fear and surprise were shown by Lozier et al. (2014) 
to have reduced recognition in ASD. Schizophrenia shows the most pronounced 
emotion recognition deficits. Two meta-analyses found large deficits in facial 
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affect recognition in schizophrenia (Kohler et al., 2010; Savla et al., 2013). 
Kohler et al. (2010) reported a Cohen’s d of 0.89, while Savla and colleages 
(2013) reported a Hedge’s g of 0.89. These meta-analyses included both 
medicated and unmedicated patients. Kohler et al. (2010) additionally reported 
that when restricted to unmedicated patients the effect size rose to 1.41.  
Having established the prevalence of social cognition deficits across psychiatric 
illness, the next section will address the efficacy of medication in treating one of 
these deficits; that of facial affect recognition in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia is 
a condition which has been treated pharmacologically for decades (Insel, 2010). 
As such, there is the potential for many studies relating to treatment outcome. 
While antipsychotic medication has a clear effect on the positive symptoms, 
there is little or no effect on cognitive processes (Vingerhoets et al., 2013). The 
effect of antipsychotic medication on social processing has not been 
quantitatively assessed. When choosing a domain of social cognition to 
investigate with regards treatment effects, it soon became clear that facial affect 
processing had the largest number of studies eligible for such an analysis. 
Furthermore, as described above, research has shown a large effect size for 




1.4 Treatment of social cognitive deficits (meta-analysis) 
This section includes work published in the Journal of Psychopharmacology: 
Gabay AS, Kempton MJ, Mehta MA (2015) Facial affect processing deficits in 
schizophrenia: a meta-analysis of antipsychotic treatment effects. J 
Psychopharmacol vol. 29 (2) 224-229. 
1.4.1 Abstract of meta-analysis 
Social cognition, including emotion processing, is a recognised deficit observed 
in patients with schizophrenia. It is one cognitive domain which has been 
emphasised as requiring further investigation, with the efficacy of antipsychotic 
treatment on this deficit remaining unclear. Nine studies met our criteria for 
entry into a meta-analysis of the effects of medication on facial affect 
processing, including data from 1162 patients and six antipsychotics. Overall we 
found a small, positive effect (Hedge’s g = 0.13, 95% CI 0.05 to 0.21, p = 
0.002). In a subgroup analysis this was statistically significant for atypical, but 
not typical, antipsychotics. It should be noted that the pooled sample size of the 
typical subgroup was significantly lower than the atypical. Meta-regression 
analyses revealed that age, gender and changes in symptom severity were not 
moderating factors. For the small, positive effect on facial affect processing, 
the clinical significance is questionable in terms of treating deficits in emotion 
identification in schizophrenia. We show that antipsychotic medications are poor 
at improving facial affect processing compared to reducing symptoms. This 
highlights the need for further investigation into the neuropharmacological 
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mechanisms associated with accurate emotion processing, to inform treatment 
options for these deficits in schizophrenia. 
 
1.4.2 Introduction to meta-analysis 
Antipsychotic medication is used to treat positive symptoms in schizophrenia 
(National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, 2014).  However, deficits in 
social cognition have been shown to be strongly associated with functional 
outcome (Green et al., 2004), and is one of eight domains identified by the 
initiative "Measurement and Treatment Research to Improve Cognition in 
Schizophrenia" (MATRICS), which require further investigation and treatment 
strategies (Nuechterlein et al., 2004). 
In a review of the literature, Kucharska-Pietura and Mortimer (Kucharska-
Pietura and Mortimer, 2013) concluded that antipsychotics are unlikely to 
facilitate the recovery of social cognition deficits in schizophrenia based on a 
review of 15 articles. By far the most widely studied aspect of social cognition is 
emotion processing, which is typically assessed using tasks requiring 
participants to perceive, identify and discriminate between facial emotion 
expressions.  A deficit in these abilities has consistently been found in 
schizophrenia (Kohler et al., 2010; Savla et al., 2013).  In a review specific to 
the facial affect recognition literature, Hempel et al. concluded, based on eight 
studies, that antipsychotic medication does not successfully treat this aspect of 
schizophrenia (Hempel et al., 2010).  
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While these reviews provide valuable descriptions of the relevant literature, they 
are unable to provide a quantitative analysis of the effects of antipsychotic 
medication on these cognitive deficits.  It also remains possible that the effects 
of treatment may be small, or affected by moderating factors such as age, 
gender or type of medication.  In order to address these questions we have 
performed a meta-analysis of studies specifically investigating the effects of 
antipsychotics on emotion processing in schizophrenia. For details of the 
methods, literature search and included studies please see Appendix A. 
 
1.4.3 Results of meta-analysis 
1.4.3.1 Overall meta-analysis 
The overall pooled Hedge’s g was 0.13 (95% CI 0.05 – 0.21, p = 0.002; see 
Figure 1-1). Here, a positive effect size represents an improvement in facial 
affect recognition following treatment. There was no significant overall between-
study heterogeneity (p = 0.85), and no evidence of publication bias (p = 0.49).  
1.4.3.2 Subgroup analyses 
There was no statistically significant effect when the analysis was restricted to 
typical antipsychotics (Hedge’s g = 0.17, 95% CI -0.09 to 0.43, p = 0.16). This 
group showed no significant between-study heterogeneity (p = 0.16), and no 




When the analysis was restricted to atypical antipsychotics, the pooled Hedge’s 
g was statistically significant, at 0.11 (95% CI 0.02 – 0.21, p = 0.01). There was 
no significant between-study heterogeneity (p = 1.0), and no evidence of 
publication bias (p = 0.15). This analysis included data from 896 participants. 
1.4.3.3 Meta-regression 
We carried out meta-regression analyses to assess the influence of age, 
gender, duration of treatment, and change in positive and negative symptoms, 
on the effect size. We were unable to obtain a breakdown of age and gender 
data across drugs for one study (Penn et al., 2009), and gender data from 
another (S. Lewis and Garver, 1995). From the nine studies, we were able to 
obtain pre and post symptom scores from only five, comprising data from 388 
patients (the overall effect size for facial affect processing remained significant 
for this subset of studies, Hedge’s g = 0.15, p = 0.03). With the exception of one 
study (n = 26; Bediou et al., 2007), these data came from studies investigating 
atypical antipsychotics (Behere et al., 2009; Cabral-Calderin et al., 2010a; 
Daros et al., 2014; Harvey et al., 2006). Four of these five studies reported pre- 
and post-Positive and Negative Symptom Scale (PANSS) (positive and 
negative symptom scales) data, while one reported data for the Scale for the 
Assessment of Negative Symptoms (SANS) and Scale for the Assessment of 
Positive Symptoms (SAPS). Percentage change in symptom scores were 
entered into the meta-regression, thus making these two scales comparable. 
The meta-regression analyses suggest that neither age nor gender act as a 
moderator of effect size (p = 0.13 and p = 0.49, respectively). Furthermore, 
duration of treatment did not act as a moderator of effect size (p = 0.48). In 
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addition, changes in positive and negative symptoms were not moderators (p = 
0.83 and p = 0.97, respectively). That is to say, although these studies did 
report an improvement in both positive and negative symptoms from baseline to 
follow-up, the analyses suggest that the observed change in overall effect size 




Figure 1-1: Forest plot and table displaying results of the meta-analysis. Data identified by study 
first author and antipsychotic investigated. X-axis displays Hedge’s g. Orange data points are 
atypical antipsychotics, blue represent typical antipsychotics. The red diamond gives the weighted 
overall effect size. 
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1.4.4 Discussion of meta-analysis 
We present data from the first meta-analysis of the effects of antipsychotic 
medication on emotion processing deficits in schizophrenia. We found a small, 
positive effect on facial affect processing tasks (Hedge’s g = 0.13). Subgroup 
analyses suggest that this positive effect is largely driven by atypical rather than 
typical antipsychotics. However, given the smaller sample size of the typical 
subgroup, we cannot rule out the possibility that there was not enough statistical 
power to identify the small effect in this group. 
It is important to note that the overall effect size is particularly small. In a meta-
analysis of facial affect identification deficits in schizophrenia, Kohler et al. 
reported a Cohen’s d of -0.89, rising to -1.41 when restricted to unmedicated 
patients (Kohler et al., 2010). Thus, it is questionable whether the effect we 
found in the current analysis would be clinically significant in terms of treating 
deficits in emotional function. Indeed, a recent multiple-treatments meta-
analysis of the efficacy of 15 antipsychotics showed Hedge’s g ranging from -
0.33 to -0.88 (median -0.44) for reducing symptoms compared to placebo 
(Leucht et al., 2013). It is clear that in comparison, antipsychotic medications 
are poor at improving facial affect processing deficits. Therefore, it is important 
to establish the neural mechanisms by which these deficits occur, as well as the 
small improvements seen with existing treatments, in order to inform better 
pharmacological targets. 
The beneficial effect of antipsychotics on positive symptoms is believed to be 
due to their antagonistic action at dopamine D2 receptors (Seeman, 2004). It 
has been argued that dopamine plays an important role in emotion processing 
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and recognition, and that emotion processing deficits in schizophrenia are 
associated with altered activity in the amygdala and prefrontal cortex (PFC) 
(Salgado-Pineda et al., 2005). Evidence suggests that individual differences in 
performance during processing of emotionally-relevant stimuli are associated 
with two different polymorphisms related to the dopamine D2 receptor gene 
(Blasi et al., 2009; Peciña et al., 2013). These are linked to differences in 
activity in the amygdala, PFC and anterior cingulate cortex. Thus, the 
dopaminergic effect of antipsychotic medication may play a role in the small 
changes in facial affect processing seen in the present study. 
Stip et al. (Stip et al., 2005) provide data that suggest that treatment with 
quetiapine improves emotion processing in schizophrenia patients with blunted 
affect, and that this improvement is associated with modulation of neural activity 
in the PFC. Conversely, studies using antipsychotic medication in healthy 
participants have suggested that D2 antagonism impairs facial affect processing 
(Gibbs et al., 2010; Lawrence et al., 2002), although the medications used in 
those studies (sulpiride and amisulpride) were not represented in the sample of 
studies included in the current meta-analysis. These results highlight the 
subtleties of dopamine D2 receptor involvement in affective processing. 
Other mechanisms by which antipsychotics may have an effect on facial effect 
processing are via serotoninergic action. Serotonin has been implicated as 
being key to emotion processing in a number of studies (Browning et al., 2007; 
Chen et al., 2008; Fu et al., 2007; Hornboll et al., 2013). These studies have 
largely involved administration of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) 
to healthy individuals, as well as in depression studies. The serotonin 2A 
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receptor (5-HT2A) has particularly been associated with alterations in emotion 
processing, as shown in studies investigating facial affect processing using 
ketanserin, a 5-HT2A receptor antagonist (Hornboll et al., 2013; Kometer et al., 
2012). Serotonergic action could explain the difference in efficacy between 
typical and atypical antipsychotics, as many atypicals act on 5-HT2A receptors. 
There are surprisingly few pharmacological studies specifically investigating the 
effects of medication on facial affect processing, and emotion processing as a 
whole in schizophrenia. As such, the scope of the present analysis is restricted 
to the nine studies returned by the literature search. However, these studies 
included a combined total of 1162 patients. It is the nature of meta-analyses 
that one is limited by the data available, and by the design of the studies 
included. Some of the included studies used a naturalistic approach to dosage, 
and only three (Harvey et al., 2006; Penn et al., 2009; Sergi et al., 2007) were 
double-blind, randomised-control studies. Despite this variability in study design 
there was no statistically significant heterogeneity seen in the meta-analysis, 
increasing confidence in its findings. Also, in this meta-analysis all emotional 
expressions were pooled. Although this may add additional heterogeneity, this 
was necessary due to the relatively small number of studies available. Ethical 
and practical considerations limit the use of placebo-controlled studies in 
patients with schizophrenia and so direct comparisons of medication and 
placebo within patient groups was not possible. Furthermore, additional 
analyses investigating how changes in facial affect processing varied with other 
cognitive processing measures would be useful. However, few of the included 
studies reported such measures, and for those that did there was inconsistency 
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in the scales used. Meta-regression analysis assessing the potential modulatory 
effect of duration of illness may also have been informative. Unfortunately this 
information was not broken down by medication in a sufficient number of 
included studies for such an analysis to be carried out. Finally, it should be 
noted that, as all of the studies used a pre-post design, the effects of learning 
cannot be ruled out. 
1.4.5 Conclusion of meta-analysis 
This study presents the first meta-analysis of the effects of antipsychotic 
medication on facial affect processing. We found a small, positive effect of 
antipsychotics, substantially lower than both the size of the typical deficit seen 
in schizophrenia and the efficacy for symptoms reduction, questioning the likely 
clinical significance. Subgroup analyses suggest the small positive effect is 
driven by atypical rather than typical antipsychotics, although the difference 
between the two treatment classes was not significant. Given the small effect 
size it is important that research continues to investigate the neural and 
neuropharmacological mechanisms associated with accurate emotion 
processing, in an attempt to inform further treatment options for these deficits in 




1.5 Social decision-making  
1.5.1 What is social decision-making? 
On one hand, social decision-making can be seen as a field of research which 
attempts to bridge the gap between aspects of social cognition which are 
generally studied in isolation; such as theory of mind, empathy and emotion 
processing. Navigating the real-life, complex, social world relies on the interplay 
of a number of different social cognitive processes, and the field attempts to 
investigate some of the mechanisms of this interaction. On the other hand, 
social decision-making can be seen from an evolutionary perspective, 
attempting to answer the question of how cooperative mechanisms can evolve 
in a population of individuals for whom self-interest intuitively appears the best 
strategy. In order to consider the details of the former, it helps to have an 
appreciation of the latter. The following discussion references a number of tasks 
used in social decision-making studies. Figure 1-2 summarises these tasks, 
which can be played as either iterated or single-shot games. A single-shot 
game is when two players interact only once, while iterated refers to repeated 










Figure 1-2 (continued): Explanation of four commonly used social decision-making tasks 
(continued from previous page) 
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Rand and Nowark (2013) provide a simple definition of cooperation as “one 
individual pay[ing] a cost for another to receive a benefit” (p.413). Social 
dilemmas occur when “there is tension between what is good for the individual 
and what is good for the population” (Rand and Nowak, 2013; p. 413). For 
example, in the classic Public Goods Game (PGG) a group of individuals pay 
an amount into a public pot. The total contribution of all players is then 
multiplied by a constant and then redistributed evenly amongst players. There is 
a clear temptation for each individual to ‘defect’ – pay nothing into the pot and 
reap the benefits of the other players’ cooperation. Here, the defector would 
gain at the expense of the group. Typically, players are blind to each other’s 
decisions, but this can be part of the experimental manipulation. This is a multi-
player version of the two-player game, the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In this game 
players can either cooperate or defect, with each player’s payoff dependant on 
the combination of decisions. Figure 1-2 shows the payoff matrix for a typical 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. As an example, both players choosing to cooperate will 
give them each 90 points. If one player cooperates while the other defects, the 
cooperative player would receive 30 points, with the non-cooperative player 
receiving 120 points. Mutual defection gives each player 60 points. It is clear 
that here, again, the best outcome for all concerned is mutual cooperation, but 
cooperation opens oneself up to being taken advantage of.  
It has been argued that in the absence of the evolution of a ‘cooperative 
mechanism’, natural selection favours defectors in populations where all 
individuals are as likely to interact with any other individual (Dreber et al., 2008; 
Nowak, 2006; Rand and Nowak, 2013). Five such mechanisms have been 
47 
 
proposed, including direct and indirect reciprocity, whereby repeated 
interactions and reputation effects come into play (Nowak, 2006). An example 
of direct reciprocity would be if Player A cooperates with Player B in response to 
Player B having cooperated in the previous round. Indirect reciprocity is when 
one bases their cooperative behaviour on knowledge of the interacting partner’s 
cooperation with previous partners – this is where reputation comes into play. 
‘Altruistic punishment’ is the costly punishment of another agent’s behaviour, 
and is repeatedly seen in social decision-making tasks (Camerer, 2003; Civai, 
2013; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Güth et al., 1982; 
Jordan et al., 2016, 2016; Rand et al., 2013; Sanfey, 2003). It has been argued 
that the evolution of altruistic punishment can maintain a higher level of 
cooperation in larger group sizes than in its absence, although it is not 
considered necessary for cooperation (Boyd et al., 2003).  
If evolutionary mechanisms have promoted cooperative social behaviour, it 
follows that there are individual-level mechanisms which lead to these 
behaviours. The next section reviews the evidence that these behaviours occur, 
and discusses the tasks used to build this evidence. Following that, I will focus 
on two specific tasks, the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Ultimatum Game, and 
consider possible mechanisms underlying these behaviours. 
1.5.2 Evidence for cooperation and altruistic punishment 
Trust plays a crucial role in almost all social relationships. Trust can be defined 
as the “willingness to take the social risk of helping another despite the 
possibility of non-reciprocation” (Rilling and Sanfey, 2011; p. 28). While a 
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separate concept to cooperation, it undoubtedly underlies decisions to 
cooperate.  
The social decision-making field uses a number of tasks borrowed from 
behavioural economics. The Trust Game is a task in which one player (the 
investor) is given a sum of money and is given the option to transfer a 
proportion to another player (the trustee). Once transferred, the money is 
multiplied by a constant, and the trustee has the opportunity to return money to 
the investor. For example, Player A is given £10 and decides to send £5 to 
Player B. This then gets multiplied by three, meaning Player B receives £15. 
Player B then has the decision whether to return some of this to Player A. By 
investing, the investor takes a social risk that the trustee will not return any of 
the money. The trustee has the opportunity to behave in self-interest, or 
cooperatively to the benefit of both. The game-theoretical prediction is that in a 
one-off interaction with a stranger, the trustee should not return any money, and 
knowing this the investor should choose not to invest any money in the trustee. 
However, evidence shows that people behave in both trustful (by investing) and 
trustworthy (by returning) ways in single-shot versions of this game far more 
frequently than predicted by game theory (e.g. Berg et al., 1995; Camerer, 
2003; Espín et al., 2016; Krueger et al., 2007), supporting the idea that trust 
could be a mechanism underlying humans’ propensity to cooperate rather than 
act in self-interest. 
Similarly, in the Pubic Goods Game described in the previous section, the game 
theoretic ‘rational’ choice in both a one-off interaction and repeated interactions 
would be to defect and pay no money into the public pot, thus benefiting from 
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others’ cooperation. However, while there is large variation in how people 
behave, there is a high rate of cooperation at the beginning of these games 
(Camerer, 2003; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Ledyard, 1994). Here, trust that other 
people will behave cooperatively underlies the decision to cooperate oneself, 
rather than defect, and perhaps it is due to the erosion of this trust through 
repeated play that causes these cooperation rates to decrease in finite-length 
games. 
1.5.2.1 The Ultimatum Game 
Parts of this section have been published in the journal Neuroscience and 
Biobehavioural Reviews: Gabay AS, Radua J, Kempton MJ, Mehta MA (2015) 
The Ultimatum Game and the brain: A meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies. 
Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev 47, 549–558. 
The Ultimatum Game (UG) is one of the most frequently used tasks in recent 
social decision-making studies. In the game one player acts as proposer and 
another acts as responder. The proposer is given a sum of money and is asked 
to split this with the responder. The proposer is typically given a range of 
options as to how to split the sum, but in all cases must offer some, but not all, 
of the money. The responder can either accept the division of money, in which 
case both players receive the amount proposed, or they can reject it, in which 
case neither player receives any money at all. 
According to Rational Choice and Expected Utility Theory, a rational responder 
in the UG should accept any amount offered by the proposer, as this will 
represent a gain. Knowing this, a rational proposer should offer the lowest 
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amount allowed by the rules, typically 10% of the total sum (Glimcher et al., 
2009). However, evidence shows that people do not behave in this way, with 
proposers typically offering closer-to-equal amounts, and responders typically 
rejecting offers they consider to be unfair. Indeed, studies suggest that while 
people accept fair, or close to fair, offers (40–50%), rejection rates gradually 
increase as the offer becomes lower (Civai et al., 2012a; C. Corradi-Dell’Acqua 
et al., 2013; Güth et al., 1982; Oosterbeek et al., 2003; Rilling and Sanfey, 
2011). This finding has been found across cultures (Henrich et al., 2005; 
although see Oosterbeek et al., 2003 for evidence to the contrary) and is 
interpreted as being a result of social influences on decision-making. This 
interpretation is supported by the consistent finding that when the same offers 
are made in a non-social control condition, typically where it is clear the offer 
has been computer-generated, rejection rates fall close to zero (e.g. Sanfey, 
2003). Thus it is suggested that responders are punishing violations of social 
norms despite the cost incurred to them, which has been argued to be an 
adaptive mechanism (Boyd et al., 2003; Nowak et al., 2000; Rand et al., 2013). 
This is an example of altruistic punishment. 
It is worth reiterating the behaviour described above. When individuals are 
offered a low, but non-zero amount of money in the context of the UG – say £1 
out of £10 – the majority will reject that offer despite the fact they will never 
again interact with the proposer. The logic behind such behaviour has been 
actively debated. The altruist argument suggests that rejection stems from the 
desire to punish proposers in the hope they will treat others more fairly in the 
future. Other considerations include punishment stemming from envy, spite, 
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selfishness, and pure fairness considerations, with disagreement in the 
literature as to which of these drive rejection behaviour (Bethwaite and 
Tompkinson, 1996; Forber and Smead, 2014; Kirchsteiger, 1994). 
Some attempts have been made to distinguish between rejection-as-emotional-
reaction to unfair treatment, and genuine fairness considerations. A series of 
studies included a third-party (TP) condition (Civai et al., 2010, 2012; Corradi-
Dell’Acqua et al., 2013). In this condition Player 1 would make an offer to Player 
2 as usual, but instead of Player 2 choosing whether or not to accept the offer, 
the study participants were asked to make the decision on behalf of Player 2. If 
the offer was accepted, it would be split as usual between Player 1 and Player 
2; if it was rejected, neither Player would receive any money. The participant 
making the decision does not receive or lose any money, regardless of the 
decision made. These studies all found that participants would reject low offers, 
even when they were not directed at themselves. Furthermore, in one of these 
studies it was found that participants would reject hyper-fair offers (80-90%) in 
the TP condition but not when the offer is directed at the self (Civai et al., 
2012a). The results from these studies suggest that rejection behaviour in the 
UG is due to fairness considerations, yet these only override self-interest up to 
a point. 
Sanfey et al. (2003) were the first to investigate the neural bases of decision-
making in the UG. They argue that the decision to forego a financial gain is a 
response to the negative emotion elicited by unfair treatment. In order to 
investigate this, neural activity following receipt of unfair offers was contrasted 
with activity following fair offers. In this study, offers of 30% or below of the total 
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stake were considered unfair. The authors discussed increased activations 
seen in the anterior cingulate cortex, anterior insula, and the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex. They suggest that anterior insula activity was predictive of the 
decision to reject an unfair offer, and argued that this area not only represented 
the negative emotion associated with unfairness, but also drove the decision to 
reject unfair offers. 
Many neuroimaging studies have followed from this seminal study, investigating 
variables such as the context of gain or loss (Guo et al., 2013a; Tomasino et al., 
2013a), variations across the lifespan (Katia M. Harlé and Sanfey, 2012) and 
the influence of competition (Halko et al., 2009a) and emotional states 
(Grecucci et al., 2013; Katia M. Harlé et al., 2012) on UG behaviour.  
In 0, I present a quantitative analysis of neuroimaging findings in the UG field. 
1.5.2.2 The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) has long been studied. In this two-player game, 
participants are simultaneously asked to cooperate or defect. Points are 
awarded based on the combination of responses. Figure 1-2 displays the payoff 
matrix for the game. A true Prisoner’s Dilemma obeys the condition that T > R > 
P > S, and that 2R > T + S (letters represent points award for different 
combinations of decision, as explained in Figure 1-2). Therefore it is clear that 
mutual cooperation is the best outcome for all involved, as the sum of points 
rewarded for mutual cooperation (2R) is larger than the sum of points of a 
defect and cooperative decision (T + S); this is true for both repeated, single-
shot games, and in iterative games. However, according to rational choice 
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theory, in both single-shot and finitely-repeated games, mutual defection is the 
only rational outcome (Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; 
Colman, 2003; Cooper et al., 1996), as cooperation opens oneself up to being 
taken advantage of. 
Despite mutual defection being the rational choice outcome, in a landmark 
study by Robert Axelrod it was shown that cooperation cannot only emerge, but 
flourish (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). This is based on the concept of the 
‘shadow of the future’, which states that with increasing probability of players 
meeting each other again, cooperation becomes beneficial. Axelrod held a 
computer tournament where programmes employing a range of strategies 
played iterated PDs. Evidence for the benefit of cooperation comes from the 
success of the Tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy, which opens with a cooperative 
decision then repeats the decision of the other player from the previous round. 
A large meta-analysis of studies with human participants playing the PD 
showed that the highest frequency of studies found 30-40% cooperation rates 
(Sally, 1995; Figure 2 p. 63). This included both single-shot and iterated games. 
Therefore, not only are cooperative strategies successful when programmed by 
computer scientists, game theorists, and interested amateurs who have deep 
knowledge of strategic benefits and pitfalls (as in Axelrod’s experiments); they 
are also seen in participants drawn from the general populace. This is 
significant because reciprocal cooperation is present in many real-world social 
interactions, and the PD is believed to be a simplistic, but effective model of 
these (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Rand and Nowak, 2013; James K. Rilling et 
al., 2008; Rilling and Sanfey, 2011). 
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A number of functional neuroimaging studies have investigated the neural 
mechanisms underlying PD behaviour. A series of studies from Rilling has 
pointed to a role for the reward system in reciprocal cooperation in both iterated 
and single-shot paradigms (Rilling et al., 2002, 2004a, 2004b, 2008). When 
receiving feedback of mutual cooperation, there was increased activity in the 
orbitofrontal cortex and ventral striatum, as well as somatosensory association 
cortex. These activations were interpreted as signalling reward to reciprocal 
cooperation and the emotional response related  to it (Rilling et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, when looking at ventromedial prefrontal cortex as regions of 
interest, it was found that the BOLD signal of these regions increased in 
response to reciprocal cooperation, but decreased when participants received 
feedback of non-reciprocated cooperation (defection of the other player having 
cooperated oneself; Rilling et al., 2004a). This was interpreted as signalling a 
prediction error, as is seen in non-human primates in probabilistic reward 
paradigms. The involvement of these reward-related areas has been 
corroborated by others (Gradin et al., 2016; Suzuki et al., 2011). 
Other regions found during PD paradigms are areas typically found in social 
cognition tasks, the superior temporal gyrus, temporal-parietal junction, and 
posterior cingulate gyrus, interpreted as being involved in processing the 
intentionality of the other player (Rilling et al., 2004; Suzuki et al., 2011). 
Anterior insula cortex activity has been found in response to unreciprocated 
cooperation (James K. Rilling et al., 2008) and when contrasting incongruous 
outcomes compared to congruous ones (Gradin et al., 2016), which could signal 
a negative emotional response to the outcome.  
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Finally, increased right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) activation was 
found by Suzuki et al. (2011) during the decision phase when participants were 
playing with mostly defecting opponents compared to mostly cooperating 
opponents. The authors suggest this is involved in the inhibition of the 
instinctive urge to cooperate. Left DLPFC activation was seen when Gradin et 
al. (2016) compared outcomes where one player defected and the other 
cooperated to those where they both cooperated or defected. Here this 
activation was interpreted as being involved in emotion regulation following an 
aversive outcome.  
1.5.3 Social decision-making in psychiatric illness 
The complexity of social dysfunction in psychiatric illness is coming under 
greater scrutiny (Kupferberg et al., 2016; Nuechterlein et al., 2004). In line with 
this, there have been a number of papers published in the last ten years 
investigating social decision-making in psychiatric populations. In this section I 
will discuss this literature with respect to the four psychiatric conditions with the 
most published social decision-making research: major depressive disorder, 
schizophrenia, borderline personality disorder, and autism spectrum disorders. 
It will become clear that social decision-making tasks have the potential to 
elucidate how social processing alterations in psychiatric illness can manifest in 
ecologically valid interpersonal interactions. The studies discussed below are 




Table 1-1: Summary of behavioural findings from studies investigating social decision-making in 
psychiatric conditions. MDD: major depressive disorder; ASD: autism spectrum disorders; UG: ultimatum 




Medication status not reported 





Destoop et al 2012; 
Gradin et al 2014U; 
Harlé et al 2010U; Pulcu 
et al, 2015; Radke et al 
2013; Scheele et al 
2013; Wang et al 2014 
Equal number of studies reporting 
increased rejection rates as those 
reporting no change in rejection 
rate. One study reports reduced 





Gradin et al 2016U; 
Pulcu et al 2015; 
McClure et al 2007U 
Two studies found no changes in 
cooperation compared to controls. 
One study found increased 
defection in currently depressed 






Csukly et al 2011; 
Wischniewski & Brüne 
2011; de la Asuncio 
2015 
Two studies found decreased 
rejection of unfair offers compared 
to controls. One of these also 
reported increased rejection of fair 
offers. The third also reported 
increased rejection of fair offers, but 
in the absence of changes in 







Unoka et al 2009; 
Franzen et al 2011; 
King-Casas et al 2008 
All studies reported reduced trusting 
behaviour, although one found this 
was only in response to 
untrustworthy faces 




Saunders et al 2015 
Reported reduced cooperative 
behaviour compared to healthy 







Ewing et al 2015U; Chiu 
et al 2008 
No differences in trusting behaviour 
reported between ASD and typically 
developing children, although one 
study suggested differential 





Downs & Smith 2004N; 
Li et al 2014N 
One study found no difference in 
cooperativeness between ASD and 
typically developing children. The 
other showed that ASD children did 
not discriminate based on reputation 




1.5.3.1 Major depressive disorder 
The Ultimatum Game 
Major depressive disorder (MDD) is associated with a number of social 
cognitive deficits (Kupferberg et al., 2016). There are many studies investigating 
social decision-making in MDD, using the Ultimatum Game (UG; Destoop et al., 
2012; Gradin et al., 2014; Harlé et al., 2010; Pulcu et al., 2015; Radke et al., 
2013; Scheele et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2014), Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD; Gradin 
et al., 2016; Pulcu et al., 2015) and Trust Game (TG; Cáceda et al., 2014). The 
findings of these studies are difficult to interpret due to their variability, although 
a recent review concludes that there are significant alterations in these tasks in 
MDD (Wang et al., 2015). 
Three studies have found that MDD patients show increased rejection rates of 
unfair offers (Radke et al., 2013; Scheele et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2014). 
Scheele et al. (2013) had inpatients complete the UG soon after admission, and 
again approximately 40 days later. In addition to finding differences between 
patients and healthy controls, they found no differences across sessions, nor 
any difference between treatment responders and non-responders. In this 
study, there was no difference in fairness ratings of unfair offers between 
patients and controls, suggesting this was not a factor in the differences in 
rejection rates. This was not the case for patients in the study by Wang et al., 
who not only found increased rejection rates of unfair offers, but also reduced 
fairness judgements of those offers (Wang et al., 2014). Radke et al. found that 
MDD patients not only rejected more unfair offers, but also hyper-fair offers, 
possibly suggesting an increased sensitivity to fairness considerations (Radke 
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et al., 2013). All three of these studies included currently depressed patients on 
medication at the time of the study. A study investigating unmedicated students 
with clinically significant symptoms of depression (as assessed by clinical 
psychologists in the study team) found decreased rejection rates of unfair offers 
(Harlé et al., 2010). 
In contrast to the above, other studies have found no difference in rejection 
rates of unfair offers in MDD (Destoop et al., 2012; Gradin et al., 2014; Pulcu et 
al., 2015). Gradin et al. did, however, find differences in the neural responses to 
different offers between healthy controls and MDD patients (Gradin et al., 
2014). The authors report that in MDD, the nucleus accumbens and dorsal 
caudate did not increase activity in line with increasing offer as much as healthy 
controls, suggesting alterations in processing of reward. While no differences 
were found in rejection rates between MDD patients and healthy controls, 
Destroop et al did report higher offers when patients acted as proposers 
(Destoop et al., 2012). Here, the authors suggested this could be due to an 
increase in harm avoidance, with rejection being considered a possible harm. It 
should also be noted that these authors used a two-round design, where 
participants first responded to an offer, then made an offer to the same player. 
As the authors note, this may have led to patients rejecting less than they would 
otherwise, to avoid a rejection of their own offer. These studies also had a mix 
of medicated and unmedicated patients. 
Medication should be very carefully considered when looking at UG results in 
MDD, as it has been shown that acute SSRI administration can alter UG 
behaviour by reducing rejection rates of moderately unfair offers (Crockett et al., 
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2010; see Section 1.6 for more details). Medications being taken by patients in 
the studies discussed were not limited to antidepressants, but also included 
antipsychotics and benzodiazepines. As such, difference in the medications 
across studies could be a key factor in the heterogeneity of the results found in 
these studies. 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma  
Two studies found no difference in overall cooperativeness in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma between MDD patients and healthy controls (Gradin et al., 2016; 
McClure et al., 2007). McClure et al. investigated a sample of mixed 
depressive/anxiety disorder patients, and found that while there was no overall 
difference in cooperativeness, the patient group were more likely to cooperate 
following co-player cooperation in the previous round. This may suggest that 
patients were less likely to take advantage of other players. Patients in both of 
these studies were medication free. Pulcu et al (2015), on the other hand, 
showed that currently depressed patients defected more than remitted patients. 
1.5.3.2 Schizophrenia 
The Ultimatum Game 
Three studies have found alterations in UG behaviour in schizophrenia patients 
(Csukly et al., 2011; de la Asuncion et al., 2015; Wischniewski and Brüne, 
2011). Two of these studies found decreases in rejection rates of low offers by 
schizophrenia patients compared to healthy controls (Csukly et al., 2011; 
Wischniewski and Brüne, 2011). In addition, Csukly et al. (2011) reported 
increased rejection rates of fair offers. Wischniewski and Brüne (2011) found 
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that there was no difference between patients and controls in fairness 
comprehension in a modified Dictator Game, suggesting that the change in 
rejection rates in the UG do not reflect differences in the concept of fairness. 
The increased rejection of fair offers in patients compared to controls was also 
seen in another study, but in the absence of a statistically significant reduction 
in unfair offer rejections (de la Asuncion et al., 2015).  
Unfortunately these studies did not include a non-social control condition. Such 
a condition would involve participants being told that the offers are randomly 
generated by a computer, rather than offers being made by another person. 
Had such a condition been included in these studies it would be easier to 
disentangle the processes behind the rejection of fair offers. 
1.5.3.3 Borderline personality disorder 
The Trust Game 
In a study investigating Trust Game (TG) behaviour in borderline personality 
disorder (BPD), Unoka et al ( 2009) found reduced investments as Player 1 in 
the game, compared to both healthy controls and patients with MDD. No 
difference was seen between MDD and healthy controls. While patients were 
not medication free, similar medications were taken across patient groups. In 
this study, there was a control task which was identical to the TG, but rather 
than the trustee returning money, investors would invest in a random lottery. No 
differences were seen in this game across groups, suggesting the reduced 
investment in BPD represented a lower level of trust. 
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In a repeated TG, BPD patients reduced their investment to untrustworthy 
trustees displaying angry faces, while healthy controls only did this in response 
to neutral faces (Franzen et al., 2011). The authors of the study point to the 
hyper-vigilance of BDP patients to social stimuli, particularly when the stimuli 
signals threat or rejection (Linehan, 1995; cited by Franzen et al., 2011). 
Reduced trusting behaviour of BPD patients was also seen when acting as 
investors in an earlier study, which paralleled this finding to reduced self-
reported interpersonal trust, compared to healthy controls (King-Casas et al., 
2008). In this study, patients also played a repeated TG acting as trustees. 
Using the amount invested in trustees as a measure of ongoing cooperation, 
these authors report that healthy investors invest similar amounts in both 
patients and healthy controls in early rounds of the game. However, as the 
game progressed, cooperation was not maintained with BPD patients, 
evidenced by a significant decrease in investment compared with controls. 
Through a thorough exploration of the data, the authors show that while 
breaches in trust occur in both groups, attempts to repair trust through ‘coaxing’ 
– returning all of the money made by the trustee in a round – is seen less 
frequently in patients than in controls. 
King-Casas et al (2008) also showed abnormal processing of violations of social 
norms in the anterior insula compared to healthy participants. They report that 
although signal change in an insula region-of-interest tracked the amount 
returned to the investor in both groups, insula did not show higher activation in 
response to low investment compared to higher investment in the BPD group as 
it did in healthy controls. The authors report this as being evidence that low 
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investments are not considered a norm violation in patients. However, looking at 
the data behind the breakdown in cooperation, it would appear that BPD 
patients were more sensitive to the lowest investments, and sanctioned these 
by low repayments significantly more than healthy trustees. Sanctioning low 
investments or offers in economic exchange games is often considered norm 
enforcement, which suggests that, behaviourally at least, patients may be more 
sensitive to norm violations. Despite this, the lack of trust and inability to repair 
breakdowns in cooperation do suggest some altered social norm processing in 
BPD. 
The Ultimatum Game 
Rejection rates of unfair offers in an Ultimatum Game (UG) were found to be 
less in medicated BPD patients compared to healthy controls (Polgár et al., 
2014). Rejection behaviour is considered to be altruistic punishment of social 
norm violations. This finding supports the interpretation of BPD behaviour in the 
TG discussed above that BPD patients show altered processing of social 
norms. The authors of the UG study suggest reduced rejection may be 
indicative of patients’ lower expectation of positive social outcomes.  
Furthermore, it was found that the control group rejected more offers when the 
picture of the proposer displayed a negative facial expression compared to 
when displaying a positive one. This effect was not seen the BPD group. 
Unfortunately, the authors of the study did not report any comparison of facial 
affect recognition across groups in this study; previous research suggests BPD 
patients have impaired emotion processing (Derks et al., 2016; Meyer and 
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Morey, 2015). An analysis taking into account the medication of the patient 
group suggested that responses did not vary with medication. 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
One study compared behaviour in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game in 
borderline personality disorder to healthy controls and euthymic bipolar disorder 
patients (Saunders et al., 2015). It was found that the proportion of cooperative 
decisions made by borderline personality disorder patients was less than both 
healthy controls and bipolar disorder patients. No differences were seen 
between bipolar disorder and control groups. 
Interestingly, the authors report that borderline personality disorder patients 
cooperated about 50% of the time, no more than chance (Saunders et al., 
2015). Borderline personality disorder patients were also less likely to cooperate 
following a mutually cooperative round than both bipolar disorder patients and 
healthy controls. Together, these findings are interpreted as showing that 
borderline personality disorder patients have “…difficulties in establishing and 
maintaining reciprocally cooperative relationships” (p. 1597).  
With the lack of non-social control task it is again difficult to further establish the 
mechanisms underlying this altered behaviour. However, it does corroborate the 
findings from the other tasks discussed in this section, that borderline 
personality disorder shows altered social reciprocity, and that this may be due 
to a lack of trust, leading to difficulties maintaining cooperative relationships. 
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1.5.3.4 Autism spectrum disorder 
The Trust Game 
Ewing et al (2015) sought to investigate how the perception of trustworthiness 
altered behaviour as investors in a repeated, single-shot Trust Game (TG) in 
children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) compared to typically developing 
controls. By presenting pictures of the other players when participants were 
deciding how much to invest, the experimenters manipulated how trustworthy 
they appeared. They found that while overall investor behaviour was similar 
across groups, children with ASD’s investments did not change with trustworthy 
appearance, while typically developing children’s did. However, there was no 
deficit in rating the trustworthiness of each picture, and furthermore, the ASD 
group did show different investor behaviour based on reputation effects, in line 
with the findings from the control group. The authors suggest alterations in 
spontaneous inference of facial features or reduced social interest may be 
behind these findings. 
In a different study, high-functioning ASD adolescents were found to behave no 
differently to typically developing controls as trustees in a multi-round TG (Chiu 
et al., 2008). However, with a complex analysis of neuroimaging data captured 
during the task (the details of which are beyond the scope of this discussion), 
the authors show that the pattern of activity of the cingulate cortex when making 
trustee decisions failed to resemble self-specific responses seen in typically 
developing controls in another, larger dataset.  
65 
 
When considering the behavioural data, it should be noted that the size of the 
ASD samples were relatively small in both studies discussed here: 12 and nine 
(Chiu et al., 2008; Ewing et al., 2015, respectively). With that in mind, both of 
these studies suggest that overall behaviour in the TG is not different in ASD 
compared to controls, although there may be some difference in consideration 
of trustworthy appearance. 
Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Two studies have shown that very similar behaviour in the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
(PD) in ASD compared to typically developing children (Downs and Smith, 
2004; Li et al., 2014). Downs and Smith (2004) found no differences in 
cooperative behaviour between these two groups, but did find a difference 
between both of these groups and children with attention-deficit/hyperactivity 
disorder. Li et al (2014) found that when typically developing children played an 
iterated PD with other children they had seen doing ‘nice’ things previously, they 
cooperated more than with those children they had seen doing ‘naughty’ things. 
This effect was not seen in high-functioning children with ASD, despite their 
ability to correctly categorise ‘naughty’ and ‘nice’ behaviours. 
The results of these two studies suggest that on the whole, children with ASD 
behave similarly to typically developing children in the PD, but may not be able 
to fully integrate social information into their decision-making process. 
1.5.4 Conclusion 
The social decision-making field employs a number of tasks to investigate the 
processes behind complex social interactions. These tasks rely on a number of 
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social processes and model complex, abstract concepts such as trust, fairness 
and cooperation. The tasks are increasingly being used to investigate how the 
well-documented social deficits in psychiatric illnesses may come together to 
affect behaviour in ecologically valid models of social interactions. 
The studies reviewed here show a diverse range of altered behaviour in 
psychiatric conditions, and describe how these differences can be used to 
understand the idiosyncrasies of each condition. However, it is clear that while 
there are certainly hints of disrupted behaviour, more work needs to be done to 
establish the extent of the deficits and possible mechanisms underlying them. 
The variation in results described above illustrate that the field as a whole would 
greatly benefit from a meta-analysis of studies comparing social decision-
making in psychiatric populations to healthy controls. If the data permitted, 
meta-regressions of symptom scores and medication would help to elucidate 
the contribution of these factors to behaviour. In the next section I will review 
the psychopharmacological literature to establish what is known about the 





1.6 The psychopharmacology of social cognition 
As outlined in Section 1.5, research on social decision-making has begun to 
investigate how healthy individuals may differ from those with psychiatric 
conditions in terms of their social interactions. It is important that this research 
continues, in order to clarify the details of the behavioural mechanisms 
underlying any alterations. It is also of great importance to understand the 
biological mechanisms underlying these behaviours, and the variations seen 
across people. Investigating these mechanisms in healthy individuals will not 
only help to establish how the brain encodes such complex concepts as trust 
and fairness, but will also provide potential treatment targets for people in which 
alterations of these concepts disrupt their quality of life. 
Psychopharmacology provides powerful methods to investigate neural 
substrates of behaviour. By using pharmacological interventions, it is possible to 
mimic or block the effects of endogenous neurotransmitters (even limited to 
specific receptor subtypes), or regulate their availability. In doing so, one can 
elucidate the contribution of particular neurotransmitter systems and receptor 
mechanisms to cognition. In this section I will discuss psychopharmacological 
research looking at social cognition, with a particular emphasis on empathy and 
social decision-making. The discussion will be limited to those studies 
investigating these processes in healthy individuals. 
Oxytocin is a neuropeptide which has received a great deal of attention over the 
last decade for its putative effects on social cognition (for reviews, see Cochran 
et al., 2013; Guastella et al., 2010). Specifically, there is evidence that 
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intranasal oxytocin administration affects emotion recognition (Cardoso et al., 
2014; Kirkpatrick et al., 2014; Marsh et al., 2010), empathy (Bartz et al., 2010; 
Domes et al., 2007; Hurlemann et al., 2010), and social decision-making 
(Kosfeld et al., 2005; Zak et al., 2007). However, there are mixed results from 
studies investigating these effects. 
Studies suggest an effect of oxytocin on empathy, but these effects appear to 
be nuanced, while other studies did not report any affects at all. Bartz et al. 
(2010), for example, found that oxytocin administration only improved empathic 
accuracy for those with low social-cognitive competence, as measured by the 
autism spectrum quotient, a questionnaire assessing autistic traits in healthy 
individuals. Those with higher competence performed equally well on placebo 
compared to oxytocin. Hurlemann et al. (2010) reported oxytocin-driven 
improvements in emotional empathy in men but not women. Indeed, male 
emotional empathy was increased to the level seen in female participants on 
placebo. These authors reported no change in cognitive empathy (for a brief 
discussion of the categorisation of empathy, see Section 1.2). Kuypers et al 
(2014) found no changes in cognitive or emotional empathy following 
administration of oxytocin. 
A meta-analysis of the social effects of oxytocin found a small improvement in 
emotion recognition with oxytocin administration (Cohen’s d = 0.21; Bakermans-
Kranenburg and van IJzendoorn, 2013). This same meta-analysis examined 
research investigating the effect of oxytocin on trust. It did this in the context of 
differences between the effects of oxytocin on in-group and out-group trust. In 
these studies, ‘in-group’ referred to people whom the participants already knew, 
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had met, or had received positive descriptions of. The authors report a 
moderate effect size of increased in-group trust, but a non-statistically 
significant overall effect size for out-group trust (Cohen’s d = 0.43 and 0.21, 
respectively).  
Serotonin (5-HT) is a modulatory neurotransmitter whose involvement in social 
cognition and emotion is supported by the role of selective serotonin reuptake-
inhibitors (SSRI) in treating depression and anxiety disorders (Fournier et al., 
2010; Hieronymus et al., 2016). A series of studies by Crockett et al have 
implicated the serotonergic system in social decision-making (Crockett et al., 
2008; M. J. Crockett et al., 2010, 2013). Acute tryptophan depletion (ATD) is a 
method used to temporarily reduce the amount of 5-HT available, by depleting 
one of its precursor compounds (for a critical review of the method, see Young, 
2013). Two studies report that reducing 5-HT availability through ATD leads to 
increased rejection rates of moderately, but not very unfair offers (30% and 
20%, respectively) in the Ultimatum Game (UG) (Crockett et al., 2008; M. J. 
Crockett et al., 2013). Neither of these studies found a corresponding change in 
fairness ratings of these offers. Crockett et al (2013) found an increase in neural 
activity in the dorsal striatum when rejecting these unfair offers following ATD 
compared to placebo, and that the magnitude of this increase was correlated 
with the increase in rejection rate. These findings suggest that reward 
mechanisms may be behind 5-HT’s influence on social decision-making. 
Another study looked at the effect of SSRIs in the UG. Acute treatment with 
SSRIs will temporarily increase the availability of 5-HT in the synapse by 
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blocking its reuptake. Crockett et al (2010) found that acute SSRI administration 
reduced rejection rates of 30% offers.  
In line with these findings, Emanuele et al (2008) found that participants who 
accepted unfair offers and those who rejected them differed in their platelet 
serotonin levels. Those who rejected unfair offers had lower levels than those 
who accepted unfair offers. In a study of cooperativeness in an iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), Wood et al reported more nuanced effects of 5-HT 
manipulation (Wood et al., 2006). Here, the authors report that reducing 5-HT 
availability through ATD reduced the proportions of cooperative responses 
compared to increasing tryptophan (and therefore 5-HT). However, this effect 
was only seen on the first day of this crossover design study. Analysing the 
results in more detail, the authors report that participants in the ATD group on 
day one significantly increased their cooperativeness on day two, when in the 
increased tryptophan condition; those with the reverse treatment order 
maintained a relatively high cooperation rate across visits. This raises the 
possibility that participants alter behaviour with repeated exposure to the task. 
However, this may also be characterised as an interaction between treatment 
and treatment order, such that perhaps serotonin disruption alters learning 
processes in the task.  
Another pharmacological method of manipulating 5-HT availability is the 
administration of 3,4-methylenedioxy-methamphetamine (MDMA), which is a 
potent 5-HT releaser (de la Torre et al., 2004). MDMA pharmacology will be 
discussed in greater detail in Section 1.8. Studies with MDMA have found that it 
increases emotional, but not cognitive, empathy (Hysek et al., 2013; Kuypers et 
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al., 2014; Schmid et al., 2014). Furthermore, MDMA has been shown to alter 
emotion processing, as measured by facial affect recognition (Bedi et al., 2009; 
Hysek et al., 2013; Kirkpatrick et al., 2014; Schmid et al., 2014). Kirkpatrick et al 
(2014) found that MDMA increased feelings of sociability, while Hysek et al 
(2013) reported increased prosocial responses on the social value orientation 
(SVO) questionnaire in men, but not women. The SVO is a questionnaire-based 
measure of equality preferences. In a trust game, Kuypers et al (2014) reported 
no MDMA-associated changes in trust or reciprocity. 
Stewart et al (2014) reported an increase rating of trustworthiness of facial 
stimuli following acute MDMA administration compared to controls. 
Furthermore, in a Dictator Game, these participants offered more money 
compared to controls, and compared to their own non-MDMA session. In this 
game participants offer a proportion of money as in the UG, but the other player 
is unable to reject it. It is considered a measure of altruism (Rilling and Sanfey, 
2011). The authors also found a larger difference between the largest amount 
offered and lowest amount accepted by the MDMA group in the UG. While 
these data suggest an MDMA effect on social cognition, it should be noted that 
this was a naturalistic study – the MDMA taken belonged to the participants, so 
there was control of dose or purity of the drug.  
There is some evidence to suggest that MDMA’s effects on rodents are driven 
by increases in oxytocin (Ramos et al., 2013; Thompson et al., 2007). In 
humans, however, there are conflicting results in the literature. A number of 
studies report MDMA-induced increases in plasma oxytocin levels (e.g. Dumont 
et al., 2009; Hysek et al., 2013; Kuypers et al., 2014; Schmid et al., 2014)  
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Dumont et al (2009) found that increases in self-report measures of prosociality 
correlated with increased plasma oxytocin levels following MDMA 
administration. A recent study investigating the influence of variations in an 
oxytocin receptor gene found a difference of genotype on self-report measures 
of sociability while on MDMA (Bershad et al., 2016). Kirkpatrick et al (2014a) 
reported a correlation between intranasal oxytocin-induced and MDMA-induced 
subjective reports of increased playfulness and insightfulness; this was seen on 
low dose, but not a high dose of oxytocin however, leading the authors to 
acknowledge the possibility that this finding was a false positive. 
 Kuypers et al (2014) found no correlation between MDMA-induced increases in 
emotional empathy and plasma oxytocin levels. Similarly, neither Hysek et al 
(2013), Kirkpatrick et al (2014b) nor Schmid et al (2014) found any correlation 
between MDMA-induced increases in plasma oxytocin and prosocial effects. It 
is important to note that there is evidence to suggest that plasma and brain 
oxytocin levels are not related (Kagerbauer et al., 2013; Martin et al., 2014), so  
the lack of relationship between prosocial effects and plasma concentrations 
does not necessarily suggest central oxytocin release is not partially 
responsible the prosocial effects of MDMA. As such, the relationship between 
MDMA-induced increases in oxytocin and the drug’s subjective effects requires 
clarification.  
Taken together, the evidence discussed above suggests a role for 5-HT in 
social cognition. On the whole, increases in 5-HT levels appear to increase self-
report measures of prosociality. In social decision-making, there is an increase 
in cooperation and altruism, and a decrease in altruistic punishment in the UG. 
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This latter finding is harder to interpret in the context of prosociality. Crockett et 
al (2010) interpret it in terms of harm avoidance. In the context of reduced 
rejection rates being seen following training in mindfulness meditation, it has 
been interpreted as being a sign of increased cooperation (Kirk et al., 2016), 
which would fit with the findings in the PD. 
While studies investigating oxytocin and serotonin make up the majority of 
psychopharmacological research in social cognition, other mechanisms have 
been examined. Testosterone has been shown to increase the proportion of fair 
offers in the UG (Eisenegger and Naef, 2011), as well as reduce trust, but 
increase reciprocity, in the trust game (Boksem et al., 2013). Using a selective 
reuptake-inhibitor, noradrenaline (NA) was found to increase social engagement 
and cooperation (Tse and Bond, 2002), and enhance recognition of disgusted 
and happy facial expressions (Harmer et al., 2008). Furthermore, d-
amphetamine and methylphenidate, both of which have affinity for NA and 
dopamine transporters (Han and Gu, 2006), have been shown to alter emotion 
processing; Wardle and Wit (2012) showed an increased sensitivity to subtle 
facial expressions with d-amphetamine, and Hysek et al (2014) showed an 
increase recognition of sad and fearful faces with methylphenidate. 
Glutamate and γ-Aminobutyric acid (GABA) are the main excitatory and 
inhibitory neurotransmitters respectively (Stahl, 2013). Yet there is a lack of 
psychopharmacological research investigating the direct effects on social 
cognition of drugs targeting these systems in the healthy, human population. 
One study of typically developing children and those with ASD used magnetic 
resonance spectroscopy to investigate the relationship between glutamate, 
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glutamine and GABA concentrations in the pregenual anterior cingulate gyrus 
and measures of emotion recognition and social responsiveness (Cochran et 
al., 2015). They found that glutamine concentrations showed a statistically 
significant negative correlation with emotion processing, and a positive 
correlation to social reactivity, but there were no significant relationships with 
GABA. A candidate gene study found a relationship between self-reported 
altruism (which is related to processes underlying some social decision-making 
paradigms), in patients with schizophrenia, and the gene encoding the 
GABAA receptor β2 subunit (Tsang et al., 2013). 
The relative lack of evidence for the direct involvement of the glutamatergic and 
GABAergic neurotransmitter systems in social cognition should not be taken to 
mean they are not involved. Serotonin, dopamine and noradrenaline are all 
neuromodulators, meaning they will have indirect effects on other 
neurotransmitter systems.  
With the serotonin system, and its interaction with the oxytocin system, being 
most strongly implicated in social cognition, these represent good targets to 
further elucidate the psychopharmacological and neural mechanisms underlying 
cooperation, trust and fairness considerations in healthy individuals. Section 1.8 
will introduce two serotonergic compounds used in the studies whose findings 
will be reported in 0 and 0 of this thesis. Prior to this, Section 1.7 will briefly 




1.7 The serotonin system 
The serotonin (5-HT) neurotransmitter system is evolutionarily ancient (Hay-
Schmidt, 2000). It has been argued that intellectual capacities of higher 
primates have been subserved by changes in the organisation of the 5-HT 
system (Raghanti et al., 2008). 5-HT neurons originate in the raphe nuclei and 
project widely to cortical and sub-cortical regions (see Figure 1-3A; Andrade 
and Haj-Dahmane, 2013; Hornung, 2003; Stahl, 2013). There are seven main 
classes of 5-HT receptor, many with further subtypes, allowing for diverse 
downstream effects of serotonergic activity (Barnes and Sharp, 1999). Figure 
1-3B and C is reproduced from Beliveau et al (2017) and shows the distribution 
of five different 5-HT receptor subtypes across the human brain. 
Of particular interest to the current thesis are the 5-HT1A and 5-HT2A 
receptors, as well as 5-HT transporters (5-HTT). 5-HT1A receptors have been 
described as having an inhibitory action on target cells through 
hyperpolarisation and often act as autoreceptors (Hoyer et al., 2002). 5-HT2A 
receptors act to increase the intracellular concentration of calcium ions, leading 
to increased neuronal excitation, and are functionally heterogeneous (Aznar 
and Klein, 2013; Leysen, 2004). In addition to modulating a wide range of 
cortical and subcortical neurons, they have been linked to modulating the 
activity of hormones including oxytocin and prolactin (Barnes and Sharp, 1999; 
Hoyer et al., 2002; Leysen, 2004). Both of these receptor subtypes have also 
been shown to have downstream effects on cellular microstructure, leading to 
alterations in synaptic receptor organisation (Aznar and Klein, 2013). 5-HTT are 
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involved in the reuptake of serotonin from the synapse, and in this way 
modulates 5-HT availability (Rudnick, 2006). 
As described elsewhere in this chapter, the serotonergic system is strongly 
implicated in different aspects of social cognition, and Aznar and Klein (2013) 
argue that the 5-HT2A receptor underlies aspects of this through modulation of 
emotion-based actions, a view that has been supported in subsequent emotion 
and social processing studies (e.g. Hornboll et al., 2013; Preller et al., 2016; 
Schmidt et al., 2013). As such, the studies presented in this thesis utilised two 
serotonergic compounds, 3,4-methylenedioxy-methamphetamine (MDMA) and 
psilocybin (4-phosphoryloxy-N,N-dimethyltryptamine). These will be introduced 





Figure 1-3: A) Diagram showing serotonergic projections from the raphe nuclei to the PFC, 
striatum, thalamus and other subcortical regions B) Reproduced with permission from Beliveau et 
al (2017), Figure 2: displays average density maps for five 5-HT targets on the common FreeSurfer 
surface; C) Reproduced with permission from Beliveau et al (2017), Figure 3: displays average 
density maps for five 5-HT targets on the common MNI152 space (coronal, upper, z = 8mm and 




1.8 3,4-methylenedioxy-methamphetamine and psilocybin  
1.8.1 3,4-methylenedioxy-methamphetamine 
3,4-methylenedioxy-methamphetamine (MDMA) is a popular recreational drug 
which has variously been called an empathogen (Bedi et al., 2010), entactogen 
(Sumnall, 2006), and the “love drug” (Leneghan, 2013).  These names allude to 
the potent emotional and social effects of the drug, which have been cited as a 
key reason for its recreational use (Leneghan, 2013; Sumnall, 2006).  MDMA 
elicits the release of dopamine (DA), noradrenaline (NA) and serotonin (5-HT) 
(de la Torre et al., 2004), with the latter of these believed to be primarily 
responsible for its prosocial and euphoric effects (Carhart-Harris et al., 2014; 
Rothman et al., 2001), due to a 10-fold higher affinity for the 5-HT transporter 
than either DA or NA receptors (Green et al., 2003).  
The mechanism of action for neurotransmitter release is reversal of membrane 
transporter proteins (5-HTT; de la Torre et al., 2004; Green et al., 2003). This 
increases the availability of 5-HT (and DA and NE) in the synaptic cleft, 
resulting in an overall increase in serotonergic activity. MDMA is also a direct 
agonist of 5-HT2A/C receptors (de la Torre et al., 2004; Green et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, MDMA acts at trace amine-associated receptor 1 (TAAR1), and 
this is believed to deplete intracellular monoamine vesicular storage, thus 
increasing their availability for reverse transport (Pei et al., 2016). 
Using specific serotonin receptor antagonists, 5-HT activity has been linked to 
MDMA-induced increased sociality in rodents, with both 5-HT1A and 5-HT2A 
receptors being implicated in this effect (Hunt et al., 2011; Morley et al., 2005; 
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Thompson et al., 2007).  Studies in humans have investigated the effect of 5-HT 
receptor antagonists on subjective ratings of prosociality and mood following 
MDMA administration.  These studies have suggested that 5-HT2A receptors 
are implicated in these effects (Liechti and Vollenweider, 2001; van Wel et al., 
2012), but have failed to find evidence of 5-HT1A receptor involvement;  
although this may be due to the human pharmacodynamics of the antagonist 
used in these studies (Hasler et al., 2009; van Wel et al., 2012). Both of these 
studies used the 5-HT1A antagonist pindolol, and they point out that at the 
dosage used one can expect approximately 40% receptor occupancy. This 
occupancy may be too low to block the 5-HT1A receptor actions of interest. 
Research investigating the potential mechanisms by which MDMA modulates 
social cognition in humans is in its infancy, with small number of papers 
published in the last decade (e.g. Dumont et al., 2009; Frye et al., 2014; Hysek 
et al., 2012; Kirkpatrick et al., 2014; Wardle et al., 2014; Wardle and de Wit, 
2014).  These have largely looked at facial affect recognition, questionnaire-
based measures of prosociality, and the interactions of these outcomes with 
changes in plasma levels of oxytocin.  No MDMA neuroimaging studies have 
investigated aspects of social cognition beyond affect recognition, although non-
social cognition, MDMA imaging studies have recently been published (Carhart-
Harris et al., 2014; Carhart-Harris et al., 2014).  One of these found reduced 
mPFC connectivity and supplementary motor area activity at rest, following 
administration of MDMA (Carhart-Harris et al., 2014). In 0 I review 
neuroimaging studies of the Ultimatum Game in detail, and will show that these 
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areas are implicated in responder behaviour. This suggests that MDMA’s 
effects on social cognition may extend to social decision-making.   
1.8.2 Psilocybin  
Psilocybin (4-phosphoryloxy-N,N-dimethyltryptamine) is the active ingredient of 
a number of psychedelic mushrooms, known for their characteristic 
hallucinogenic effects. With its metabolite, psilocin, it is a mixed serotonin 
agonist, with highest affinity for 5-HT1A and 5-HT2A receptors (Passie et al., 
2002). Recent studies have shown psilocybin to modulate facial affect 
recognition (Kometer et al., 2012; Schmidt et al., 2013). A single study has 
administered psilocybin to investigate other aspects of social cognition (Preller 
et al., 2016). Preller et al (2016) found decreased feelings of social exclusion on 
psilocybin compared to placebo, with a corresponding decrease in activity of the 
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex. Recent evidence also suggests that psilocybin 
may be efficacious in treating anxiety disorders and depression (Carhart-Harris 
et al., 2016; Grob et al., 2011). 
Characteristics of psilocybin intoxication include vivid perceptual alterations, 
disruptions of thought, time distortion, euphoria and changes in mood. Kometer 
and Vollenweider (2016) discuss in detail the evidence that 5-HT2A receptors 
are primarily responsible for these effects across serotonergic psychedelics. 
Here, I summarise part of their discussion. A study using transgenic mice 
attempted to assess the relative contribution of 5-HT1A and 5-HT2A receptors 
to the effects of LSD (González-Maeso et al., 2007). They found that 5-HT2A 
receptor knock-out mice did not exhibit classic psychedelic markers in response 
to LSD. Studies in humans have investigated the effect of the 5-HT2A receptor 
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antagonist ketanserin, and found that this compound blocks the hallucinogenic 
effects of psilocybin (Carter et al., 2005; Kometer et al., 2012; Vollenweider et 
al., 1998). However, a study with human participants found that the partial 5-
HT1A agonist buspirone attenuated some of the subjective effects of psilocybin 
(Pokorny et al., 2016). The authors hypothesise that 5-HT1A receptor activity 
may modulate the 5-HT2A effect of psilocybin.  Together, these provide strong 
evidence for the key role of the 5-HT2A receptor in the subjective effects of 
psilocybin, and its potential interactions with the 5-HT1A receptor. It should be 
noted that while psilocybin has no affinity for dopamine D1 or D2 receptors 
(Creese et al., 1975; Passie et al., 2002), Vollenweider et al (1999) provided 
evidence that some of the subjective effects of psilocybin may be due to an 
indirect effect on dopamine activity, through serotonergic modulation of 
dopamine release through agonism at these 5-HT receptors. 
A body of research has focused on the mechanisms of 5-HT2A receptor 
activation by psychedelic compounds (González-Maeso et al., 2007, 2003; 
González-Maeso and Sealfon, 2009; Moreno et al., 2012, 2011). González-
Maeso et al (2007) suggest that psychedelic compounds such as psilocybin 
cause different conformational changes to the 5-HT2A receptor than non-
hallucinogenic compounds, thus initiating additional intracellular signalling 
pathways, a process termed agonist-directed trafficking. Figure 1-4 summarises 
these findings, which I discuss next.  
González-Maeso et al (2007) investigated the transcriptome response to both 
the hallucinogenic compound (HC) LSD and the non-hallucinogenic compound 
(NHC) R-lisuride. First they established that both compounds acted at 5-HT2A 
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receptors. 5-HT receptors are G-coupled protein receptors (GCPR), meaning 
their intracellular terminal components are associated with so-called G-proteins 
(Barnes and Sharp, 1999). Ligand binding causes conformational changes of 
the GCPR which induces G-protein-mediated signalling cascades, with different 
G-protein subunits being associated with different downstream signalling (Millar 
and Newton, 2010). 5-HT2A receptor activation has a canonical signalling 
pathway associated with Gq/11 proteins, but it has also been shown to be 
associated with Gi/o-mediated signalling cascades, via βγ G-protein subunits 
(Barnes and Sharp, 1999; Kurrasch-Orbaugh et al., 2003). Following the 
observation that both HCs and NHCs activate Gq/11-mediated PLC-ß cascades, 
González-Maeso et al inhibited this pathway. They found that by doing so, both 
NHC and HC responses were eliminated, suggesting that this pathway was not 
specific to HC responses.  
Building on previous work which had suggested that the Gi/o-mediated cascade 
included the tyrosine kinase, src (Banes et al., 1999; Quinn et al., 2002), 
González-Maeso et al (2007) inhibited this kinase. They found that src inhibition 
had no effect on the 5-HT2A transcriptome response to NHCs, but had a 
dramatic effect on that of HCs, as well as HC behavioural markers. Therefore, it 
is hypothesised that both the Gq/11 and Gi/o-mediated signalling cascades are 
required for psychedelic effect of HCs such as psilocybin. This mechanism has 
never been examined in humans. 
It is unknown whether the psychedelic effects of psilocybin in humans involve 
the same mechanism, and if so, whether these are also responsible for the 
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alterations in facial affect recognition. By inhibiting src-kinase in humans it will 





Figure 1-4: Diagram illustrating hypothesised mechanisms underlying hallucinogenic (HC) and 
non-hallucinogenic (NHC) compound activation of the 5-HT2A receptor. A) Unbound 5-HT2A 
receptor; B) Shows conformational changes following NHC binding. This allows initiation of 
phospholipase C-β (PLC- β ) cascade; C) Shows hypothesised additional downstream mechanisms 
of HC binding 
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1.9 Aims and hypotheses 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate the neural and behavioural 
mechanisms of social cognition, with a focus on social decision-making, 
empathy and facial affect recognition. To this end I have carried out three main 
bodies of work, detailed below. 
1.9.1 Meta-analysis of Ultimatum Game neuroimaging studies 
Chapter 2 will present a meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies investigating the 
Ultimatum Game (UG). The aim of this chapter is to identify a network of brain 
regions underlying UG behaviour in healthy adults. As a meta-analysis, this 
work was hypothesis-free. 
The results of this meta-analysis were used to inform the analysis of data 
collected for the subsequent chapters. 
1.9.2 Social cognition following the administration of psilocybin 
Chapter 3 will present data collected as part of a study investigating src-kinase 
inhibition as a potential mechanism for novel antipsychotic development. I 
present behavioural data of responses to UG offers and an analysis of their 
relationship to resting-state brain imaging data. This chapter will also present an 
analysis of facial affect recognition.  
Data was collected at three time-points in a placebo-controlled, counter-
balanced, crossover design. The first time-point was when participants were 
being screened for the study and were drug-free. On both other time-points 
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participants received psilocybin, with prior administration of either a placebo or 
a src-kinase inhibitor. 
The main hypotheses for this chapter are: 
1) Psilocybin will decrease rejection rates of unfair offers in the Ultimatum 
Game, and this decrease will be attenuated by src-kinase inhibition. 
2) Psilocybin will impair recognition of negative facial affect. 
1.9.3 Social cognition following the administration of MDMA 
Chapter 4 will present data from a placebo-controlled, counter-balanced, 
crossover study investigating the effect of MDMA on social decision-making. In 
this study participants played the UG and Prisoner’s Dilemma during functional 
neuroimaging. In addition they completed an empathy task and facial affect 
recognition task outside of the scanner. 
The main hypotheses for this chapter are: 
1) MDMA will reduce rejection rates of unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game 
2) MDMA will increase cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
3) MDMA will enhance emotional, but not cognitive empathy 
4) MDMA will reduce recognition of negative facial affect 
5) Altered activation of brain regions identified in Chapter 2 will accompany 





Chapter 2 The Ultimatum Game and 
brain: a meta-analysis of neuroimaging 
studies  
2.1 Overview 
This work in this chapter has been published in the journal Neuroscience and 
Biobehavioural Reviews: Gabay AS, Radua J, Kempton MJ, Mehta MA (2015) 
The Ultimatum Game and the brain: A meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies. 
Neurosci. Biobehav Rev 47, 549–558. 
Section 1.5.2.1 of this thesis was an edited version of the introduction to this 
paper, with both additions and omissions. As such the introduction here will 
contain some material repeated from the Chapter 1. 
2.2 Abstract 
Social decision-making tasks involve psychological processes key to effective 
functioning in a complex, social world. The Ultimatum Game (UG) is a widely 
studied social decision-making task, which models responses to fairness. A 
number of neuroimaging studies have investigated the UG to identify neural 
correlates of unfairness and decisions to reject versus accept an offer. We 
present the first quantitative summary of neuroimaging studies in social 
decision-making with a meta-analysis of 11 fMRI studies of the UG, including 
data from 282 participants. Effect-Size Signed Differential Mapping was used to 
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estimate effect sizes from statistical parametric maps and reported peak 
information before meta-analysing them. Consistent activations were seen in 
the anterior insula, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), supplementary motor area 
(SMA) and cerebellum in response to unfair offers. Robust activations in the 
ACC, SMA and putamen were seen when deciding to reject rather than accept 
UG offers. These are consistent with models of motivational conflict during the 
UG decision-making process, a response to norm violations, with a possible 
role for the reward system. 
 
2.3 Introduction 
Social interactions often require a balance between emotional and ‘rational’, 
cognitive motivations. Examples of this conflict can be seen in everyday life, for 
example in managing workplace relationships or taking decisions to trust others. 
The conflict between emotional and cognitive motivation has been studied using 
social decision-making tasks (Rilling and Sanfey, 2011; Stallen and Sanfey, 
2013). Social decision-making tasks are an important model of the interplay 
between social and emotional cognition and reasoned, self-interest judgments, 
and are believed to involve psychological processes key to effective functioning 
in the complex, social world. 
The Ultimatum Game (UG) is a task often used to study social decision-making, 
with its origins in behavioural economics (Güth et al., 1982). In the game one 
player acts as proposer and another acts as responder. The proposer is given a 
sum of money and chooses how much to split this with the responder. The 
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proposer is typically given a range of options as to how to split the sum, but in 
all cases must offer something. The responder can either accept the division of 
money, in which case both players receive the amount proposed, or they can 
reject it, in which case neither player receives any money at all. 
According to Rational Choice and Expected Utility Theory, a rational responder 
in the UG should accept any amount offered by the proposer, as this will 
represent a gain. Knowing this, a rational proposer should offer the lowest 
amount allowed by the rules, typically 10% of the total sum (Glimcher et al., 
2009). However, evidence shows that people do not behave in this way, with 
proposers typically offering closer-to-equal amounts, and responders typically 
rejecting offers they consider to be unfair. Indeed, studies suggest that while 
people accept fair, or close to fair, offers (40–50%), rejection rates gradually 
increase as the offer becomes lower (Civai et al., 2012a; C. Corradi-Dell’Acqua 
et al., 2013; Güth et al., 1982; Oosterbeek et al., 2003; Rilling and Sanfey, 
2011). This finding has been found across cultures (Henrich et al., 2005; 
although see Oosterbeek et al., 2003) and is interpreted as being a result of 
social influences on decision-making. This interpretation is supported by the 
consistent finding that when the same offers are made in a non-social control 
condition, typically where it is clear the offer has been computer-generated, 
rejection rates fall close to zero (e.g. Sanfey, 2003). Thus it is suggested that 
responders are punishing violations of social norms despite the cost incurred to 
them, which has been argued to be an adaptive mechanism (Boyd et al., 2003; 
Nowak et al., 2000; Rand et al., 2013). 
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Sanfey et al. (Sanfey, 2003) were the first to investigate the neural basis of 
motivational conflicts during decision-making in the UG. They argue that the 
decision to forego a financial gain is a response to the negative emotion elicited 
by unfair treatment. In order to investigate this, neural activity following receipt 
of unfair offers was contrasted with activity following fair offers. In this study, 
offers of 30% or below of the total stake were considered unfair. The authors 
discussed increased activations seen in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), 
anterior insula, and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). They suggest 
that anterior insula activity was predictive of the decision to reject an unfair 
offer, and argued that this area not only represented the negative emotion 
associated with unfairness, but also drove the decision to reject unfair offers. 
Follow-up studies have similarly investigated fairness in the UG, with others 
reporting differences in activation associated with the decision to reject versus 
accept an offer. In the imaging literature there is some variation in the threshold 
below which offers are considered unfair, ranging from 20% to 40% of the total 
stake (see Table 2-1 for the definition of unfair for each of the included studies 
in the present analysis). This lack of consensus represents a challenge for the 
field, as an “unfair” offer in one study may not engage the same processes as 
an “unfair” offer in another study. Indeed, it has been reported that responses to 
30% offers are dependent on the context in which they are presented, with 
lower rejection rates when there are more offers of 10–20% than 40–50%, and 
vice versa (Wright et al., 2011). An aim of the current analysis was to see if this 




Neuroimaging studies have investigated variables such as the context of gain or 
loss (Guo et al., 2013a; Tomasino et al., 2013a), variations across the lifespan 
(Katia M. Harlé and Sanfey, 2012) and the influence of competition (Halko et al., 
2009a) and emotional states (Grecucci et al., 2013; Katia M. Harlé et al., 2012) 
on UG behaviour. 
Across studies, there is an apparent consistency in the areas involved in social 
decision-making in the UG, and there have been a number of reviews published 
which summarise neuroimaging studies of social decision-making (Lee and 
Harris, 2013; James K Rilling et al., 2008; Rilling and Sanfey, 2011; Stallen and 
Sanfey, 2013). However, it has been documented that neuroimaging studies are 
typically under-powered (Button et al., 2013), leading to increased risks of both 
type I and type II errors. As such, meta-analyses of neuroimaging studies have 
become increasingly important. To date there has been no attempt at a 
quantitative analysis of neuroimaging findings in this field. 
Social cognitive deficits are well recognised in psychiatric disorders, and have 
specifically been emphasised in schizophrenia as being a domain requiring 
urgent research to improve treatment options (Green et al., 2004). Social 
decision-making is an area of social cognition which is increasingly investigated, 
and by providing evidence for brain regions consistently involved in this domain, 
meta-analysis represents an important step in the development of 
psychopharmacological treatments. To date the UG is the most studied social 




Popular methods of fMRI meta-analysis include activation likelihood estimation 
(ALE) and multi-level kernel density analysis (MKDA). These methods base 
their meta-analytic results on coordinates which have been reported by 
individual studies to have passed the statistical threshold for significance set by 
those studies. Whilst the results of such analyses provide an informative 
summary of statistically significant fMRI results across a number of studies in a 
field, these methods do not include subthreshold results and therefore do not 
necessarily address the problem of low power inherent in fMRI. A further 
limitation of these techniques is that they do not produce a statistical measure 
of effect-size or its variance. 
In this analysis, we use Effect-Size Signed Differential Mapping (ES-SDM), a 
neuroimaging meta-analytic method that can combine reported peak 
information (coordinates and t-values) from some studies, with original 
statistical parametric maps (SPMs) from others, thus allowing a comprehensive 
inclusion of information from these studies (J. Radua et al., 2012). The main 
advantage of an effect-size-based meta-analysis is the ability to produce a more 
precise estimate of the effect size than is seen in the individual studies included 
in the meta-analysis alone. Other relevant advantages are the possibility to 
assess the between-study heterogeneity and the potential publication bias. 
Here, we not only use these tools but also assess whether findings are 
replicable using the so-called jack-knife analyses. 
Typically, for the UG, contrasts of interest are those comparing neural activity 
associated with receiving an unfair offer compared to a fair offer, or activity 
associated with choosing to reject rather than accept an offer, although not all 
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studies report both of these contrasts. We present findings from the analysis of 
both of these contrasts, termed the Fairness and Response contrast, 
respectively. Where appropriate, additional data has been obtained from the 
authors. There are four possible outcomes in the UG: acceptance or rejection of 
a fair offer, and acceptance or rejection of an unfair offer. Figure 2-1 illustrates 
how these possible outcomes are positioned in each of the contrasts reported in 
this meta-analysis. 
There are different interpretations of UG neuroimaging results. These place 
different emphasis on the role of negative emotions and the idea of violations of 
social norms. As mentioned above, it has been suggested that UG rejection 
behaviour is driven by negative emotion elicited by unfair treatment, and that 
this is associated with anterior insula activation (James K Rilling et al., 2008; 
Sanfey, 2003). An alternative interpretation is that anterior insula responses are 
not driven by negative emotion per se, but by detection of violations of social 
norms, and that the decision to reject the unfair offer is a rejection of this norm 
violation (Civai et al., 2012a; C. Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2013). Additionally, a 
role for reward has been proposed. It has been suggested that reward 
pathways may be involved in the punishment of norm violations, as well as 
overcoming negative emotions to accept unfair offers (de Quervain, 2004; 
Tabibnia et al., 2008). These explanations need not be mutually exclusive, and 
while a meta-analysis will not be able to select between these interpretations, 
we will discuss our findings in the context of these models. Here, in order to 
identify areas most robustly associated with unfairness and rejection behaviour, 
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we present results from a meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging studies 
investigating the Ultimatum Game. 
 
Figure 2-1: Contrast diagram.  NB: No ‘Fair reject’ as the frequency of this outcome was negligible 
 
2.4 Methods  
2.4.1 Literature search 
A literature search was carried out using the PubMed and Web of Knowledge 
databases, entering the search terms “Ultimatum Game” AND (“fMRI” OR 
“functional magnetic resonance imaging”) in March 2014. Further papers were 
identified by searching reference sections in papers returned by the original 
search. We included studies that (1) reported fMRI results from whole brain 
thresholds, i.e. excluding those results only obtained after applying small-
volume corrections, (2) included healthy participants, (3) used a single-shot 
rather than iterated version of the Ultimatum Game, (4) reported data from 
participants acting as Responders rather than Proposers, (5) reported data from 
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versions of the Ultimatum Game which can be considered equivalent to the 
standard version of the game (for example, where a study investigated 
differences between a ‘gain’ or ‘loss’ context, we only included data from the 
‘gain’ context). In order to adhere to typical meta-analysis standards, we 
excluded studies with sample overlap with an already-included study. Eleven 
studies met these inclusion criteria (see Figure 2-2). 
Our primary interest was in the Fairness (Unfair offer vs Fair offer) activation 
contrasts in participants playing a standard version-equivalent of the Ultimatum 
Game. Where these contrasts were not reported, authors were contacted 
asking for the relevant data. Authors were also asked to provide data for the 
Response contrast (Accept vs Reject) where available, as well as behavioural 
data in the form of offer rejection rate. Statistical parametric maps (t-maps) were 
requested from all studies included in the meta-analysis in order to increase the 
precision and accuracy of the results (for details, see Section 2.4.2). 
2.4.2 Effect Size-Signed Differential Mapping (ES-SDM) 
The meta-analysis was carried out using Effect Size-Signed Differential 
Mapping (ES-SDM) software. ES-SDM is a weighted, voxel-based meta-
analytic method which has been validated and used in a number of structural 
and functional MRI meta-analyses (Aoki et al., 2013; Fusar-Poli, 2012; Hart et 
al., 2012; Nakao et al., 2011; Richlan et al., 2011). ES-SDM recreates voxel-
level maps of effect sizes and their variances, and allows the inclusion of both 
peak information (coordinates and t-values) and statistical parametric maps (J. 
Radua et al., 2012). The conversion from t-statistics to effect size is carried out 
using standard statistical techniques. Where statistics are only available for 
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reported peak coordinates, the effect size is exactly calculated at this peak and 
estimated in the remaining voxels depending on their distance from these 
peaks, using an unnormalised Gaussian kernel, which is multiplied by the effect 
size of the peak. This method of estimation is similar to the estimation of 
activation likelihood used in ALE, but the use of effect sizes in the calculation 
has been shown to increase the accuracy of estimation of the true signal 
compared to alternative methods (Radua et al., 2012). Additionally, the 
inclusion of statistical parametric maps in a meta-analysis has been shown to 
substantially increase the sensitivity of voxel-based meta-analyses. For 
example, in the ES-SDM validation study, sensitivity increased from 55% to 
73% with the inclusion of just one SPM and to 87% with the inclusion of two 
SPMs (Radua et al., 2012). Unlike other methods, ES-SDM allows both 
negative and positive values in the same map, which, along with the use of 
effect size and variance maps, allows for standard meta-analytic measures to 
be calculated, such as between-study heterogeneity. Full details of the ES-SDM 
method and its validation are presented elsewhere (Radua et al., 2012). 
2.4.3 Analyses 
Meta-analytic effect-sizes were voxel-wise divided by their standard errors to 
obtain ES-SDM z-values. As these z-values may not follow a standard normal 
distribution, a null distribution was empirically estimated for each meta-analytic 
brain map. Specifically, null distributions were obtained from 50 whole brain 
permutations (which, multiplied by the number of voxels, resulted in about 4-
million values per null distribution); previous simulation work has found that 
permutation-derived ES-SDM thresholds are already very stable with even only 
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5 whole-brain permutations (Radua et al., 2012). Voxels with a p-value <0.001 
were considered as significant, but those from clusters with less than 10 voxels 
or with peaks with SDM z-values <1 were discarded in order to reduce the false 
positive rate. While this threshold is not strictly family-wise correction for 
multiple comparisons, previous research has found that it has an optimal 
sensitivity while correctly controlling the false positive rate at <0.05 or even 
<0.01 (Radua et al., 2012). 
In order to assess the potential impact of the variation in definition of unfair offer 
(See Table 2-1), we carried out a meta-regression analysis on effect size values 
at peak voxels of significant clusters using the metareg module in Stata 
Statistical Software (Harbord and Higgins, 2008; StataCorp, 2011). 
Heterogeneity was also assessed in areas of significant activation. Jack-knife 
sensitivity analyses were conducted to examine the robustness of the main 
meta-analytic output. This was carried out by removing one study at a time and 
repeating the analysis. In order to assess publication bias, effect size estimates 
were extracted for peak voxels of significant clusters from the meta-analysis for 
each study. Using these, funnel plots were created and visually inspected, and 
Egger regression tests carried out (Matthias Egger et al., 1997). We used the 
Egger regression test as a quantitative method of assessing asymmetry in the 
funnel plots. Evidence of bias is indicated if the intercept of a regression line of 
effect size/standard error against 1/standard error significantly deviates from 
zero. 
In addition, we assessed the rejection rate of the responder from each study 
included in the meta-analysis in order to explore the variation in response 
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trends across studies. Where behavioural data was supplied by corresponding 
authors on individual studies, this data was incorporated into this analysis (n = 
4). Where this data was unavailable from corresponding authors, graphical 
behavioural data was digitally measured using the GNU imaging manipulation 
program (v2.6.1) (Mattis and Kimball, 2008). 
 
 





2.5.1 Included studies 
See Table 2-1 for details of included studies. 11 studies were identified for 
inclusion in the ‘Fairness’ meta-analysis (Unfair offer > Fair offer)(Baumgartner 
et al., 2011; Civai et al., 2012b; Corrado Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2013; Guo et 
al., 2013b; Halko et al., 2009b; Katia M Harlé and Sanfey, 2012; Kirk et al., 
2011a; Sanfey et al., 2003; Tomasino et al., 2013b; Vieira et al., 2013; Wei et 
al., 2013). These included a total of 282 participants. The authors of eight 
studies were able to provide T-maps for use in the meta-analysis (Baumgartner 
et al., 2011; Civai et al., 2012b; Corrado Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2013; Guo et 
al., 2013b; Halko et al., 2009b; Tomasino et al., 2013b; Vieira et al., 2013; Wei 
et al., 2013). Five studies were able to provide statistical parametric maps for 
the ‘Response’ meta-analysis (Reject > Accept), which included data from 100 
participants (Civai et al., 2012b; Corrado Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2013; Guo et 
al., 2013b; Tomasino et al., 2013b; Wei et al., 2013). Six studies were able to 
provide data for contrasts which were not reported in their publications 
(Baumgartner et al., 2011; Civai et al., 2012b; Corrado Corradi-Dell’Acqua et 
al., 2013; Guo et al., 2013b; Tomasino et al., 2013b; Wei et al., 2013). 
The inclusion of this many statistical parametric maps is a strong asset to the 
current analysis. The results of the meta-analyses will be less biased toward the 
reported peaks of studies for which we were unable to obtain T-maps. 
Additionally, the increased statistical power afforded by the inclusion of a high 
percentage of T-maps (J Radua et al., 2012) in the analysis enables the 
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detection of areas of activation which may not have reached statistical 
significance in any one study alone. As such, the potential exists to highlight 




Table 2-1: Details of included studies. For studies whose t-maps were not available, the reported results were thresholded as follows: Sanfey et al (2003) – p < 0.001, 
cluster size >= 10 voxels; Kirk et al (2009) – p < 0.05, FDR-corrected, extend threshold > 10 v voxels; Harlé & Sanfey, 2012 – corrected for cluster-wise significance: p < 
0.05, cluster size >= 5 




Definition Behavioural data Meta-analysis 
 Unfair (mean) Fair Fairness Response 
 

















Halko et al, 2009 23 T-map SPM 2 8 - 17% 
(10.4%) 
33 -42% Actual data   
Kirk et al, 2011 40 Reported peak 
coordinates 
SPM 2 10 -20% (15%) 30 -50% Graphically measured   




Actual data   




Civai et al, 2012 19 T-map SPM 8 10 -20% (15%) 50% Actual data   
Corradi-Dell’Aqua et al, 
2013 
23 T-map SPM 8 10 -20% (15%) 50% Graphically measured   
Guo et al, 2013 21 T-map SPM 5 10 -40% 
(21.7%) 
50% Actual data (error bars graphically 
measured) 
  
Tomasino et al, 2013 17 T-map SPM 5 10% (10%) 30% Actual data   
Vieira et al, 2013 35 T-map AFNI 20 – 33% 40 – 
50% 
N/A   
Wei et al, 2013 29 T-map SPM 8 10 – 20% 40 – 
50% 
N/A   
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2.5.2 Behavioural results 
Offers were converted to percentages of the total money available, to enable 
comparison across studies. Figure 2-3 illustrates the mean rejection rate at 




Figure 2-3: Responder rejection rates from behavioural data of the included studies. NB: Civai et al 
(2012) and Wei et al (2013) not included due to rejection rates not being given for individual offers.  
Vieira et al (2013) not included because data not available ƚData from Harlé and Sanfey (2012) 
reported separately for two participant groups, a Young (18-27) and b Older (55-78).  Error bars: ± 1 




2.5.3 Fairness meta-analysis 
2.5.3.1 Results of Fairness meta-analysis 
This meta-analysis included all 11 studies comprising 282 participants. 
Participants showed spatially large activations in: a) bilateral mid/anterior 
cingulate cortex (aMCC/ACC), extending to the left anterior supplementary 
motor area (SMA); b) bilateral insula; and c) right cerebellum. Additionally, there 
was a smaller cluster of activation in the left inferior parietal lobule (Table 2-2; 
Figure 2-4(A)). 
2.5.3.2 Fairness contrast heterogeneity, sensitivity and publication bias 
analyses 
Significant between-study heterogeneity was limited to a small area in the 
cingulate gyrus. Jack-knife sensitivity analyses showed that the main findings 
were highly replicable across combinations of datasets.  However, the 
activations in the clusters encompassing the left insula appear more robust than 
those of the right insula.  In addition, clusters in the cerebellum and aMCC/ACC 
appear more robust than the inferior parietal lobule (see Figure 2-5(A)). Three 
clusters (left precentral gyrus, left postcentral gyrus, right insula) showed 
evidence of publication bias using Egger. It should be noted that the publication 
bias analyses would not have survived multiple comparison correction, but we 
chose to report the conservative figure here. 
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2.5.4 Response meta-analysis 
2.5.4.1 Results of Response meta-analysis 
This meta-analysis only included five studies comprising 100 participants, but 
we could retrieve the statistical parametric maps from all of these studies.  
Statistical parametric maps highly increase statistical power (J Radua et al., 
2012), enabling the detection of a number of robust activation clusters. The 
results of the response contrast meta-analysis showed increased activation in: 
a) SMA, extending to the anterior midcingulate cortex (aMCC); b) right middle 
frontal gyrus; c) bilateral lentiform nucleus. Other, less significant, clusters 
included the bilateral fusiform gyrus, inferior parietal lobule, and the posterior 
cingulate (Table 2-3; Figure 2-4(B)).    
2.5.4.2 Response contrast heterogeneity, sensitivity and publication bias 
analyses 
There was no significant between-study heterogeneity.  Jack-knife sensitivity 
analyses showed that the main findings were replicable across combinations of 
datasets, with the most robust findings being in the left aMCC, left SMA and 
right lentiform nucleus (see Figure 2-5B).  There was no evidence of publication 
bias in all but one cluster, as assessed by the Egger regression test (right 
superior frontal gyrus) (M Egger et al., 1997).  
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2.5.5 Comparison of Fairness and Response activations 
The meta-analytic output maps were binarised in order to assess the overlap of 
regions activated both by fairness and response contrasts (see Figure 2-4C).  
Common activation of areas in the bilateral aMCC and right SMA were found. 
2.5.6 Meta-regression to assess the influence of unfair offer definition 
In order to assess the influence of the variation of unfair offer definitions across 
studies on the meta-analytic results, we carried out a meta-regression of the 
effect size of the peak voxel at each significant cluster. We first calculated the 
mean unfair offer in each study (range: 10-26.5%, mean: 17.4%), then used 
these values in the meta-regression. In no cluster across the two contrasts did 




Figure 2-4:A) Fairness contrast results, with small area of between-study heterogeneity labelled on 
sagittal slice with a dotted outline and arrow B) Response contrast results C) Fairness and 





Figure 2-5: Binarised maps of Jack-knife analyses.  Colour bars represent number of overlapping 
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2.6 Discussion  
We present the first meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies of the Ultimatum 
Game (UG). The UG is a widely used social decision-making task, which 
models behaviour in response to fairness considerations. By examining the 
neural correlates of responders in the UG, we aim to build upon the growing 
body of literature which looks to elucidate the mechanisms by which humans 
incorporate social and self-interested considerations on a neural level. The 
results of this meta-analysis indicate that there is a consistent activation of the 
bilateral mid-anterior insula, aMCC/anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), medial 
supplementary motor area (SMA), and cerebellum in response to unfairness in 
the Ultimatum Game (UG). When making the decision to reject rather than 
accept an offer, activations were seen bilaterally in the aMCC and SMA, 
bilateral lentiform nucleus, and the right middle frontal gyrus. The results from 
the Response contrast were most robust in the left aMCC and left SMA. Based 
on the results of these analyses, there appears to be common activations in 
response to unfairness and during the decision to reject rather than accept an 
offer.  This overlap occurs in the aMCC and the SMA. 
The purpose of the analysis was not to select between the different models 
used to explain UG behaviour and its neural correlates, but to provide a robust, 
quantitative definition of the brain regions consistently activated in the relevant 
contrasts.  In so doing, we have discussed the role of each region in relation to 
the model of norm violations, reward, or affective processing, as appropriate. 
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Studies have previously found the anterior insula to be involved in processing 
negative emotional states, such as anger and disgust (Damasio et al., 2000; 
Phillips et al., 1997).  The activation of this region in response to unfair offers in 
the UG is often interpreted as processing and representing the negative 
emotional state induced by unfair treatment by a social entity (Halko et al., 
2009b; Sanfey et al., 2003). The consistent finding that anterior insula activation 
is not seen in low, control-condition offers (non-social) is evidence that this is 
not simply a negative emotional response to low monetary reward (Civai et al., 
2012b; Corrado Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2013; Katia M Harlé et al., 2012; 
Sanfey et al., 2003).  Some studies report that the strength of anterior insula 
activation in response to unfair offers is predictive of the decision to reject such 
an offer (Kirk et al., 2011a; Sanfey et al., 2003). Indeed, Sanfey et al (2003) 
examined this on a trial by trial basis and concluded that this supported “…the 
hypothesis that neural representations of emotional states guide human 
decision-making” (p.1757). 
A different interpretation of anterior insula activation is that it is involved in 
representing a deviation from expected norms, in this case, the violation of 
social norms (Civai et al., 2012b; Corrado Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2013). Civai 
et al (2012) and Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al (2012) report that anterior insula is 
activated in response to unequal offers regardless of whether responders are 
making decisions on behalf of themselves or a third party. Citing investigations 
of galvanic skin response during a similar study (Civai et al., 2010b), these 
authors have suggested that responding to third-party offers diminishes the 
emotional response elicited by unfair offers, despite no observed reduction in 
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rejection rate. Supporting the interpretation that anterior insula activity 
represents deviation from expected norms, the study by Civai et al (2012) 
reported that when participants responded to unequal offers in both directions – 
i.e. both advantageous and disadvantageous – for themselves or a third party, 
they rejected inequality on behalf of a third party regardless of 
advantageousness, while only rejecting disadvantageous inequality in the self-
trials. Interestingly, not only was the anterior insula activated in response to 
both self and third-party inequality, but increased activation was not observed in 
disadvantageous unequal compared to advantageous unequal offers to the self.  
Furthermore no correlation was found between strength of anterior insula 
activation and rejection rate. This suggests that the role of the insula upon 
receipt of an unfair offer goes beyond representing negative emotions. 
The activations seen in the medial prefrontal and cingulate cortices have been 
interpreted as representing the control and monitoring of conflict between 
emotional and cognitive motivations (Baumgartner et al., 2011; Sanfey et al., 
2003). The fact that there is overlap in these areas in both the Fairness and 
Response analyses presented here appears to support this interpretation.  
Referring to Figure 2-1, it is clear that the Fairness contrast encompasses the 
decision to both accept and reject unfair offers; the Response contrast 
represents the cognitive, motivational conflict involved in rejecting an unfair 
offer. As such both contrasts would be expected to identify a conflict between 
emotional and cognitive motivations. It should be noted that while these results 
appear to be in line with the conflict monitoring/resolution model of ACC/mPFC 
function, there is debate as to the validity of this model (Fellows and Farah, 
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2005; Grinband et al., 2011; Holroyd, 2013). Grinband and colleagues (2011) 
suggest that mPFC activation (including mid-anterior cingulate) in conflict 
resolution paradigms is better explained in relation to reaction/response time, 
with greater activation seen with longer response times. Few studies report 
reaction times in the UG, so a meta-regression was not possible, and there is 
inconsistency between those that do (Katia M Harlé and Sanfey, 2012; 
Tomasino et al., 2013b; Van der Veen and Sahibdin, 2011). While the findings 
of the current analysis confirm the role of this area in social decision-making 
and the UG, we are unable to resolve the debate with this data. 
Reports that the aMCC/mPFC are activated more in response to unfair offers to 
the self than to third parties, and that this activation is negatively correlated with 
rejection rate, supports the argument that these areas are involved in 
overcoming the motivation to sanction norm violations in favour of self-interest 
following receipt of an unfair offer (Civai et al., 2012b; Corrado Corradi-
Dell’Acqua et al., 2013). In a recent review, Apps et al (M. a J. Apps et al., 
2013) argue that the midcingulate cortical gyrus is intimately involved in the 
processing of social information, specifically when predicting and monitoring the 
outcomes of decisions during social interactions. The results from the Fairness 
and Response contrasts support this.  Nachev et al (2005) argue that the rostral 
and caudal regions of the pre-SMA, seen in the present analyses, are 
functionally distinct in free-choice action planning, with the overall role being to 
resolve competition between two incompatible action plans. The authors 
suggest that alterations in planned action will be represented in the pre-SMA, 
and this interpretation can be applied to decision to reject unfair offers (rather 
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than act in economic self-interest), which is on the same side of both the 
Fairness and Response contrast.  
Interestingly, activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) was not 
present in the Fairness contrast, despite this being reported in a number of 
studies (Baumgartner et al., 2011; Guo et al., 2013b; Güroğlu et al., 2011a; 
Katia M Harlé and Sanfey, 2012; Sanfey et al., 2003). Meta-analysis seeks to 
identify consistency in activation across studies. As the DLPFC encompasses a 
large area, the fact that it is minimally present in this contrast may reflect the 
disparate regions within this area being activated in different studies. Right 
DLPFC activation was, however, present in the Response contrast, although 
sensitivity analyses show the robustness of this finding was less than cingulate 
and medial prefrontal regions. Studies employing repetitive transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (rTMS) have shown that disruption to the right DLPFC 
results in reduced rejection rates of unfair offers (Baumgartner et al., 2011; 
Knoch et al., 2006, 2008). Baumgartner et al further reported reduced 
connectivity to the posterior ventromedial PFC (vmPFC), but no differences in 
activity of, nor connectivity with, the anterior insula. rTMS did not affect 
participants’ fairness ratings of different offers (Knoch et al., 2006, 2008). With 
anterior insula response to inequality still intact with disrupted right DLPFC, it 
suggests that DLPFC connectivity to the vmPFC may be key in implementing 
the costly, normative decision to reject unfair offers. It should be noted, 
however, that vmPFC activity was not seen in the current analysis, and we were 
unable to look at connectivity as it was not reported in the included studies.    A 
limitation of ES-SDM, other neuroimaging meta-analytic methods and reporting 
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of imaging results is that there are no standards in place for the meta-analysis 
of functional connectivity data.   
Despite the finding of increased activation in the anterior putamen in the 
Response contrast analysis, little attempt has been made in the included 
studies to interpret this, although the reward system has been discussed in 
relation to its activation upon receipt of a fair offer (Tabibnia et al., 2008). Kirk et 
al (2011) cite a study which  reported putamen activation in a non-social, 
decision-making investment game when it was revealed that an alternative 
decision by the participant could have earned an alternative reward to that 
which they actually earned (Lohrenz et al., 2007). This is termed the “fictive 
error”, which could plausibly explain the activations seen following offers which 
were later rejected – as these were mostly unfair offers. This interpretation does 
not elucidate the degree to which this activation is due to social processing. An 
interpretation which involves social processing draws on the idea of altruistic 
punishment, the costly punishment of social norm violation.  It has been 
suggested that while the experience of disadvantageous inequality is in itself 
negative, the opportunity to resolve this inequality is rewarding (de Quervain et 
al., 2004; Yu et al., 2013), leading to activation of the putamen and related 
striatal structures. A recent review (Jamil P Bhanji and Delgado, 2014) 
discusses the evidence for non-social reward pathways being involved in social 
reward. The evidence suggests there is no distinct social reward pathway, but 
social rewards, such as sanctioning norm violators, can activate reward areas 
despite monetary loss ( Crockett et al., 2013; de Quervain et al., 2004). 
Considering the positioning of the possible responses (see Figure 2-1), it is 
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clear that putamen activation is only seen when acceptance of an unfair offer is 
not on the same side of the contrast as rejection of an unfair offer. This provides 
some support for the idea of rejecting an unfair offer being inherently rewarding.   
This meta-analysis has highlighted the involvement of another region not 
discussed in the UG literature: the cerebellum. A recent meta-analysis of 
cerebellar function highlights a region, close to those activated in our analysis, 
as being involved in negative emotion (Keren-Happuch et al., 2014). Activity of 
this area in the Fairness contrast fits with the theory that the cerebellum has a 
general cognitive-affective role (Keren-Happuch et al., 2014; Schmahmann and 
Caplan, 2006), but it is unclear from this analysis whether it plays a specific part 
in the social decision-making aspect of the UG. Referring again to Figure 2-1, 
the difference between contrasts is the positioning of the decision to accept an 
unfair offer. The finding of cerebellar activity when both responses to unfair 
offers are on the same side of the contrast (Fairness) supports an affective 
processing role for the cerebellum; be this due to negative emotion elicited by 
unfair treatment, or to inequality aversion. There is large cerebellar-cortical 
connectivity, and investigation beyond the scope of this meta-analysis is 
needed to elucidate the role of the cerebellum in social decision-making. 
One strength of the current study is that we were able to obtain statistical 
parametric maps for 8 of the 11 studies included in the analysis. However, there 
remains the possibility of bias toward the areas of peak coordinates reported in 
the remaining 3 studies. Running the analysis with just those studies for which 
we had t-maps produced results similar (though expectably slightly less 
significant) to those reported here, so any bias introduced appears to be 
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minimal. The Response contrast consisted of only five studies, so the results 
from this contrast should be treated with some caution. However, it must be 
noted that we could retrieve the statistical parametric maps from all of these 
studies, thus highly increasing the statistical power (J Radua et al., 2012).  As 
with all meta-analyses, inclusion criteria needed to be strict to limit 
heterogeneity, and as such many fMRI studies in the UG field were necessarily 
not included in the analyses.  This may add an additional unintentional level of 
bias to the findings reported here.   
It is notable that very few neuroimaging meta-analyses address the issue of 
publication bias. Publication bias analysis in neuroimaging is an area which 
requires further consideration in the field as a whole, as interpretation of its 
results are not as straightforward as in traditional meta-analyses. Firstly, there is 
a relatively low plausibility of a whole-brain analysis not being published due to 
a low effect in a particular voxel. Secondly, voxels whose effect failed to survive 
multiple comparisons in an individual study will have an estimated effect size of 
zero in a coordinate-based, voxel-wise meta-analysis (i.e. in the absence of a 
statistical parametric map). Studies with small sample sizes will more likely 
have small effects not reaching significance. Ultimately, this will affect the 
standard analysis of a funnel plot. However, we have reported the results of the 
publication bias analysis here to stay in line with standard meta-analysis 
methods and because the majority of our data included whole brain statistical 
parametric maps. Furthermore, we do not believe publication bias is any less of 
an issue as it is in other fields. With these limitations in mind, Egger regression 
analyses revealed asymmetry in the funnel plots of the peak voxel of 3 clusters 
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in the Fairness contrast, and 1 in the Response contrast. Visual inspection of 
these funnel plots suggest that some relatively smaller studies reporting small 
effects at these voxels are not included in the analysis. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This study presents the first meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging studies 
investigating social decision-making. Specifically, Fairness and Response 
contrasts in the Ultimatum Game. Consistent activations were seen in the 
anterior insula, aMCC, ACC, and mPFC in response to unfair compared to fair 
offers. These activations are consistent with a model of norm violations.  This 
analysis has also identified a potential role for the cerebellum in social decision-
making.  Robust findings of activation in the aMCC, mPFC and putamen were 
seen during the decision to reject as compared to accept UG offers.  This is 
most parsimoniously explained by conflict during the decision-making process, 
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Chapter 3 The effect of psilocybin on 
social cognition 
3.1 Overview 
This chapter examines the influence of the mixed serotonin receptor agonist 
psilocybin on social decision-making and emotion recognition, as measured by 
the Ultimatum Game (Güth et al., 1982) and the Affective Bias task (Bland et 
al., 2016) respectively.   
Section 3.2 will introduce the study reported in the chapter. Section 3.3 will 
outline the version of the Ultimatum Game used in this study, and assess its 
validity in terms of replicating the findings in the literature and its test-retest 
reliability. Section 3.4 will then present the method, results and discussion of the 
study examining the effect of psilocybin on social cognition. 
3.2 Introduction 
As outlined in Chapter 1 (Sections 1.3 and 1.5.3), there is growing interest in 
how social cognition, including emotion recognition and social decision-making, 
is altered in psychiatric conditions (e.g. Bora and Pantelis, 2016; Csukly et al., 
2011; Dalili et al., 2015; Destoop et al., 2012; McClure et al., 2007; Polgár et al., 
2014). 0 (Section 1.4) provided evidence that current treatments do not do 
enough to address the emotion recognition deficits seen in schizophrenia 
(Gabay et al., 2015). In order to understand the mechanisms underlying 
different aspects of social cognition, studies in healthy volunteers are extremely 
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important, as samples can be more homogenous than studies with patients 
exhibiting variations in impairments. Furthermore, when studying the effect of 
pharmacological interventions, one can study the drug response in the absence 
of pathological mechanisms, which in turn is important for developing an 
understanding of the processes affected by the intervention. 
Although the psychopharmacology is poorly understood, there is some 
evidence from studies with healthy individuals that social cognition, including 
emotion recognition and social decision-making, is modulated by the 
serotoninergic system (e.g. Crockett, 2009; Hysek et al., 2012, 2013; Schmid et 
al., 2014; Stewart et al., 2014). Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), 
which increase the synaptic availability of serotonin, have been shown to alter 
emotion recognition in healthy volunteers, such that there was an increase in 
recognition of fearful and happy expressions (Browning et al., 2007; Harmer et 
al., 2003a). Acute SSRI administration has also been associated with reduced 
accuracy in recognition of angry and sad expressions (Capitão et al., 2015). 
Contrary to both of these findings, Alves-Neto et al. (2010) showed improved 
accuracy in recognition of sad expressions and inhibited recognition of happy 
expression following single-dose administration of the SSRI escitalopram; a 
relatively small sample size of twelve participants should be noted for this study, 
however.  
Limiting serotonin availability through tryptophan depletion has produced 
conflicting results, with Harmer et al. having shown a reduction of fear 
recognition (Harmer et al., 2003b), while others found no behavioural 
differences (Fusar-Poli et al., 2007; Grady et al., 2013). Furthermore, the potent 
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serotoninergic compound 3,4-methylenedioxy-methamphetamine (MDMA), 
which increases serotonin availability as well as being a direct serotonin 2A 
receptor agonist, has been shown to reduce the recognition of sad, angry and 
fearful facial expressions (Bedi et al., 2010; Matthew G Kirkpatrick et al., 2014; 
Schmid et al., 2014).  
The studies detailed above show some variation in their findings. Reasons for 
this may include the difference in pharmacological agents used; for example, 
differences in SSRI (citalopram vs fluoxetine vs escitalopram). Additionally, 
there are a number of serotonin receptors, with a range of downstream 
mechanisms (Barnes and Sharp, 1999; Hoyer et al., 2002). Treatment with 
SSRIs and tryptophan depletion do not have a nuanced effect on the serotonin 
system – they increase or decrease global 5-HT availability, rather than alter 
activity of specific receptor subtypes – possibly adding to the heterogeneity of 
the results obtained in the discussed studies of emotion recognition. 
The psychopharmacology of social decision-making is discussed in detail in 0 
(Section 1.6). Here I will briefly recap the main points relating to the serotonin 
system and the Ultimatum Game.  
As detailed in Chapter 1 (Section 1.5), the Ultimatum Game (UG) was 
developed in the field of behavioural economics (Güth et al., 1982), and is often 
used to investigate responses to violations of social norms. In the game one 
player acts as proposer and another acts as responder.  The proposer is given 
a sum of money and chooses how much to share with the responder.  The 
responder can either accept the division of money, in which case both players 
receive the amount proposed, or they can reject it, in which case neither player 
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receives any money at all. Whilst there is a range of strategies of how people 
respond to monetary offers in this context, most people typically reject low 
offers (e.g. Gabay et al., 2014; Güth et al., 1982; Sanfey, 2003). 
Tryptophan depletion has been shown to increase rejection rates of low offers, 
while treatment with SSRIs have been shown to reduce the rejection of low 
offers in the UG (Crockett et al., 2008; M. J. Crockett et al., 2010, 2013). 
Furthermore, it has been reported in a study investigating the UG that 
participants who rejected low, unfair offers had lower platelet serotonin levels 
than those who accepted these offers (Emanuele et al., 2008). In a naturalistic 
study, Stewart et al. (2014) reported increased generosity while playing the UG 
after taking MDMA; this was quantified as the difference between the highest 
amount offered and the lowest amount accepted. 
As mentioned above, there are a range of serotonin receptor subtypes (Barnes 
and Sharp, 1999; Hoyer et al., 2002). Having established that the serotonin 
system is implicated in social cognition, it would be beneficial to establish if 
specific receptor subtypes underlie this serotonergic effect. As such, the current 
study investigated the influence of the psychedelic compound psilocybin (4-
phosphoryloxy-N,N-dimethyltryptamine). Psilocybin’s primary metabolite, 
psilocin, is a mixed serotonin agonist, with highest affinity for 5-HT1A and 5-
HT2A receptors (Passie et al., 2002). Schmid et al (2013) found no effect of 
psilocybin on the ability to discriminate happy from neutral faces, but reported 
an impairment in the ability to discriminate fearful faces from neutral faces. 
Kometer et al (2012), on the other hand, have shown that psilocybin improves 
recognition of positive, but not negative, facial affect; an effect that was 
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reversed by pre-treatment with the 5-HT2A receptor antagonist ketanserin. 
Furthermore, psilocybin has been shown to alter processing of social 
interactions such that Preller et al (2016) reported a reduction in feelings of 
experimentally-induced social exclusion with psilocybin compared to placebo. 
The pharmacology of psilocybin was discussed in detail in 0 (Section 1.8.2). 
Here, I will briefly reiterate the pertinent points for this study. Evidence suggests 
that the psychedelic effects of psilocybin – which include vivid perceptual 
alterations, disruptions of thought, time distortion, and euphoria – are largely 
driven by direct agonist action at the 5-HT2A receptor (Nichols, 2004; 
Vollenweider and Kometer, 2010). This is supported by a body of research in 
both rodents and humans (e.g. Carter et al., 2005; González-Maeso et al., 
2007; Vollenweider et al., 1998). Figure 3-1 (reproduced from Section 1.8.2) 
shows how conformational changes of the 5-HT2A receptor following binding by 
classic psychedelics (of which psilocybin is an example) initiates a specific 
intracellular signalling pathway, mediated by src kinase. Blocking this pathway 
in rodents has been shown to eliminate psychedelic behavioural markers 




Figure 3-1: Diagram illustrating hypothesised mechanisms underlying hallucinogenic (HC) and 
non-hallucinogenic (NHC) compound activation of the 5-HT2A receptor. A) Unbound 5-HT2A 
receptor; B) Shows conformational changes following NHC binding. This allows initiation of 




Saracatinib is a src-family kinase inhibitor developed for solid tumour therapy 
(Hennequin et al., 2006). It is an investigational compound which, due to its 
specific inhibition of src and fyn kinases, has been repurposed and tested in a 
phase Ib clinical trial testing for safety, tolerability and nervous system 
availability in Alzheimer’s disease (Nygaard et al., 2015). This study showed 
acceptable tolerability and safety at a range of doses, as well as dose-
dependent levels of the compound in cerebral spinal fluid, suggesting crossing 
of the blood-brain barrier. By using this compound in the present study, we 
aimed to investigate if we can attenuate any psilocybin-induced changes in 
social cognition in healthy volunteers. Attenuation of these effects by src kinase 
inhibition would provide strong evidence of 5-HT2A involvement in these 
processes.  
In this study, we first aimed to investigate the effect of psilocybin and 
saracatinib on social decision-making by looking at responses to a range of 
offer levels in the UG.  This task was completed outside of the scanner. Task-
free resting state fMRI data was collected while participants were infused with 
the psilocybin. As such, I was able to carry out an exploratory analysis 
investigating the functional connectivity of regions identified in the meta-analysis 
reported in 0 (Gabay et al., 2014). The aim of this analysis was to investigate 
whether any changes in UG behaviour across experimental sessions could be 
associated with changes in connectivity of the UG seed regions as a result of 
the pharmacological manipulations. Due to the time delay during the collection 
of this data and completion of the UG, this data must be treated with 
appropriate caution.  
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We also had participants carry out a facial affect recognition task outside of the 
scanner. In addition, we aimed to investigate the effect of pre-treatment with the 
src-family kinase inhibitor, saracatinib, on these measures. We hypothesised 
that psilocybin would reduce rejection rates of unfair offers in the UG. We also 
hypothesised an effect of psilocybin on affect recognition, such that an 
improved accuracy for positive emotions and reduced accuracy of negative 
emotions would be found. Additionally, we hypothesised that pre-treatment with 
saracatinib would attenuate these effects. 
In the following section I will introduce the version of the Ultimatum Game used, 




3.3 Validation of the Ultimatum Game task design 
3.3.1 Abstract 
The Ultimatum Game (UG) is a task increasingly used in cognitive neuroscience 
to investigate prosociality, self-interest, and responses to (un)fairness.  
Modulation of performance in this task in pharmacological studies would provide 
insights into its neural underpinnings. Such approaches require that 
performance stability is known so that appropriate designs of adequate power 
can be planned. We have carried out a test-retest reliability study to aid design 
and interpretation of future modulatory studies of the UG. 15 (6F) participants 
completed the UG at least one week apart. To assess reliability across 
sessions, variance components were extracted from a generalized linear mixed 
effects model, with each participant entered as a random effect. This enabled 
comparison of within- and between-participant variance. Performance in the 
task itself was also assessed, using the generalized estimating equations 
method. The task showed good test-retest reliability (Rs ranging from 0.68 – 
0.82). Participants rejected a low offers (10-20%) more when they believed the 
offer came from a real person compared to when it was explicitly received from 
a computer (χ2(1,16) = 14.69, OR = 0.31, p < 0.001). As such, this task is not only 
reliable for use in multi-session studies, but also produces results in line with 




3.3.2 Introduction  
The Ultimatum Game (UG) is a task developed in the field of behavioural 
economics which has been introduced in detail in 0 (Sections 1.5) of this thesis. 
Most neuroimaging studies investigate UG responses, rather than proposals 
(Civai et al., 2012a; Civai, 2013a; C. Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2013; Sanfey, 
2003), and this is the approach taken in the current version of the task. 
Researchers frequently present UG offers to participants on a computer, rather 
than have live partners play the game with them. In order to ensure study 
participants believe the offers are genuine, different cover-stories are created 
about where the offers originate. In the current version of the game, participants 
were told that the offers were collected as part of another study in the wider 
research project. Participants were led to believe that previous participants 
would be paid a proportion of the money earned, based on the responses of the 
participants in the current study. They were also told that their own financial 
reimbursement was linked to their responses in the game.  
When conducting a repeated-measures psychopharmacological study it is 
important to have an understanding of the test-retest reliability of the tasks 
being used to assess the behavioural effect of an intervention. That is, whether 
in the absence of any pharmacological intervention, will people behave similarly 
across multiple sessions? If a test has poor test-retest reliability, the large 
variance of the within-participant responses could make it difficult for an effect 
of the pharmacological intervention to be detected, particularly if the effect size 
is small. It may also be the case that the process being measured is not stable 
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(e.g. continued learning). This has implications regarding the sample size 
required to detect an effect and the amount of training required for participants. 
The current study was designed to assess the test-retest reliability of the 
version of the UG used in the psilocybin study. In addition, we report the 
outcome of the first session to compare the results to those in the literature. 
 
3.3.2 Methods  
3.3.2.1 Participants  
Seventeen participants were recruited by advertising through King’s College 
London’s research volunteer portal. Of these, two participants did not complete 
both sessions, so all data analyses are based on 15 datasets (6 F; mean age 
21.3yrs, range 19-27yrs). While the drug study reported in this chapter (Section 
3.4 below) only included male participants, both genders were included in this 
validation to make the results more generalizable. Participants played a 
repeated, single-shot UG on two separate occasions at least one week apart 
(mean: 7.7 days; range: 7 – 10 days). Written informed consent was obtained 
from each participant, and  ethical approval granted by the King’s College 
London’s Psychiatry, Nursing and Midwifery Research Ethics Subcommittee 
(PNM 14/15-10). 
3.3.2.2 Procedure 
This version of the UG has three ‘offer origin’ conditions: first-party (FP), third-
party (TP) and random computer-generated offer (GS). Only the FP and GS 
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conditions will be reported here, as these are the only conditions used in the 
psilocybin study.  
In the FP condition, participants made a decision to reject or accept an offer 
made directly to them.  The premise of this condition is that both they and the 
proposer will be affected by their response. In the GS condition, the participant 
is told that the offer they receive is a random, computer-generated offer. In this 
condition, their decision solely affects their own payoff. Participants were told 
that they would be paid one percent of the total amount they earn during the 
course of the study; in reality participants were paid a fixed sum of £20. 
While the majority of published studies investigate offers from 10-50% of the 
total stake, the present study includes “hyper-fair” offers of 80 and 90%. All 
offers were out of a total stake of £20, so an 80% offer equates to £16. The 
number of each offer level is given in Table 3-1. The same offers were 
presented in each offer origin condition; thus participants received a total of 144 
offers, split across two runs of the task. Figure 3-2 shows the order of 










Table 3-1: Number of each offer level and the fairness level assigned for the sake of analysis 
Offer level (%) Number of offers at this 
level 
Fairness level 
10 8  
Unfair 
20 8 
30 4  
N/A 
40 4 
50 8 Fair 








Figure 3-2: A single round from the UG version tested here. First participants are told who is 
making the offer, they are then told what the offer is, before being asked to either accept or reject 
that offer 
 
3.3.2.3 Data analysis 
The raw data comes in the form of dichotomous accept/reject decisions for each 
offer. There were 16 offers each from the unfair and hyper-fair levels, and eight 
fair offers. Participants completed the task during two separate sessions, and 
the test-retest reliability was tested across these two sessions. 
Test-retest reliability 
A popular statistic for test-retest reliability is the intraclass correlation coefficient 
(ICC) (Shrout and Fleiss, 1979). The ICC gives the proportion of the total 
variance (between- and within-participant) that can be explained by the 
between-participant variance, with a maximum value of one indicating no within-
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subjects’ variability. As the method uses the variance components of a 
repeated-measures ANOVA, it is not an appropriate measure for non-Gaussian 
data such as the binomial or proportion data collected here (Nakagawa and 
Schielzeth, 2010). 
I have used the rptR package (version 0.6.405, Nakagawa and Schielzeth, 
2010) implemented in the R statistical environment (R Development Core 
Team, 2015). I entered each participant as a random effect into a generalised 
linear mixed model (GLMM) and extracted variance components to obtain an 
estimate of repeatability on a logit-link scale. An estimate of more than 0.6 was 
considered an acceptable level of reliability. This represents 60% of the total 
variance being explained by between-participant variance. 
Outcome of session one 
In order to assess whether participants completing this version of the UG 
behave similarly to the behaviour reported in the UG literature, I took the first 
session as an example and analysed the data from this session. The data 
collected was in the form of categorical (accept or reject) responses to 
monetary offers. Converting this data to proportions and analysing with an 
ANOVA is problematic on two fronts. First, the proportion data is non-normally 
distributed. Second, variance of binomial distributions do not show 
homogeneity, thus violating the assumptions of ANOVA (Jaeger, 2008).  
As such, the current data have been analysed using repeated-measures logistic 
regression, implemented with generalized estimating equations using IBM 
SPSS Statistics for Windows (IBM Corp., 2012). This is a nonparametric test 
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which takes into account the correlation of responses within subjects, and 
produces a chi-squared statistic (χ2), an odds ratio (OR) and its 95% confidence 
interval (CI), and a p-value. It is a recommended approach to analysing 
categorical data that has been used in a number of studies in the UG literature 
(M. J. Crockett et al., 2013; Hanley et al., 2003; Koenigs et al., 2007; Koenigs 
and Tranel, 2007; Wang, 2014). The odds ratio represents the change in 
probability of an event (in this case, a rejection) occurring with a change in 
condition (fairness, offer origin etc.). 
 
3.3.3 Results  
3.3.3.1 Outcome of session one 
Figure 3-3A displays the rejection rates at each offer level in the first session, 
for both the FP and GS condition. In line the with published literature 
investigating the UG, rejection rates decreased with increasing offer levels 
(Civai, 2013a; Crockett et al., 2008; Gabay et al., 2014; Güth et al., 1982; 
Sanfey, 2003). 
The GEE method estimates a covariance structure for repeated measurements, 
and when there is very low variance in responses within a ‘cluster’ (for example, 
a participant accepting all fair offers), the method is unable to ‘converge’ on a 
covariance structure for that cluster. This renders subsequent parameter 
estimates unreliable. This was the case for fair and hyper-fair offers in the 
current analysis, where almost every offer was accepted in both the FP and GS 
conditions (see Figure 3-3B). In order to investigate the effect of offer origin on 
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unfair offers, I removed the fair and hyper-fair conditions from the model. This 
analysis found a statistically significant main effect of offer origin, such that 
there was a 73% reduction in the probability of rejecting an unfair offer in the 
GS condition compared the FP condition (χ2(1,16) = 11.83, OR = 0.27, p < 0.001). 






Figure 3-3: Rejection rates from session one of the validation study of the psilocybin study's 
version of the Ultimatum Game. A) Rejection rates per offer, error bars: ±1SE; FP: First person 
condition, GS: Random number generator; B) Rejection rates when grouped into unfair (10-20%), 
fair, (50%) and hyper-fair (80-90%) offers. Boxes represent the interquartile range, with a bold line 
at the median. Whiskers extend to data points within the range*interquartile range. Individual 




3.3.3.2 Test-retest reliability between sessions 
Table 3-2 shows the Repeatability (R) estimates and their 95% confidence 
interval (CI) for each fairness level in each condition. 
Generalized mixed models attempt to estimate a covariance matrix of repeated 
measurements. When there is little variation in response, this is not possible, 
resulting in a failure to ‘converge’ on a covariance matrix. In the current data, 
there was not enough variation in responses in either condition for the fair and 
hyper-fair offers to calculate a repeatability statistic. Examination of Figure 3-4B 
and C shows that all but one participant rejected an equal number of offers in 
each session at these fairness levels, representing almost perfect repeatability.  
Table 3-2 shows that responses to unfair offers in both conditions were reliable, 
with the FP condition showing very high reliability (FP: R = 0.82, 95% CIs: 0.56 
– 0.97; GS: R = 0.69, 95% CIs: 0.39 – 0.86). Figure 3-4A shows the variability 
in response to unfair offers for each participant. The median change in rejection 
rates was zero for both conditions, the inter-quartile range being 9.38 and 28.13 
for the FP and GS conditions respectively. 
Table 3-2: Repeatability (R) estimates with 95% CIs in brackets for each condition across fairness 




Unfair Fair Hyper-fair 
FP 0.82 (0.56 – 0.97) NV NV 




Figure 3-4: Change in rejection rate for each participant in each condition across fairness levels. A) 




This study was designed to investigate the validity of the version of the 
Ultimatum Game (UG) used in the psilocybin study. Rejection rates to all offer 
levels showed good test-retest reliability, in both the social and non-social 
control conditions. Furthermore, the results from session one are in line with 
those seen in the UG literature. 
Taking the first session as an example, the results found in the current version 
of the task followed the same pattern as those seen in the literature, with 
decreasing rejection rates with increasing offer levels. Furthermore, there was a 
difference in rejection rates of low offers when received from a non-social 
bargaining partner compared to a social partner. It should be noted, however, 
that the rejection rates seen in the non-social condition were higher than 
typically seen. For example, in the first neuroimaging study of the UG, the mean 
rejection rate of 10% offers in the non-social control condition were 35%, 
compared to 55% seen here. Despite the higher rejection rates of the GS 
condition, there is still a statistical difference, with a moderate effect size, 
between the two conditions. This is important as it shows the cognitive 
mechanisms under investigation in the social condition are in fact due to the 
social factors of the task rather than purely monetary considerations. 
With the evidence that these findings show good test-retest reliability, we do not 
expect there will be a limited sensitivity to detect changes across multiple 
sessions, and we can be confident that the effect size detectable by a within-
participant study design will not be unnecessarily inflated. 
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This validation study therefore establishes the current version of the Ultimatum 
Game as an acceptable protocol, with good test-retest reliability, for use in 




3.4 The effect of psilocybin on social cognition 
3.4.1 Abstract 
Psilocybin is a compound which causes potent changes in subjective conscious 
experience. There is strong evidence that these effects are mediated by 
agonism at the serotonin (5-HT) 2A or 1A receptors. With the serotonergic 
system implicated in many aspects of social cognition and social decision-
making, we investigated the effect of psilocybin on the Ultimatum Game (UG) 
and facial affect recognition. Furthermore, we administered the src-kinase 
inhibitor, saracatinib, to investigate whether disruption of putative intracellular 
pathways related to psilocybin would attenuate any effects seen in these tasks. 
Twenty male participants completed this study. The effect of psilocybin was 
compared to a drug-free session in an open-label design, while the effect of 
saracatinib on psilocybin was tested in a placebo-controlled, crossover design. 
Thus the tasks were completed on three occasions: drug free, psilocybin alone 
(Psilo), psilocybin following pre-treatment with saracatinib (Psilo+). Task free 
functional neuroimaging data were collected on both psilocybin sessions. In the 
UG, compared to the drug-free session, there was reduced rejection of unfair 
offers in the Psilo session (χ2(1,18) = 4.58, OR = 0.42, p = 0.006). Compared to 
the Psilo session, there was an increase in rejection of unfair offers in the Psilo+ 
session (χ2(1,18) = 4.54, OR = 1.53, p = 0.032). There was no statistical 
difference in rejection behaviour between the drug-free session and the Psilo+ 
session (χ2(1,18) = 2.26, p = 0.133). There was no difference in facial affect 
recognition across sessions. An exploratory analysis found differences in 
functional connectivity related to later UG behavioural changes, and these are 
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discussed. These data provide evidence that the mixed serotonergic agonist, 
psilocybin, affects how people respond to violations of social norms in the 
context of the UG. 
   
3.4.2 Introduction  
Section 3.2 introduced the background to the study presented here. It is clear 
from the literature that the serotonergic system plays an important role in 
mediating social cognition, including social decision-making (for a review, see 
Crockett, 2009), with research suggesting that acute administration of a 
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor can reduce rejection rates in the 
Ultimatum Game (UG) (Crockett et al., 2008; M. J. Crockett et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, psilocybin has been shown to alter emotion processing 
(Bernasconi et al., 2014; Kometer et al., 2012) and a recent study has 
examined the sociocognitive effects of psilocybin using a social exclusion 
paradigm (Preller et al., 2016).  
Psilocybin and its metabolite psilocin are potent, mixed serotonergic agonists, 
with their effects largely the result of its activation of the serotonin 2A (5-HT2A) 
receptor (Nichols, 2004; for an in-depth discussion psilocybin pharmacology, 
see 0, Section 1.8.2). Furthermore, evidence from rodent studies suggest the 
src family of tyrosine kinases are involved in the downstream mechanisms 
responsible for the psychedelic effects of psilocybin (González-Maeso et al., 
2007; Gonzalez-Maeso and Sealfon, 2009). 
145 
 
Saracatinib is an investigational compound which potently inhibits tyrosine 
kinases, including the src family of kinases (Nygaard et al., 2015).  The current 
study was a mechanistic study with the aim of determining whether saracatinib 
would alter the behavioural effects of psilocybin in healthy human volunteers. In 
addition, we investigated whether or not changes in task-free functional 
connectivity, compared across experimental sessions, of brain regions identified 
in 0 (Gabay et al., 2014) could be linked to changes in UG behaviour. 
We hypothesised that psilocybin would reduce rejection rates of unfair offers in 
the UG, and that pre-treatment with saracatinib would attenuate this effect. 
Furthermore, we hypothesised that psilocybin would reduce recognition of 
negative facial expressions, increase recognition of positive facial expressions, 
and that pre-treatment with saracatinib would reverse this effect. 
 
3.4.3 Methods  
3.4.3.1 Participants 
Twenty-three male participants were recruited from the community and gave 
written informed consent to take part in the study and were financially 
compensated for their time. Psychopharmacological studies are particularly 
sensitive to differences in hormone levels in participants.  As such, single-sex 
studies have more power to detect a given effect. Fluctuations in levels of 
hormones in males are less than those in females, thus making it simpler to 
choose an all-male design. In addition, there is no information available on the 
effects of psilocybin and saracatinib on the developing foetus. The sample size 
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was based on a power calculation relating to imaging parameters not reported 
in this thesis (arterial spin labelling), and was based on previous psilocybin 
neuroimaging research (Carhart-Harris et al., 2012). The study received ethical 
approval from King’s College London’s Psychiatry, Nursing and Midwifery 
Research Ethics Committee (PNM/14/15-11). 
Exclusion criteria included: personal history of psychiatric illness (assessed with 
the Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview, Sheehan et al., 1998); first-
order relative with a history of psychotic illness; evidence of cardiac (assessed 
with ECG), hepatic, renal, gastrointestinal (assessed with standard blood 
screening) or neurological disorders; excessive use of caffeine (> six cups of 
coffee per day) and alcohol (> 28 units per week); current use of medication; 
failure of drugs of abuse test at screening or on either study day (drugs tested 
for: amphetamine, barbiturates, benozodiazepines, cocaine, THC, methadone, 
methamphetamine, opiate, phenylcyclidine, tricyclic antidepressants). 
Participants were only included in this study if they had at least one previous 
experience with a hallucinogenic drug. Participants were excluded if any 
previous experience could be described as ‘negative’, or a ‘bad trip’. We did not 
collect data on lifetime use. 
Three participants did not complete the study: the QTc reading of one 
participant’s ECG exceeded the upper limit specified in the study protocol on 
the day of testing; one participant experienced high anxiety prior to the 
psilocybin dosing on his first session and withdrew from the study (following 
unblinding it was revealed he had taken placebo on this session) and one 
participant tested positive for cocaine on the morning of his second session. As 
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such, 20 participants completed the study (mean age 26.6, SD 7.1, range 19 – 
47). 
3.4.3.2 Experimental procedure 
This study followed a double-blind, placebo-controlled, cross-over, counter-
balanced design. Following a successful screening, participants attended two 
experimental study days at least one week apart (mean 13.3 days, SD 3.5, 
range 1 – 15). On each experimental study day participants would receive a 
placebo followed by psilocybin (“Psilo”) or saracatinib followed by psilocybin 
(“Psilo+”).  
See Figure 3-5 for a schematic representing the study day. Participants arrived 
at the study centre at 08:30, at which time we repeated neurological, cardiac, 
and general health safety checks to ensure nothing had changed since their 
screening visit. At 10:00 participants were dosed with either 125mg saracatinib 
or placebo, orally. At 30 minutes and 120 minutes post-dose participants gave a 
blood sample. At 180 minutes post-dose participants completed some 
questionnaires and were retrained in the tasked they were to perform in the 
scanner. At 240 minutes post-dose participants entered the scanner. The 
scanning session lasted 90 minutes, with an infusion of 2mg psilocybin over 2 
minutes occurring approximately 40 minutes into the scanning session (280 
minutes post saracatinib). 
Following the scanning session, a further blood sample was taken and 
participants completed a questionnaire of subjective effects, the UG (340 
minutes post saracatinib) and the Affective Bias task (355 minutes post 
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saracatinib). Participants then completed further questionnaires before 
commencing discharge procedures. The study typically finished at around 
17:00. For the current chapter only the results of the UG and Affective Bias task 
will be considered. Analyses of blood samples collected during this study are 
not reported in this thesis, due to the data not being available at the time of 
writing. 
For full details of the UG task implemented in this study see Section 3.3, which 
outlines the stimuli and trial duration.  Appendix B presents the task instructions 
used for this task. . Briefly, participants were told they would receive offers out 
of £20 from either another player whose offer had been collected as part of 
another study (FP) or a randomly computer generated offer (GS). In both cases, 
acceptance of the offer would lead to the money being split as offered, while 
rejection would mean that neither player would receive any money for that 
round. Participants were told they would receive one percent of the amount of 
money earned during the course of the task; in reality they were paid a fixed 
sum for participation in the study as a whole. Table 3-1 displays the number of 
offers at each offer level. In this study participants received offers in two 
conditions (FP and GS), leading to a total of 96 offer trials presented in one run 
of the task. 
The Affective Bias task was taken from the EMOTICOM cognitive test battery 
(Bland et al., 2016). In this task participants see a face appear on the screen for 
approximately half a second and are asked to indicate which emotion the face 
was expressing from a choice of happy, sad, fear or anger. For each emotion 
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there are nine levels of intensity. Control conditions of faces of different ages 
were presented at the half way point in the task.  
 
 
Figure 3-5: Graphical representation of the study day. ASL: arterial spin labelling; Moving dots: 
visual processing task; phMRI: pharmacological MRI; RT task: reaction time task 
 
3.4.3.3 Statistical analyses 
The Ultimatum Game 
The data collected was in the form of categorical (accept or reject) responses to 
monetary offers. Converting this data to proportions and analysing with an 
ANOVA is problematic on two fronts. First, the proportion data is non-normally 
distributed. Second, variance of binomial distributions do not show 
homogeneity, thus violating the assumptions of ANOVA (Jaeger, 2008).  
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As such, the current data have been analysed using repeated-measures logistic 
regression, implemented with generalized estimating equations using IBM 
SPSS Statistics for Windows (IBM Corp., 2012). This is a nonparametric test 
which takes into account the correlation of responses within subjects, and 
produces a chi-squared statistic (χ2), an odds ratio (OR) and its 95% confidence 
interval (CI), and a p-value. It is a recommended approach to analysing 
categorical data that has been used in a number of studies in the UG literature 
(M. J. Crockett et al., 2013; Hanley et al., 2003; Koenigs et al., 2007; Koenigs 
and Tranel, 2007). The odds ratio represents the change in probability of an 
event (in this case, a rejection) occurring with a change in condition (fairness, 
offer origin etc.). 
Since both experimental sessions involved administration of psilocybin, and the 
task was administered post scan only, participants were also asked to complete 
the task at screening, to act as a baseline measure. This is justified, given the 
test-retest reliability demonstrated in the previous section of this chapter. 
Affective Bias 
The Affective Bias task has a number of outcome measures. First is the 
percentage accuracy for each emotion (fear, anger, happy, sad) and control 
condition. Secondly is the affective bias, defined by Bland and colleagues 
(Bland et al., 2016) as the difference between happy and sad emotion accuracy. 
Finally, one can consider the bias of incorrect responses – i.e. what proportion 
of wrong responses corresponded to each emotion. 
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Here, we will compare these outcomes across sessions using repeated 
measures ANOVA, following up with post-hoc pairwise comparisons where 
appropriate. As with the UG, this task was administered post-psilocybin on both 
study days, so participants completed this task at the drug-free screening to act 
as a baseline measure. 
3.4.3.4 MRI data acquisition and analysis 
Functional images were acquired with a MR750 3.0 Tesla (T) General Electric 
MR scanner using a 32-channel head coil. A T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging 
sequence was used, with the following parameters: TR: 2500 ms; Multi-echo 
TEs: 12, 28, 44, 60ms; flip angle: 80°; slice thickness: 3.2 mm; field of view: 
240; number of slices: 28; 356 time points. We also acquired a structural 
Magnetization Prepared Rapid Gradient Echo (MPRAGE) image with the 
following parameters: TR: 7312 ms; TE: 3.02 ms; flip angle 11°; slice thickness: 
12 mm; 196 sagittal slices; field of view = 270. 
Multi-echo image acquisition acquires data at multiple echo times for each slice. 
This allows better characterisation of the BOLD-response, enabling an 
independent component analysis (ICA) to differentiate non-BOLD noise signal 
from BOLD-related signal changes. This method is described below.  Multi-echo 
data pre-processing was performed using the AFNI (Cox, 1996) tool meica.py 
(Kundu et al., 2013, 2014). Pre-processing steps included six-parameter rigid 
body motion correction, time-series de-spiking and slice time correction. 
Functional data were then optimally combined (OC) by taking a weighted 
summation of the four echoes, using an exponential T2* weighting approach 
(Posse et al., 1999). 
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The OC data were then de-noised with the AFNI tool meica.py (Kundu et al., 
2013, 2014). Multi-echo principal components analysis was first applied to the 
OC dataset to reduce the data dimensionality. Spatial ICA was then applied and 
the independent component time-series were fit to the pre-processed time-
series from each of the four echoes to generate ICA weights for each echo. 
These weights were then fit to the linear TE-dependence and TE-independence 
models to generate F-statistics and component-level κ and ρ values, which 
respectively indicate BOLD and non-BOLD weightings. The κ and ρ metrics 
were then used to identify the non-BOLD-like components to be regressed out 
from fMRI data. Further technical details on ME-ICA can be found in (Kundu et 
al., 2015). 
After de-noising, data were spatially smoothed with an 8-mm full width at half 
maximum Gaussian kernel and high-pass temporal filtered with a cut-off 
frequency of 0.005 Hz.  
A study-specific template representing the average T1-weighted anatomical 
image across subjects was built using the Advanced Normalization Tools 
(ANTs) (Avants et al., 2011) toolbox. Each participant’s cleaned dataset was co-
registered to its corresponding structural scan, then normalized to the study-
specific template before warping to standard MNI152 space, with 2×2×2mm3 
resampling.  
The resting state scan was 15 minutes long. Participants were instructed to 
keep their eyes open and look at a fixation cross. Five minutes into the scan 
participants were infused with 2mg psilocybin, dissolved in 5ml saline solution, 
at a steady rate over a period of two minutes. Previous research from our group 
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has investigated the pharmacological MRI response to drug infusions by 
modelling a gamma variate regressor at the first level (De Simoni et al., 2013; 
Doyle et al., 2013). The gamma variate response function was based on the 
following equation: 






where tmax is the time of peak amplitude and 𝛽 is a shape parameter. In the 
current study I was interested in modelling the subjective effects of the 
psilocybin infusion. A study from Carhart-Harris et al (2011) had participants 
rate the intensity of the subjective effects, every minute for 20 minutes, of an 
intravenous infusion of psilocybin at the same dose used in the current study. It 
should be noted however, that those authors infused the participants over one 
minute rather than two minutes. Figure 3-6A is taken from that publication and 
displays these subjective ratings. Here it can be seen that the peak effects are 
reached approximately three minutes from the end of the infusion. For the 
gamma variate function used in the current analysis, tmax was set to 96 (96 
volumes = 4 minutes from the middle of the infusion) and the shape parameter 
was adjusted to fit the rate of decline in the subjective effects seen in Figure 
3-6, set at 0.004. The gamma variate first level covariate was padded with zeros 
at its start, up until the time of infusion. 
All connectivity analyses were carried using the CONN toolbox (Whitfield-
Gabrieli and Nieto-Castanon, 2012). By modelling this function as part of a GLM 
at the first level, this analysis attempts to examine how functional connectivity 
changes in line with the expected subjective effects (see Figure 3-6B). I carried 
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out a seed-to-voxel bivariate correlation analysis using the peak voxels from five 
clusters identified in the meta-analysis reported in 0 (Gabay et al., 2014, see 
Figure 3-7). These seeds were: anterior cingulate gyrus (ACCg; MNI 6, 10, 30); 
right anterior insula (MNI 40, 11, 10); left frontal operculum/anterior insula (MNI 
-42, 13, 8); left fusiform gyrus (MNI -26, -73, -4); right cerebellum, cruss1 (MNI 
26, -71, -34). At the second level, the experimental sessions were contrasted, to 
identify regions whose connectivity with these seeds was different between the 
Psilo and Psilo+ sessions. To control for multiple comparisons, an F-contrasts 
was carried out looking for any effect of seed. Follow-up comparisons were 
carried out where appropriate. Following this, a second-level covariate was 
included in the model. This looked for regions whose connectivity with the 
seeds co-varied as a function of the participants change in rejection behaviour 
in the UG. I acknowledge the time delay between the scan and completing this 
task. However, since the gamma variate function attempted to capture the 
change in connectivity related to changes in subjective effects of the drug over 
time, this exploratory analysis could still be informative about possible 





Figure 3-6: A) Reproduced from Carhart-Harris (2011): “The 0–10 ratings were anchored with 0 
being ‘no noticeable drug effects’ and 10 being ‘extremely intense effects’. Time zero corresponds 
to the end of the 60 s injection” B) Gamma variate function. The connectivity analysis looked for 






Figure 3-7: Seeds used in the connectivity analysis. ACCg: anterior cingulate 
gyrus (MNI 6, 10, 30); AI: anterior insula (right MNI 40, 11, 10; left MNI -42, 13, 
8); left fusiform MNI -26, -73, -4; right cerebellum MNI 26, -71, -34. 
 
3.4.4 Results  
3.4.4.1 Ultimatum Game 
Due to technical issues, one participant’s responses were not recorded in the 
Psilo+ session. In this section we will mostly consider responses to unfair offers. 
For the other offer levels, the results are briefly summarised here: With the 
exception of one participant in the Psilo session and three participants in the 
Psilo+ session, all fair and hyper-fair offers were accepted. Of those who 
rejected offers at these fairness levels, one participant rejected 50% and 43.8% 
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of FP hyper-fair offers and GS hyper-fair offers respectively in the Psilo session. 
The same participant rejected 56.2% and 18.8% of offers in these same 
conditions in the Psilo+ session. In addition, one participant rejected 12.5% of 
fair FP offers in the Psilo+ session, and yet another rejected 6.3% of GS hyper-
fair offers in the Psilo+ session.  
Figure 3-8 displays a boxplot of rejections rates of unfair offers in the FP and 
GS conditions across sessions. There was a statistically significant main effect 
of offer origin, such that, compared to the FP condition, there was a reduced 
probability of rejecting unfair offers in the GS condition (χ2(1,18) = 6.24, OR = 
0.49, p = 0.013). Compared to the screening session, there was a statistically 
significant reduction in the probability of rejecting FP unfair offers in the Psilo 
session (χ2(1,18) = 4.58, OR = 0.42, p = 0.006). Compared to the Psilo session, 
there was a statistically significant increase in probability of rejecting FP unfair 
offers in the Psilo+ session (χ2(1,18) = 4.54, OR = 1.53, p = 0.032). There was no 
statistical difference in FP unfair rejection behaviour between the drug-free 





Figure 3-8: Boxplot displaying rejection rates of unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game across 
conditions. OR: odds ratio. Blue dots: FP condition; Orange dots: GS condition 
 
3.4.4.2 Affective Bias 
Three participants did not complete the task at screening. One participant was 
unable to complete all assessments due to time restrictions and for two there 
were technical difficulties with the computer equipment. As such, all analyses 
presented here are based on N = 17. Figure 3-9A displays the mean number of 
correct responses for both the control faces and all emotions pooled together. A 
2x3 repeated-measures ANOVA revealed that participants showed greater 
accuracy in the control condition than the affective condition across sessions 
(F(2,16) = 7.647, p = 0.014, ή
2 = 0.323). There was no statistically significant 
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change in accuracy in either condition across sessions (F(2,32) = 0.534, p = 
0.572, ή2 = 0.032). 
A one-way ANOVA revealed that Affective Bias, the difference between 
accuracy of happy and sad emotion identification, showed no statistical 
difference across sessions (see Figure 3-9B; F(2,32) = 1.019, p = 0.370, ή
2 = 
0.060). Furthermore, of those emotions identified incorrectly, there was no 
change in bias in the responses incorrectly given (see Figure 3-9C; F(2,32) < 




Figure 3-9: Affective Bias results. A) Comparison of accuracies of affective and control conditions, 
B) Affective bias (proportion of happy correct minus sad correct, C) Bias of wrong responses i.e. 




3.4.4.3 Subjective effects 
In this study, participants were asked to complete a subjective effects visual 
analogue scale questionnaire obtained from the authors of Carhart-Harris et al 
(2011). The first question on this questionnaire was “How intense were the drug 
effects when at their peak”. There was a statistically significant reduction in 
reported intensity during the Psilo+ session compared to Psilo session (t(17) = 
1.99, one-sided p = 0.031; two participants did not answer this first question on 
one session). 
In order to assess whether changes in UG rejection behaviour can be explained 
by changes in the overall subjective effects of the drug, I carried out a 
regression analysis with subjective rating of peak intensity as the independent 
variable and rejection of unfair FP offers as the dependent variable. There was 
no statistically significant relationship between the two variables (Beta = 0.175, 
p = 0.502). 
3.4.4.4 Exploratory functional connectivity analysis 
Figure 3-10 and Table 3-4 display the results from the functional connectivity 
analysis carried out on the pharmacological MRI data. This analysis used a first 
level covariate to identify how the seeds’ connectivity changed in line with the 
subjective effects.  
Carrying out an F-contrast to look for any changes across all seeds, three 
clusters were identified: left lateral occipital cortex; right central 
opercular/posterior insular, extending to mid/anterior insula; left cerebellum, 
anterior lobe. Examination of the beta estimates for this analysis suggests that 
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there was greater connectivity between the left fusiform seed and the occipital 
cluster during the Psilo session than during the Psilo+ session, and that both 
the ACCg and left fusiform seeds showed increased connectivity with the insula 
cluster, and that the fusiform, ACCg, and right insula seeds showed increased 
connectivity with the cerebellar cluster, during the Psilo session compared to 
the Psilo+ session. 
Including a second level covariate of change in rejection rate of unfair UG offers 
between sessions, one cluster was identified in the right orbitofrontal cortex. 
Examining the beta estimates for this analysis suggests a significant correlation 
between change in rejection rates and the connectivity of the right anterior 
insula to this orbitofrontal cluster, and connectivity of the left fusiform gyrus to 
this orbitofrontal cluster ; such that the greater the increase in connectivity, the 




Table 3-4:Clusters showing changes in functional connectivity across experimental sessions 












x y z 
F-contrast contrast of changes from Psilo to Psilo+ 
Left Lateral 
occipital cortex 




0.002 323 58 0 6 4.08 Central oper/ 
post insula 
   38 8 8  Mid/ant insula 
Right cerebellum, 
anterior lobe 
0.002 377 -26 -46 -28 3.82  
F-contrast contrast of changes from Psilo to Psilo+, with a second level covariate of change in rejection 
rates of unfair offers between these two sessions 
Right orbitofrontal 
cortex 
0.019 321 24 36 -12 4.17  
   28 24 0 3.67  
 
 
Figure 3-10: OFC cluster whose change in connectivity with the right anterior insula and left 




3.4.5 Discussion  
This study is the first to provide direct evidence of specific serotonergic receptor 
involvement in behaviour underlying responses to unfair offers in the Ultimatum 
Game (UG). As hypothesised, when responding to UG offers following 
intravenous administration of psilocybin – at a point where the most acute drug 
effects had diminished – participants showed a reduced probability of rejecting 
low offers compared to the drug-free screening visit. Treatment with the src-
family kinase inhibitor, saracatinib, appears to attenuate this effect. 
Furthermore, an exploratory analysis revealed a statistically significant 
relationship between changes in rejection rates across experimental sessions 
and the functional connectivity between a cluster in the right orbitofrontal cortex 
(OFC) and both the right anterior insula and left fusiform gyrus, in task-free 
functional neuroimaging during the period of the acute drug effects. Counter to 
our hypothesis, there was no change in facial affect recognition across 
sessions.  
Studies have previously implicated the serotonergic system in responses to 
unfairness in the UG (Crockett et al., 2008; M. J. Crockett et al., 2010, 2013). 
These studies found that altering serotonin availability through SSRI 
administration and tryptophan depletion (ATD) altered rejection rates of 
moderately unfair offers, but not very unfair offers (10-20%). The current study 
extends these findings by providing evidence of changes in rejection behaviour 
for the most unfair of offers. The authors of the previous studies claim that 
reduced rejection is due to an increased harm aversion being induced by 
greater serotonin availability, and that rejecting an offer harms the other by 
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denying them reward (M. J. Crockett et al., 2010). There is of course the harm 
to oneself implicit in rejection behaviour – by rejecting an offer one forgoes 
one’s own financial reward. Indeed, this is what makes rejection behaviour in 
the UG so interesting. When people reject unfair offers, one’s own loss is 
considerably lower than that of the proposer, and it is considered a prosocial act 
to forgo this reward in the interest of punishing a violation of social norms (Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2003).  
In this light, it is possible to consider a decrease in rejection as being due to a 
change in reward sensitivity, or an increase in loss aversion. A limitation of the 
current study is that neither of these possibilities were explored. However, 
Crockett et al (2015) specifically included loss aversion in a computational 
model of ‘moral’ decision-making and found no change as a result of 
serotonergic manipulation. Furthermore, Takahashi (2012) conducted a review 
of monoamine influence on risk during (non-social) decision-making and 
concluded that increased serotonergic activity would lessen, rather than 
increase loss aversion. 
A study investigating the effect of training in mindfulness meditation on UG 
behaviour found similar results to those presented here, such that participants 
accepted more unfair offers post training (Kirk et al., 2016). Drawing on the 
finding that accompanying this decrease in rejection rate was an attenuation of 
anterior insula activation in response to unfair offers, the authors of this study 
claimed that the change in behaviour may be due to greater emotion regulation. 
This draws on the hypothesis that rejection behaviour is driven by a negative 
emotional reaction to unfair treatment (e.g. Sanfey, 2003), and that regulation of 
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this then led to greater social cooperation. The current study did not include any 
measurement of emotional states, so it is not possible to speculate too far on 
the psychological mechanisms underlying the changes in UG behaviour seen 
here. 
In an important extension of previous psychopharmacological studies of UG 
behaviour, the current study has shown the serotonergic effect to be specific to 
particular receptor subtypes, through use of a preferential 5-HT1A/2A receptor 
agonist (Passie et al., 2002). SSRIs and ATD cause global changes to 
serotonergic availability; the first through inhibition of presynaptic reuptake, the 
latter through limitation of serotonin precursor compounds (Stahl, 2013; Young, 
2013). Changes in behaviour following either manipulation cannot provide 
specific insight into the serotonergic mechanisms underlying these changes. 
Psilocybin acts with highest affinity at 5-HT1A and 5-HT2A receptors (Passie et 
al., 2002), and there is evidence to suggest that conformational changes 
following hallucinogen binding at these receptors activate additional 
intracellular, second-messenger pathways (González-Maeso et al., 2007; 
Gonzalez-Maeso and Sealfon, 2009). This same evidence suggests that one of 
these pathways relies on the src-family kinases. By attenuating the effect of 
psilocybin on UG behaviour through inhibition of src-kinase, we have provided 
dual evidence that the behavioural changes presented here are due to 5-
HT1A/2A agonism. 
A motivation for the current study was the current lack of research examining 
the psychopharmacology of social decision-making. However, there is evidence 
of 5-HT2A receptor involvement in other aspects of social behaviour. In a study 
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investigating the effects of psilocybin, the 5-HT2A receptor antagonist 
ketanserin blocked drug-induced reductions in recognition of negative facial 
affect (Kometer et al., 2012). In mice, increases in social behaviour, following 
administration of 3,4-methylenedioxy-methamphetamine (MDMA), were linked 
to 5-HT1A receptors (Thompson et al., 2007). Also in mice, there is some 
evidence that effects of the cannabinoid THC on social interaction are reliant on 
5-HT2A receptors (Viñals et al., 2015). The current finding that the 5-HT1A/2A 
receptor subtypes play a crucial role in rejection behaviour in the UG extends 
these findings to human interpersonal interactions. 
In this study we have also shown a relationship between changes in functional 
connectivity during the acute phase of the psilocybin effect with behaviour in the 
UG after the psychedelic effect has largely dissipated. These changes were 
seen in the connectivity of voxels of interest identified in the meta-analysis of 
UG neuroimaging studies reported in 0 (Gabay et al., 2014). Whilst 
acknowledging the time delay separating collection of these data (approximately 
50 minutes), and the vast differences between the acute psilocybin effects and 
those still being experienced at the time of UG data collection, these data 
provide preliminary evidence that changes in connectivity, mediated by 5-
HT1A/2A receptor activity, can influence behaviour in interpersonal interactions.  
By using a gamma variate model based on the trajectory of subjective effects 
measured by Carhart-Harris et al (2011), the connectivity findings examine 
changes that follow this trajectory. Follow-up studies should attempt to replicate 
these findings, which are discussed below, whilst completing the task during 
functional neuroimaging. A benefit of the current design is that UG behaviour 
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was not confounded by the profound alterations in experience induced by 
psilocybin administration. Unfortunately we do not have subjective effects data 
from the time of completing the UG task, but we did not find a relationship 
between changes in the peak effects and UG behaviour across sessions. The 
current findings could inform analysis design in fMRI-UG studies investigating 
other serotonergic compounds. 
When looking at changes in seed connectivity across experimental conditions, 
the left fusiform gyrus and ACCg seeds showed increased connectivity to a 
cluster which encompassed the right anterior insula, and right central 
operculum/posterior insula region during the Psilo compared to Psilo+ session. 
There is growing evidence that the ACCg is involved in tracking others’ 
motivations during interpersonal interactions (M. A. J. Apps et al., 2013; Apps et 
al., 2016; Apps and Sallet, 2017). There is strong evidence that the anterior 
insula is involved in responses to norm violations, be it to signal negative 
emotions associated which such violations or inequality more generally (Civai et 
al., 2012a; Civai, 2013a; Sanfey, 2003; Sanfey et al., 2014). If one can 
extrapolate that these changes in connectivity may still be present at the time of 
UG completion, these results suggests that a greater integration of these 
regions may play a role in driving rejection behaviour. Furthermore, the central 
operculum/posterior insula region has been implicated in UG studies, 
particularly in reference to accepting unfair offers (Güroğlu et al., 2011b; Kirk et 
al., 2011b, 2016). In the current study, acceptance of unfair offers was seen 
more often in the session with higher connectivity of this region to the ACCg. 
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This is an intriguing finding which should be followed up with a study which 
collects UG and imaging data concurrently. 
The current findings also suggest that the connectivity between the right 
anterior insula and the OFC varied in line with changes in rejection rate across 
experimental sessions; participants whose rejection rates increased more from 
the Psilo to Psilo+ session showing greater increase in the connectivity of these 
regions. The OFC has been implicated in reward processing across a range of 
domains, including in the UG (e.g. Becker et al..; Domenech et al.; Howard and 
Kahnt, 2017; Tabibnia et al., 2008). The finding that connectivity between the 
anterior insula, which is involved in signalling norm violations, and the OFC was 
altered in line with the magnitude of change in rejection rates suggests some 
role for the integration of these two processes in UG responder behaviour. 
Again, this hypothesis needs to be explicitly followed up with fMRI data 
collected during the UG itself. 
It is surprising that no changes were found across experimental sessions for the 
Affective Bias task. Studies investigating the effect of SSRIs have found 
changes in emotion recognition, albeit with some conflicting results (e.g. Alves-
Neto et al., 2010; Browning et al., 2007; Capitão et al., 2015; Harmer et al., 
2003a). One interpretation of the current study is that it may be evidence that 
the findings in previous studies are not due to 5-HT1A/2A receptor activity, but 
some other serotonergic effect. The Affective Bias task was not performed 
during the acute effects of psilocybin, which occurred while the participants 
were still in the scanner, but at a time where the subjective effects were very 
much reduced. Previous studies administering psilocybin during its acute stage 
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have demonstrated an effect on emotion recognition (Kometer et al., 2012; 
Schmidt et al., 2013). Therefore the acute and delayed effects of psilocybin on 
emotion processing may differ. Establishing this relationship is potentially 
important, given recent evidence of the antidepressant effects of psilocybin 
outside of the psychedelic window (Carhart-Harris et al., 2016; Griffiths et al., 
2016). The results presented here suggest that the UG may be a more sensitive 
measure of serotonergic changes in social processing than facial affect 
recognition. 
It could be that the perceptual disturbances of the psychedelic effect itself 
impaired facial processing in those previous studies (Kometer et al., 2012; 
Schmidt et al., 2013). Kometer et al (2012) found improved recognition of 
positive, but not negative valence; Schmid et al (2013) found reduced sensitivity 
to negative, but not positive, valence. While the acute psychedelic perceptual 
disturbances would not explain the differential effects of positive vs negative 
valence, there was no non-emotional control condition. Acute perceptual 
disturbances would not have been present in the current study precisely 
because the task was administered later in the time course of the drug effects. 
The Affective Bias task used in the current study includes a control condition 
where participants are asked to identify the age-range in which different faces 
belong (Bland et al., 2016). The fact that decision-making in this context was 
not altered across sessions shows that these perceptual disturbances were not 
an issue in the current study. 
The study presented here provides evidence of 5-HT1A/2A receptor 
involvement in responder behaviour in the UG. To follow up on this it would be 
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beneficial to establish any changes in reward sensitivity and loss aversion in 
non-social tasks. This would provide a better clarification that these effects are 
truly due to social processing. Differences were seen here between the social 
and non-social control condition, and as expected the drug treatment did not 
alter rejection rates in the non-social control condition. However, given that 
these were low already, it is feasible that the changes seen were not due to 
changes in social processing. 
Rejection behaviour in the UG is considered to be a prosocial behaviour (Rand 
et al., 2013; Rilling and Sanfey, 2011; Sanfey, 2003), yet rejection of unfair 
offers has also been classed as causing another harm, with reduction in 
rejection rates being an increase in harm aversion (Crockett, 2009). Recent 
studies have included a third-party condition, where participants make social 
decisions that do not affect their own outcome (Civai et al., 2012a, 2015; C. 
Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2013). By including such a condition in future 
psychopharmacology research, not only could one extend the literature 
attempting to explain ‘non-rational’ behaviour in social decision-making tasks, it 
would also help to tease apart the nuances in serotonergic activity in these 
tasks. 
A limitation of the current study was the open-label design of the psilocybin-
drug-free comparison. While placebo-controlled studies are the gold standard 
for psychopharmacology research, the difficulty in blinding compounds with 
such profound subjective effects as psilocybin is a recognised challenge for the 
field. This will be discussed further in Chapter 5. It should be noted that this 
limitation was not present when testing the effects of saracatinib, as any 
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subjective effects were subtle and participants were unable to discriminate 
saracatinib from placebo.  
Saracatinib is selective to src-family kinases, which in turn appear to be 
primarily associated with whose G-protein coupled receptors including the Gi/o 
subunit (Luttrell and Luttrell, 2004; Nygaard et al., 2015). Whilst the 
hypothesised mechanism being tested in this study was psilocybin-induced 5-
HT2A/1A interaction with Gi/o subunits, there does exist the possibility that the 
saracatinib effect seen was due to inhibition of src-signalling from other receptor 
Gi/o subunits. For example, dopamine D2 receptor activation involves this same 
subunit (British Pharmacological Society, accessed 2017). Therefore it is 
possible that the saracatinib effect is due to an influence on psilocybin’s indirect 
modulation of dopamine activity, or a psilocybin-independent effect on Gi/o 
signalling. 
Conclusion 
The study presented in this chapter has provided strong evidence for the role of 
specific receptor subtypes, the 5-HT1A/2A receptors, in rejection behaviour in 
the Ultimatum Game, such that agonism at these receptors reduces rejection of 
unfair offers. Provisionally, there appears to be a relationship to these changes 
and the connectivity between the anterior insula and orbitofrontal cortex, 
although these data were collected during an earlier, acute phase of drug 
effects than the UG data. No changes were seen in facial affect recognition, 
possibly suggesting different serotonergic mechanisms underlying this aspect of 
social cognition. Future work should aim to further clarify the neural 






Chapter 4 The effect of MDMA on social 
cognition 
4.1 Overview 
This chapter examines the effects of the 3,4-methylenedioxy-methamphetamine 
(MDMA) on social decision-making, emotion recognition, and empathy. These 
were measured using the Ultimatum Game (UG), Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), 
Affective Bias task and Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET). In addition to 
behavioural data, functional neuroimaging data was collected for the UG and 
PD. 
Section 4.2 will introduce the study reported in this chapter. Section 4.3 will 
introduce the versions of the PD and UG2 used in this study and report on their 
test-retest reliability. Section 4.4 will then present the method, results and 
discussion of the study examining the effect of MDMA on social cognition. 
  
                                            
2 One modification was made to this version of the UG before use in the MDMA study, 




Social cognition deficits are increasingly recognised as a fundamental aspect of 
a range of psychiatric illnesses, and current medications do not effectively treat 
these deficits (see 0; Gabay et al., 2015; Nuechterlein et al., 2004). 0 provided a 
detailed overview of these deficits. While deficits in emotion recognition and 
empathy are quite clearly established across a range of disorders (e.g. Bora 
and Pantelis, 2013; Dalili et al., 2015; Dziobek et al., 2011, 2008; Kohler et al., 
2010; Mazza et al., 2014), the research looking at social decision-making is less 
clear-cut, with a number of studies finding alterations across psychiatric 
conditions, and others not (see 0 for details; Csukly et al., 2011; de la Asuncion 
et al., 2015; Destoop et al., 2012; Gradin et al., 2014; McClure et al., 2007; 
Radke et al., 2013; Scheele et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2014). There are a 
number of challenges in social decision-making research in psychiatric illness. 
Currently there is not a clear characterisation of the precise nature and neural 
mechanisms of the deficits. Clarifying these will not only provide target 
processes for treatment, but also show the target brain systems. By developing 
an understanding of the psychopharmacology of social decision-making in 
healthy populations, these challenges can be addressed. This would reveal the 
normal brain systems and candidate modulatory systems involved in these 
processes.  
Social decision-making is an important domain because it moves beyond more 
traditional methods of social cognition research, and attempts to study the 
integration of a number of social processes in ecologically valid interpersonal 
interactions. As a field it utilises tasks with their origins in behavioural 
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economics, and adaptations of these tasks. Two such examples are the 
Ultimatum Game (UG) and Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). They have been 
introduced in detail elsewhere in this thesis. Between them they model trust, 
cooperation, social expectations and responses to violations of social norms.  
Unfair offers in the UG have been shown to consistently activate a network of 
brain regions, including the anterior insula, anterior mid-cingulate gyrus (aMCC) 
and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), putamen and supplementary motor area 
(Gabay et al., 2014). Interpretations for these activations are covered in detail in 
0, but will be repeated here in brief. Sanfey et al (2003) provided evidence that 
the strength of anterior insula activation predicted rejection rates in the UG. 
They concluded that this represented the negative emotion of being treated 
unfairly, and that this negative emotion drove rejection behaviour. The finding 
that insula activation was present in the absence of a strong emotional 
response when responding to unfair offers on behalf of a third party, however, 
suggests that anterior insula signals inequality and social norm violation, 
regardless of whether the person is directly involved in the outcome of the game 
(Civai et al., 2010a; C. Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2013). Conversely, 
aMCC/mPFC activation has been found to be specific to decisions regarding 
unfair offers to the self (Civai et al., 2013, 2015). 
There is a less diverse collection of published research investigating the neural 
correlates of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.  As outlined in 0 (Section 1.5.2.2), 
neuroimaging research has reported the involvement of the reward system and 
classic social cognition areas during the PD (e.g. Gradin et al., 2016; Rilling et 
al., 2002, 2008, 2004; Suzuki et al., 2011). Specifically, the orbitofrontal cortex 
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and ventral striatum are interpreted as representing reward during feedback of 
mutual cooperation, and activation of the superior temporal sulcus (STS), 
temporal-parietal junction (TPJ) and posterior cingulate gyrus are believed to 
represent processing of the intentionality of the other player (James K Rilling et 
al., 2004, 2004; Suzuki et al., 2011).  
Previous psychopharmacology research has suggested a role for the serotonin 
(5-HT) system in social decision-making. Evidence suggests that acute 
tryptophan depletion (ATD), which reduces the amount of systemic serotonin, 
alters behaviour in both the UG and PD. In the PD, ATD reduces cooperative 
behaviour, while in the UG it increases rejection of moderately (30% of the total 
stake) unfair offers, while not changing rejection rates of lower offers (Crockett 
et al., 2008; M. J. Crockett et al., 2013; Wood et al., 2006). In terms of 
‘prosocial’ behaviour, these results appear contradictory. Rejection of unfair 
offers in the UG is considered prosocial because it is thought to be altruistic 
punishment – punishment of another at a personal cost, but with a benefit to 
wider society. Cooperative behaviour is also considered prosocial. Therefore, 
an increase in one is at odds with a reduction in the other when framed through 
the lens of prosocial behaviour. Unfortunately the lack of 
psychopharmacological PD studies means these results have not been 
corroborated by others. In the UG however, increasing serotonin availability with 
acute administration of a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) has 
shown the opposite effect of ATD – a reduction in rejections of 30% offers 
(Crockett et al., 2010). The authors of this study interpreted this as being the 
result of increased harm aversion, with rejection in the context of the UG 
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bringing harm on one’s partner by reducing their payoff. The lack of effect for 
10-20% offers in these UG studies could mean that the serotonergic 
manipulations were not potent enough to effect UG behaviour at the extreme 
end of norm violations, or that multiple psychopharmacological mechanisms 
underlie UG behaviour.  
In the current study, we aimed to clarify the role of 5-HT in social decision-
making by using the potent serotonergic compound 3,4-methylenedioxy-
methamphetamine (MDMA). We also aimed to extend our understanding of the 
processes underling any 5-HT effect by concurrently collecting functional 
neuroimaging data. As detailed in 0, MDMA increases synaptic availability of 5-
HT by reversing membrane transporter proteins, as well as acting as a direct 
agonist at the 5-HT2A receptor (de la Torre et al., 2004; Green et al., 2003). 
MDMA has been shown to alter other social cognitive processes. A number of 
studies have found that MDMA increases affective, but not cognitive, empathy 
(Hysek et al., 2013; Kuypers et al., 2014; Schmid et al., 2014). As outlined in 0 
(Section 1.2), cognitive empathy is the ability to identify and understand the 
emotional content the other’s experience, while affective empathy involves not 
only an understanding of how someone else feels, but to some extend 
experiencing those same emotions.  Previous research has also found that 
MDMA reduces recognition of fearful, angry and sad facial expressions (Hysek 
et al., 2013; Matthew G Kirkpatrick et al., 2014; Schmid et al., 2014). In addition 
to investigating social decision-making, the current study seeks to reproduce 
these findings of MDMA on empathy and facial affect recognition. 
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We had participants complete adapted versions of the UG and PD. Full details 
of the version of these tasks can be found below, in Section 4.3. Participants 
played multiple single-shot UG rounds with players who offered amounts 
ranging from 10% to 90% of the total stake. We hypothesised that MDMA would 
reduce rejection rates of low offers (10-20%) when they were directly affected 
by the outcome of the game (first person condition, FP). We also had 
participants make decisions on behalf of a third-party (TP), where their own 
outcome was not affected by their decision. We hypothesised that in these 
cases, MDMA would not reduce rejection rates. Activity in brain regions 
identified in the meta-analysis reported in 0 (Gabay et al., 2014) was 
hypothesised to be altered in the placebo session, and that MDMA would affect 
these changes in activity. Specifically, we expected MDMA to reduce the mPFC 
response to unfair offers in the FP condition, while having no effect on AI 
activation. 
In the PD, participants played with both trustworthy (mostly cooperative) and 
untrustworthy (mostly competitive) players, as well as an explicit computer 
opponent (game server; non-social control). We hypothesised that MDMA 
would increase cooperation with both types of ‘human’ opponent, as well as 
increase self-reported trust in each opponent. We expected that none of these 
changes would be seen when playing the game server. We hypothesised that 
regions involved in social cognition, including the STS, TPJ and the posterior 
cingulate cortex would show increased activity when playing the game in the 
MDMA session compared to the placebo session.  
180 
 
We expected to reproduce previous findings on the effect of MDMA on facial 
affect recognition and empathy. Specifically, we expected MDMA to reduce 
recognition of negative facial emotions (anger, fear), and increase affective but 
not cognitive empathy in the MET. 
Before reporting the study investigating the effects of MDMA on social 
cognition, I will report the validation study investigating the version of the PD 




4.3 Validation of the Ultimatum Game and Prisoner’s Dilemma  
4.3.1 Abstract 
The Ultimatum Game (UG) and Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) are frequently-studied 
tasks investigating interpersonal interactions.  With evidence accumulating that 
there are behavioural differences between healthy samples and those with 
psychiatric disorders, psychopharmacological studies are needed to aid 
understanding of how the processes underlying these tasks are implemented in 
the healthy brain. Such approaches require that performance stability is known. 
We have carried out a test-retest reliability study to aid design and interpretation 
of future modulatory studies of the UG and PD. 15 (6F) participants completed 
the UG at least one week apart. To assess reliability across sessions, variance 
components were extracted from a generalized linear mixed effects model, with 
each participant entered as a random effect. This enabled comparison of within- 
and between-participant variance. Performance in the tasks themselves was 
also assessed, using the generalized estimating equations method. The UG 
showed acceptable between-session reliability (Rs ranging between 0.52 an 
and 0.82). Trust ratings of the other players in the PD were reliable between 
sessions (Rs ranging between 0.76 and 0.92). There was poor reliability across 
sessions of the PD, with regard to the number of compete decisions (Rs ranging 
from 0.18 and 0.48). However, there was a failure for the method to converge 
on the covariance matrix, making these results difficult to interpret. These 




4.3.2 Introduction  
Psychopharmacological research often utilises repeated-measures designs, 
with participants carrying out the same tasks in a number of experimental 
sessions. When designing these studies, it is important to consider the test-
retest reliability of the tasks being used. Test-retest reliability is a measure of 
the variance in participants’ responses to a task across multiple time points, in 
the absence of an experimental manipulation. Tasks with high reliability will 
have greater power to detect an effect of a manipulation than those with poor 
test-retest reliability. 
The current study was designed to assess the test-retest reliability of a version 
of the Ultimatum Game (UG) and Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). These were the 
versions proposed for use in the MDMA study reported later in this chapter. It 
should be noted that while the PD remained unchanged, the UG was further 
altered from the version reported here. These alterations followed a discussion 
with Dr Molly Crockett, who has published a number of UG studies, and 
occurred after the validation study had been conducted. Full details of these 
changes are given in Section 4.4.3.2 below, which outlines the methodology of 
the MDMA study. The results of the validation study presented here remain 
informative, as the changes were relatively minor and did not affect the overall 
task methodology. Here, I provide details of the UG version used in the test-
retest study.  
In order to convince study participants that they are interacting with real people 
in social decision-making tasks, different cover-stories are created about where 
other players’ responses originate. In the version of the games presented here, 
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participants were led to believe that they were logged onto an online network 
set up as part of a collaboration between King’s College London, University 
College London and Imperial College London. They were told that the people 
they were to interact with were also logged on to the network at one of these 
three sites. They were told that these participants may or may not be taking part 
in an MRI or drug study, but regardless of the exact study they are involved in, 
the researchers were interested in the same social processes as the current 
project. They were also told that all participants would be financially reimbursed 
based on their responses in the UG. There was no such reimbursement based 
on the decisions made in the PD, which was played on a points-based system. 
The aim of this cover story was to enhance the feeling of socially interacting 
with other people when making decisions in the tasks. 
The aim of this study was to assess the test-retest reliability of these tasks, and 
to evaluate their outcomes for comparison to those in the literature. To this end, 
we had participants complete both tasks, one week apart, and tested their 
results for reliability. We took the outcome measures from their first session to 
assess the results of the task and compare them to those found in the literature.  
 
4.3.3 Methods  
4.3.3.1 Participants  
Fifteen participants (7 female) were recruited by advertising through King’s 
College London’s research volunteer portal. While the drug study reported in 
this chapter (Section 4.4 below) only included male participants, both genders 
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were included in this validation to make the results more generalizable. 
Participants played a repeated, single-shot UG and repeated, iterated PD on 
two separate occasions at least one week apart (mean: 8.5 days; range: 7 – 16 
days). Written informed consent was obtained from each participant, and ethical 
approval granted by the King’s College London’s Psychiatry, Nursing and 
Midwifery Research Ethics Subcommittee (PNM 14/15-10). 
4.3.3.2 Procedure 
Due to the length of these tasks, each was split in two to mitigate against task 
fatigue. Participants first completed one run of the UG (11 minutes 45 seconds), 
followed by one run of the PD (9 minutes 15 seconds). This was then repeated.  
Ultimatum Game 
This version of the UG has three conditions: first-party (FP), third-party (TP) and 
a non-social control condition, the game server condition (GS).  
In the FP condition, participants make a decision to reject or accept an offer 
made directly to them.  The premise of this condition is that both they and the 
proposer will be affected monetarily by their response. In the TP condition, 
participants are shown an offer from one person to another, and are asked to 
make a decision on behalf of the other player. In this condition the rules of the 
game are the same, but the participant themselves are not directly affected by 
the outcome. For example, if they see ‘John’ offering ‘Simon’ £4 out of £20 and 
the participant chooses to accept this offer, ‘Simon’ receives £4 and ‘John’ 
keeps the remaining £16. If the participant rejects this offer, neither ‘John’ nor 
‘Simon’ receives any money for that round. In neither outcome does the 
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participant receive or lose any money. In the GS condition, the participant is told 
that the offer they receive is a random, computer-generated offer.  In this 
condition, their decision solely affects their own payoff.  
While the majority of published studies investigate offers from 10-50% of the 
total stake, the present study includes “hyper-fair” offers of 80% and 90%. All 
offers were out of a total stake of £20. The number of each offer level is given in 
Table 4-1. These offer levels were presented in each in condition, leading to a 
total of 144 offers,  split equally across runs on each session. Figure 4-1 shows 
the order of presentation and timing of each round of the task. Participants were 
also asked to make five offers, acting as the proposer, in each run of the game. 
They were able to make offers in increments of 10% of the total stake. 
Participants were told that they would be paid one percent of the total amount 
they earn during the course of the study; in reality participants were paid a fixed 
sum of £20. 
 
Table 4-1: Number of each offer level and the fairness level assigned for the sake of analysis 
Offer level (%) Number of offers at this 
level 
Fairness level 
10 8  
Unfair 
20 8 





50 8 Fair 







Figure 4-1: Diagram depicting the three conditions of the UG task. Green writing: first person 
condition; red writing: third-party condition; blue writing: game server condition 
 
Prisoner’s Dilemma 
As mentioned above, the PD was split into two runs. In each run, participants 
played with three other ‘players’, and were told that the middle player was in 
fact a random response generator, which did not learn from the participant’s 
responses. This condition was included as a non-social control condition and 
was referred to as the Game Server (GS).  
See Figure 4-2 for details of the PD game. In this version of the PD, the 
participant played multiple rounds with each player. They were told this could be 
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any number of rounds between eight and fifteen but it was in fact set at fifteen 
rounds per player. The number of rounds was undisclosed as evidence 
suggests disclosure can affect behaviour in the game (Ghoneim et al., 2007; 
Normann and Wallace, 2012). 
On each round, players first made a Compete or Cooperate decision 
simultaneously with the other player. They were then given feedback as to what 
the other player did and how the points are distributed. They were then asked to 
rate their trust in the other player.  
While the participants believed that the other ‘players’ were real people logged 
onto a network, they were in fact pre-programmed with set responses. One 
player in each run was programmed to be trustworthy, making mostly 
Cooperate decisions (12 out of 15 decisions to cooperate), while the other was 
untrustworthy (12 out of 15 decisions to compete). In the first run of each 
session the order of opponents was: Trustworthy – GS – Untrustworthy. In the 







Figure 4-2: The Prisoner’s Dilemma. A) Diagram depicting the paradigm with timings; B) payoff 
matrix 
 
4.3.3.3 Data analysis 
The raw responder data for the UG comes in the form of dichotomous 
accept/reject decisions for each offer. There were 16 offers each from the unfair 
and hyper-fair levels, and eight fair offers, spread equally over two runs of the 
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task. Participants were also asked to make offers to other players – here the 
raw data is an absolute value of a total stake (always £20). 
Two forms of data come from the PD. First, trust ratings are given after each 
round of the game. This is a number from 1 to 7. Second are dichotomous 
compete/cooperate decisions on each round of the game.   
Test-retest reliability – Ultimatum Game: rejection rates 
A popular statistic for test-retest reliability is the intraclass correlation coefficient 
(ICC) (Shrout and Fleiss, 1979). The ICC gives the proportion of the total 
variance (between- and within-participant) that can be explained by the 
between-participant variance. As the method uses the variance components of 
a repeated-measures ANOVA, it is not an appropriate measure for non-
Gaussian data such as the binomial or proportion data collected here 
(Nakagawa and Schielzeth, 2010). 
We have used the rptR package (version 0.6.405, Nakagawa and Schielzeth, 
2010) implemented in the R statistical environment (R Development Core 
Team, 2015). We entered each participant as a random effect into a 
generalised linear mixed model (GLMM) and extracted variance components to 
obtain an estimate of repeatability on a logit-link scale. An estimate of more 
than 0.6 was considered an acceptable level of reliability. This represents 60% 
of the total variance being explained by between-participant variance. 
As data was collected in two runs per session, reliability of two types have been 
analysed – first, the reliability of responses across runs within session one 
(henceforth, ‘within-session reliability’); second, the reliability of responses 
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combined across runs of each session, across sessions (henceforth, ‘between-
session reliability’). 
Test-retest reliability – Ultimatum Game: proposals 
Each offer was converted to a percentage of the total stake, and the mean offer 
calculated. We calculated an absolute, two-way, mixed model intraclass 
correlation coefficient (ICC; Shrout and Fleiss, 1979). The ICC gives the 
proportion of the total variance (between- and within-participant) that can be 
explained by the between-participant variance. An ICC greater than or equal to 
0.6 was considered acceptable. 
Outcome of session one – Ultimatum Game 
The data collected was in the form of categorical (accept or reject) responses to 
monetary offers. Converting this data to proportions and analysing with an 
ANOVA is problematic on two fronts. First, the proportion data is non-normally 
distributed. Second, the variance of binomial distributions does not show 
homogeneity, thus violating the assumptions of ANOVA (Jaeger, 2008).  
As such, the current data have been analysed using repeated-measures logistic 
regression, implemented with generalized estimating equations using IBM 
SPSS Statistics for Windows (IBM Corp., 2012). This is a nonparametric test 
which takes into account the correlation of responses within subjects, and 
produces a chi-squared statistic (χ2), an odds ratio (OR) and its 95% confidence 
interval (CI), and a p-value. It is a recommended approach to analysing 
categorical data that has been used in a number of studies in the UG literature 
(M. J. Crockett et al., 2013; Hanley et al., 2003; Koenigs et al., 2007; Koenigs 
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and Tranel, 2007). The odds ratio represents the change in probability of an 
event (in this case, a rejection) occurring with a change in condition (fairness, 
offer origin etc.). 
Test-retest reliability – Prisoner’s Dilemma: Trust ratings 
For each category of opponent (Trustworthy, Untrustworthy, non-social control 
(GS)), the final eight trust ratings were averaged, giving a rating per opponent. 
We calculated an absolute, two-way, mixed model intraclass correlation 
coefficient (ICC; Shrout and Fleiss, 1979). The ICC gives the proportion of the 
total variance (between- and within-participant) that can be explained by the 
between-participant variance. An ICC greater than or equal to 0.6 was 
considered acceptable. 
Test-retest reliability – Prisoner’s Dilemma: Compete decisions 
The dichotomous compete/cooperate decisions were repeated 15 times with 
each opponent. As with the UG data, we have used the rptR package (version 
0.6.405, Nakagawa and Schielzeth, 2010) implemented in the R statistical 
environment (R Development Core Team, 2015). We entered each participant 
as a random effect into a generalised linear mixed model (GLMM) and extracted 
variance components to obtain an estimate of repeatability on a logit-link scale. 
An estimate of more than 0.6 was considered an acceptable level of reliability. 
This represents 60% of the total variance being explained by between-
participant variance. 
Again, as with the UG, as data was collected in two runs per session, reliability 
of two types have been analysed – first, the reliability of responses across runs 
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within session one (henceforth, ‘within-session reliability’); second, the reliability 
of responses combined across runs of each session, across sessions 
(henceforth, ‘between-session reliability’). This is true for both the trust ratings 
and decision data. 
Outcome of session one – Prisoner’s Dilemma 
The trust rating outcomes were averaged across both runs of each category of 
opponent (Trustworthy, Untrustworthy, GS). These were then entered into a 
one-way ANOVA, with post hoc pairwise comparisons. 
As with the UG, the dichotomous decisions were analysed using repeated-
measures logistic regression, implemented with generalized estimating 
equations using IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows (IBM Corp., 2012). This 
method has been used in a number of studies investigating the PD (Duffy and 
Smith, 2014; Reed et al., 2012; Sparks et al., 2016), and is a recommended 
approach for repeated-measures dichotomous outcomes (Hanley et al., 2003). 
 
4.3.4  Results  
4.3.4.1 Ultimatum Game 
Test-retest reliability – within-session 
This section presents the reliability of responses between runs in the same 
session. Table 4-2 shows the Repeatability (R) estimates and their 95% 
confidence interval (CI) for the rejection rates of each fairness level in each 
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condition. Figure 4-3 displays the change in rejection rate of each participant 
across runs within session one. Generalized mixed models attempt to estimate 
a covariance matrix of repeated measurements. When there is little variation in 
response, this is not possible, resulting in a failure to ‘converge’ on a covariance 
matrix. In the current data there was not enough variability in responses to Fair 
and Hyper-fair offers in the FP and GS conditions to calculate a repeatability 
statistic, meaning that these conditions showed very high reliability. 
Responses to Unfair offers in all three conditions were highly reliable (FP: R = 
0.96, CIs: 0.96 – 0.99; TP: R = 0.96, CIs: 0.93 – 0.99; GS: R = 0.84, CIs: 0.59 – 
0.98), as were responses to Fair offers in the TP condition (R = 0.84, 95% CIs: 
0.59 – 0.98). Response to TP Hyper-fair offers showed poor test-retest reliability 
(R = 0.32, CIs: 0 – 0.86). 
The proposer data showed a high level of test-retest reliability across runs 
within-session (ICC = 0.85, CIs: 0.54 – 0.95). 
 
Table 4-2: Repeatability (R) estimates of UG responses across runs within session one, with 95% 
CIs in brackets for each condition across fairness levels. NV = Not enough variation: almost all 
participants accepted all offers in both sessions 
 Fairness Level 
Condition Unfair Fair Hyper-fair 
FP 0.96 (0.96 – 0.99) N/V N/V 
TP 0.96 (0.93 – 0.99) 0.84 (0.59 – 0.98) 0.32 (0 – 0.86) 





Figure 4-3: Within-session change in rejection rate for each participant in each condition across 
fairness levels. A) Unfair; B) Fair; C) Hyper-fair 
 
Test-retest reliability – between-session 
This section presents the between-session reliability of UG responses in each 
condition and at each fairness level. Figure 4-4 displays the change in rejection 
rate of each participant between sessions. The FP Hyper-fair and GS Fair 
conditions did not show enough variation to produce a repeatability statistic, 
meaning that these conditions showed very high reliability. 
196 
 
All Unfair and Fair offers across all conditions showed good reliability between 
sessions (range of R: 0.76 – 0.82). Hyper-fair offers in the TP and GS had a 
repeatability statistic, R = 0.57; this is lower than the cut-off of 0.6 which we had 
defined as being a good repeatability. 
The proposer data showed very high reliability between sessions (ICC = 0.92, 
Cls: 0.75 – 0.97). 
 
Table 4-3: Repeatability (R) estimates between sessions, with 95% CIs. N/V = Not enough variation 
 Fairness Level 
Condition Unfair Fair Hyper-fair 
FP 0.79 (0.48 – 0.97) 0.82 (0.53 – 0.95) N/V 
TP 0.76 (0.41 – 0.93) 0.82 (0.53 – 0.95) 0.57 (0.06 – 0.87) 





Figure 4-4: Between-session change in rejection rate for each participant in each condition across 
fairness level. A) Unfair; B) Fair; C) Hyper-fair 
 
Outcome of session one 
Figure 4-5A displays the rejection rates of each offer level in session one, 
combined across runs. In line with the published literature, rejections rates 
decreased with increasing offer level (Civai et al., 2013; M. J. Crockett et al., 
2013; Gabay et al., 2014; Güth et al., 1982; Sanfey, 2003) in all conditions. 
Figure 4-5B displays the rejection rates when these are grouped into Unfair, 




Figure 4-5: Rejection rates combined across runs in session one. A) Rejection rate per offer; B) 
Rejection rates when grouped into Unfair (10-20%), Fair (50%) and Hyper-fair (80-90%) offers. Error 





There was a statistically significant reduction in the probability of rejecting an 
offer in the non-social control condition (GS) compared to both the FP and TP 
conditions (FP vs GS: χ2(1,14) = 9.77, OR = 0.3, p = 0.002; TP vs GS: χ
2
(1,14)  = 
13.26, OR = 0.227, p < 0.001), but no change between the FP and TP 
conditions (χ2(1,14)  = 2.59, OR = 1.49, p = 0.11). 
There was statistically significant reduction in the probability of rejecting an offer 
in both the Fair and Hyper-fair conditions compared to the Unfair condition 
(Unfair vs Fair: χ2(1,14)  = 47.71, OR = 0.01, p < 0.001; Unfair vs Hyper-fair: χ
2
(1,14)  = 45.22, OR = 0.02, p < 0.001). There was no change in rejection rates 
between the Fair and Hyper-fair conditions (χ2(1,14)  = 2.32, OR = 0.392, p = 
0.127). Furthermore, gender was included in the model, and there was no main 
effect, nor any interaction between gender and fairness or offer origin (all ps > 
0.303). 
Figure 4-6 displays a histogram of mean offer in session one. There was a 
statistically significant difference of mean offer from the lowest possible offer of 




Figure 4-6: Histogram of mean offer in session one 
 
4.3.4.2 Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Test-retest reliability – trust rating 
Table 4-4 shows the ICC for the Trust ratings with each category of opponent. 
There was good reliability for all conditions, both within- and between sessions 









Table 4-4: ICC for the Trust ratings for each category of opponent, both within- and between-
sessions 
Opponent Within-session Between-sessions 
Trustworthy 0.75 0.92 
Untrustworthy 0.86 0.76 
GS 0.89 0.96 
 
Figure 4-7: Change in trust ratings for each category of opponent. A) Within-session changes; B) 




Test-retest reliability –Compete decisions 
As stated in Section 4.3.3.3, a generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) 
approach was used to estimate the between- and within-participant variance 
components of the proportion data. GLMMs estimate the maximum likelihood of 
the of model parameters. It is not always possible to estimate the maximum 
likelihood for a number of reasons, including overly complex models, small 
sample sizes, small estimated variances or large uncertainties (Bolker et al., 
2009; Williamson et al., 2013). This can result in ‘convergence errors’. If such 
an error occurs one cannot be certain the output of the test is reliable. 
Such convergence errors occurred when calculating the repeatability in the 
current dataset. Nonetheless, the repeatability estimates are displayed in Table 
4-5 for the change in percentage of Compete decisions for each category of 
opponent. None of the repeatability estimates were above 0.6 (range 0.18 – 
0.48), suggesting that the test-retest reliability for this outcome measure is not 
good. However, as stated above, it is unknown how reliable these estimates 
are. The change for each individual is displayed in Figure 4-8, with the median 
and interquartile range displayed below the x-axis. 
The median change in response for all categories when considering both within- 
and between-session analyses were very close to zero, with the largest 




Table 4-5: Repeatability estimates of the proportion of Compete decisions, both within- and 
between-sessions. Note that the GLMM failed to converge, rendering these estimates unreliable. 
Opponent Within-session Between-sessions 
Trustworthy 0.18 (0 – 0.35) 0.27 (0.1 – 0.47) 
Untrustworthy 0.34 (0.13 – 0.52) 0.26 (0.09 – 0.40) 




Figure 4-8: Change in the percentage of Compete for each category of opponent. A) Within-session 
changes; B) Between-session changes. Points below the x-axis are the median for that category, 




Outcome of session one – trust ratings 
Figure 4-9A displays the mean trust ratings of the final eight rounds for each 
category of opponent, averaged across runs in session one. A repeated-
measures ANOVA reveals a main effect of opponent (F(2,28) = 20.96, p < 0.001, 
ή2 = 0.6, Greenhouse-Geisser). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed a 
statistically significant reduction in trust ratings for untrustworthy, compared to 
trustworthy, opponents (Bonferroni-corrected p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.87) and 
a statistically significant difference between untrustworthy and game server 
opponents (Bonferroni-corrected p = 0.009, Cohen’s d = 1.12). The difference 
between Trustworthy and the non-social control opponent was not statistically 
different (Bonferroni-corrected p = 0.085, Cohen’s d = -0.64). 
Figure 4-9C displays a histogram of the mean trust ratings for the game server. 
Participants reported different interpretations of what ‘trust’ meant in this 
context. In the task, a rating of one was labelled as ‘No trust’, four was labelled 
‘Unsure’, seven as ‘Full trust’. Some participants commented that they had no 
trust in a computer because one cannot ‘trust’ a random response generator, 
while other participants stated that one could neither trust nor not trust the 
computer, and so they rated it as ’unsure’. These differing interpretations are 





Figure 4-9: PD outcome of session one, averaged across runs. A) average trust rating over the final 
eight rounds; B) percentage Compete decisions; C) histogram of mean trust ratings for the game 




Outcome of session one – Compete decisions 
Figure 4-9B displays the percentage of Compete decisions for each category of 
opponent. When the opponent was untrustworthy and mostly competed, there 
was a statistically increased probability of participants making Compete 
decisions compared to when they were playing trustworthy opponents (χ2(1,14)  = 
15.21, OR = 2.25, p < 0.001). Likewise, there was an increase in Compete 
decisions when playing the non-social control opponent compared  to when 
they were playing trustworthy opponents (χ2(1,14) = 14.47, OR = 2.43, p < 0.001). 
There was no statistical difference in the proportion of Compete decisions 
between the non-social control and untrustworthy opponents (χ2(1,14)  = 0.1, OR 
= 0.93, p = 0.754). Furthermore, when gender was included in the model, and 
there was no main effect, nor any interaction between gender and 
trustworthiness (p = 0.62 and 0.343, respectively). 
 
4.3.5 Discussion 
This study was designed to investigate the test-retest reliability of the versions 
of the Ultimatum Game (UG)3 and Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) used in the MDMA 
study, and to compare the results obtained to those seen in the literature. In this 
version of the tasks, participants were told that they would play with other 
                                            
3 One modification was made to this version of the UG before use in the MDMA study, 
which is detailed in Section 4.4.3.2 
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players over an online network developed by researchers as part of a 
collaboration between King’s College London, Imperial College London and 
University College London. Participants played two runs of each game at each 
session. Most measures showed good test-retest reliability, with some notable 
exceptions which will be discussed further below. Task performance aligned 
with expectations for both tasks. Importantly for the experimental study reported 
in Section 4.4 (which recruited only male participants), there was no effect of 
gender in either task.  
4.3.5.1 The Ultimatum Game 
As with the version of the UG validated in 0, rejection rates decreased with 
increasing offer in all conditions. There were lower rejection rates in the non-
social control condition compared to both the first- and third- party conditions 
(FP and TP, respectively). These results are in line with UG studies in the 
literature (Civai et al., 2013; Gabay et al., 2014; Güth et al., 1982; Sanfey, 
2003). There was no difference between FP and TP conditions. Studies 
investigating FP and TP conditions together have also not shown differences 
between these conditions under ‘normal’ conditions (Civai et al., 2012a, 2015; 
C. Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2013). Civai and colleagues did, however, find 
evidence of a differential effect of transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) 
over the medial prefrontal cortex for FP and TP conditions (Civai et al., 2015). 
This study found that tDCS reduced rejection rates of unfair offers in the FP, but 
not TP, condition, suggesting that while behavioural outcomes may be similar 
under ‘normal’ conditions, the underlying neural mechanisms may differ. 
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Examination of the proposer data showed that participants in this study were 
generally more inclined to offer amounts close to equal, rather than the lowest 
amount they were able. Although this latter behaviour is that which would be 
predicted by rational choice and expected utility theory (Glimcher et al., 2009), it 
is rarely seen in studies of the UG, where people typically offer close to equal 
offers . As such, proposer data from the current version of the UG is in line with 
the literature, reviewed and analysed using meta-analysis by Oosterbeek et al 
(2003). 
With the exception of rejection rates of hyper-fair offers in the TP and non-social 
control conditions, all UG measures showed good test-retest reliability. For 
those two conditions which did not, the reliability was close to the level which 
had been specified as acceptable (both conditions R = 0.57; predefined 
acceptable level: 0.6). Reliability is a measure of the between-participant 
variance as a proportion of total variance (between- plus within-participant 
variance). Rejection rates in the hyper-fair conditions were very low for most 
participants. As such the between-participant variance was also low, and those 
changes seen within-participant, across sessions, would have had a more 
prominent effect on the repeatability statistic. Lower-than-ideal reliability means 
that a larger effect size may be required to find a statistically significant effect of 
an intervention, as the variance across sessions may be larger than if the 
reliability were better. With the current task, the hyper-fair conditions are not 




4.3.5.2 The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
In this version of the PD, when participants believed they were playing the 
game with another person (i.e. across trustworthy and untrustworthy 
conditions), they cooperated approximately 40% of the time. A large meta-
analysis of the PD showed that the highest frequency of studies found 30-40% 
cooperation rates (Sally, 1995; Figure 2 p. 63). It should be noted that this was 
looking at both iterated and single-shot studies. However, cooperation is 
repeatedly seen in iterated PD games, despite the game theoretic ‘rational’ 
decision being mutual defection (Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Colman, 2003; 
Cooper et al., 1996). 
When broken down into different types of opponents, participants cooperated 
more (competed less) with cooperative opponents compared to uncooperative 
opponents (i.e. trustworthy vs untrustworthy). While the same is true when 
comparing trustworthy opponents to the non-social control opponent, it is 
interesting that there was no difference in behaviour when playing untrustworthy 
opponents compared to the non-social control.  
The difference in cooperative behaviour between the two social conditions is 
mirrored by the increased trust ratings for the trustworthy opponent compared to 
the untrustworthy opponent. It is interesting that this relationship between trust 
and cooperation wasn’t seen when comparing untrustworthy opponents to the 
non-social control; where there was a difference in trust ratings but not rates of 
compete decisions. However, there were different interpretations of the idea of 
‘trust’ when referring to the non-social control condition – some participants 
stated that it was impossible to neither trust nor not trust a random response 
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generator, while others stated that they had no trust in this condition. 
Qualitatively, it is possible these could amount to the same thing, and therefore 
perhaps the percentage of compete decisions are in fact mirrored by the 
amount of trust in each condition. 
The test-retest reliability of participants’ trust ratings was high in all conditions. It 
was not possible to formally assess the reliability of the compete/cooperate 
decisions, as it was not possible to estimate the maximum likelihood in the 
GLMM, and therefore not possible to extract the necessary variance 
components. ‘Failure to converge’ in GLMM estimations is a recognised 
problem with the statistical method, with a number of possible reasons 
underlying it (Bolker et al., 2009; Williamson et al., 2013). Examining plots of the 
differences in responses across sessions (Figure 4-8) reveals that there is 
indeed some variation, with a wider relative range than that seen with the trust 
ratings. However, there was a median change in response very close to zero, 
and an interquartile range of less than 10% either way. This is comparable to, if 
not slightly better than, the relative range in TP hyper-fair rejection rates in the 
UG (which had a repeatability estimate of 0.57). This lower reliability of the task 
must be taken into account when performing a repeated-measures study with 
any intervention, as a small effect size may be lost in the within-participant 
variance. 
4.3.5.3 Conclusion 
The current study has assessed the validity of the version of the Ultimatum 
Game (UG) and Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) to be used in a 
psychopharmacological study with the compound MDMA.  
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Both tasks produce similar responses to those seen in the literature. While there 
are some reservations around the retest reliability of the proportion of compete 
decisions in the PD, the trust rating outcome measure showed good test-retest 





4.4 The effect of MDMA on social cognition 
4.4.1 Abstract 
With growing interest in the social cognitive deficits of psychiatric conditions, it 
is vital to investigate the psychopharmacology of these functions in healthy 
individuals. To this end, we administered 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine 
(MDMA), a compound known for potent social effects, prior to playing an 
Ultimatum Game (UG) and Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) during functional 
neuroimaging. We employed a double-blind, placebo-controlled, crossover 
design. 100mg of MDMA or a placebo was administered to 20 healthy, male 
volunteers prior to playing an iterated PD with a ‘trustworthy’ (mostly 
cooperative) and ‘untrustworthy’ (mostly uncooperative) opponent, as well as a 
non-social control. Participants also a played a repeated, single-shot UG. 
Decisions were made on offers directed to themselves (FP), or to other players, 
where their decision had no effect on their own utility (TP). Participants also 
received offers in a non-social control condition. In the PD, MDMA increased 
cooperation when playing with trustworthy opponents (OR = 2.01 (1.46 – 2.96), 
p < 0.001), but not when playing untrustworthy opponents (OR = 1.25 (0.73 – 
2.13)).  There was no effect of MDMA on trust ratings for any opponent. When 
receiving feedback of the trustworthy players’ decisions, MDMA increased 
activity in regions involved with social cognition, including the mid-cingulate 
gyrus, supplementary motor area, superior temporal sulcus, and bilateral insula. 
In the UG, MDMA reduced rejection rates of unfair offers directed at the self (χ
2
(1,18) = 11.02, OR = 0.57, p < 0.001) and when making decisions in the TP 
condition (OR = 0.68, 95% CIs 0.51 – 0.90). No neuroimaging changes were 
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seen in the UG. MDMA produced clear behavioural changes in these social 
decision-making tasks. In the UG, our findings support previous results of 
reduced rejection behaviour following serotonergic manipulations. Our findings 
highlight the context-specific nature of MDMA-modulated mechanisms 
underlying decision-making in the PD. Increased engagement of social brain 
regions on MDMA underlies greater tolerance for untrustworthy behaviour of 
cooperative partners. These results suggest that alterations to the serotonin 
neurotransmitter system may underlie differences in how people respond to 
norm violations and (un)cooperative behaviour in psychiatric conditions. 
 
4.4.2 Introduction 
Section 4.2 introduced the study reported here. We sought to investigate the 
effect of the serotonergic compound 3,4-methylenedioxy-methamphetamine 
(MDMA) on social decision-making, empathy, and emotion processing. In order 
to do so, we carried out functional neuroimaging while participants played 
modified versions of the Ultimatum Game (UG) and Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). In 
addition, participants completed the Affective Bias task (Bland et al., 2016) and 
the Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET; Dziobek et al., 2008) after the scanning 
session. 
We made the following hypotheses: 
1. MDMA would reduce recognition of negative affect in the Affective Bias 
task. 
2. MDMA would increase affective, but not cognitive, empathy in the MET.  
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3. In the UG, MDMA would reduce rejection rates of unfair offers directed at 
the participant, but not when participants responded on behalf of another 
player, or when responding to the game server. We hypothesised an 
increase in offers made during the MDMA session.  
4. In the PD, participants would show more cooperative behaviour and rate 
their ‘human’ opponents as more trustworthy during the MDMA session. 
We hypothesised that this effect would not be present for the game 
server.  
5. For the UG neuroimaging results, we expected to see the network of 
regions identified in the meta-analysis presented in Chapter 2 activated 
in response to unfair offers in the UG, and alterations to this as a result of 
MDMA administration.  
6. For the PD we expected an increased activation of the social cognition 
areas, including the superior temporal sulcus and temporoparietal 




21 male participants were recruited from the community and gave written 
informed consent to take part in the study and were financially compensated for 
their time. The study received ethical approval from King’s College London’s 
Psychiatry, Nursing and Midwifery Research Ethics Committee (PNM/14/15-32). 
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Exclusion criteria included: personal history of psychiatric illness; first-order 
relative with a history of psychotic illness; evidence of cardiac, hepatic, renal, 
gastrointestinal or neurological disorders; excessive use of caffeine and alcohol; 
current use of medication; failure of drugs of abuse test at screening or on 
either study day. Only participants with previous experience of MDMA were 
included in this study. Participants were only included in this study if they had at 
least one previous experience with MDMA. They were also required to have not 
used MDMA in the three months leading up to their involvement in the study. 
We did not collect data on lifetime use. 
Due to personal circumstances, one participant withdrew from the study after 
his first visit. This was unrelated to his participation, and unblinding confirmed 
that on his first visit he received placebo. As such, 20 participants completed 
the study (mean age 24.8y, SD = 3.7, range = 21 – 37). 
4.4.3.2 Experimental procedure 
This study followed a double-blind, placebo-controlled, cross-over, counter-
balanced design. Following a successful screening, participants attended two 
experimental study days at least one week apart (mean 9.3, SD 5.7, range 7 – 
31).  
See Figure 4-10 for a schematic representing the study day. Participants arrived 
at the study centre at 08:45, at which time we repeated physical health 
screening checks to confirm they were still eligible to take part. At 10:00 a pre-
dose blood sample was taken to assess baseline plasma oxytocin levels. At 
10:15 participants were dosed with either 100mg MDMA or placebo, orally. At 
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45 minutes post-dose participants gave another blood sample to assess plasma 
oxytocin and MDMA levels. Between these samples participants were retrained 
in the tasks. At 75 minutes post-dose participants entered the scanner. The 
scanning session lasted 90 minutes, with the first task beginning approximately 
20 minutes into the session. Prior to the fMRI tasks we collected structural 
scans, resting state data and arterial spinal labelling data. These data are not 
presented in this thesis. 
The timing for the MRI session was chosen because the Tmax of MDMA ranges 
between 1.5 – 3 hours (Kolbrich et al., 2008), and subjective effects peak and 
remain stable between 1 and 3 hours (Harris et al., 2002), meaning functional 
acquisitions would fall within these time points.   
 
 
Figure 4-10: Diagram showing study timeline. ASL: arterial spin labelling 
 
As mentioned in Section 4.3.2.2, to protect against task fatigue, each task was 
split into two runs. Participants first played the PD with three separate 
opponents (trustworthy, game server, untrustworthy) followed by a run of the 
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UG wherein they responded to 72 offers and were asked to make 5 offers 
themselves. Participants then completed a breath-hold task (results not 
reported here), before playing the PD again with three separate opponents 
(untrustworthy, game server, trustworthy) followed by the second run of the UG. 
Following the scanning session, a further blood sample was taken (165 minutes 
post-dose, plasma oxytocin and MDMA). Participants then completed a reward 
sensitivity task (see below for details), the Affective Bias task, the Multifaceted 
Empathy Test and an optimism bias task (results not reported as part of this 
thesis). Participants were then discharged after the study medic was satisfied 
they were no longer under the influence of the drug. 
The version of the PD used in the current study was described in detail in 
Section 4.3. The UG reported here was modified from the version described in 
that section, and these changes will be described next, as well as the other 
tasks reported in the current chapter. 
Analyses of blood samples collected during this study are not reported in this 
thesis, due to the data not being available at the time of writing. 
The Ultimatum Game 
Many studies investigating the UG vary the offer proportion in relation to a fixed 
total stake (e.g. Civai et al., 2012; Guo et al., 2013; Kirk et al., 2011; Sanfey, 
2003; Tomasino et al., 2013). While the evidence is mixed, there is data 
suggesting UG behaviour varies as a function of total stake, with some 
individuals being willing to accept a lower proportion of a high stake than a 
lower proportion of a low stake (Andersen et al., 2011; Novakova and Flegr, 
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2013; Tompkinson and Bethwaite, 1995). It could be argued that while these 
people still have fairness concerns, the higher utility of high-stake unfair offers 
takes precedent.  
In order to asses if there was an effect of stake size and utility of the absolute 
value of the offer, we changed the offer and stake distribution from the version 
of the task used in the validation study (Section 4.3), while keeping all other 
aspects of the task the same. In line with Crockett el al (2013), we chose a 
range of offer values, each of which were repeated as unfair (10-20% of the 
total stake), fair (45-50%) and hyper-fair (80-90%) offers. By defining utility as a 
function of the highest absolute value offered over the course of the task, we 
were able to define different offers as being low utility if they were less than half 
of the highest offer value. In this way, not only could each offer value be 
presented as each of the three fairness levels, we were also able to present an 
equal number of high and low utility offers in each fairness condition. Appendix 
C has a full breakdown of the offers presented in this version of the task. In 
each run, there were eight unfair (10 – 20%), eight fair (45 – 50%) and eight 
hyper-fair (80 – 90%) offers in each condition (FP, TP, GS). 
By altering this aspect of the task, it was possible to analyse whether MDMA 
had a differential effect on high and low utility offers. The limitation of having 
changed the design of the task at this stage is that it has not been evaluated for 
test-retest reliability. However, there has been consistently high reliability of 
responses displayed over two different version of this task (see 0, Section 3.3 
and Section 4.3 of this chapter). Furthermore, the cover-story and presentation 
of the task remained unchanged from that discussed earlier in this chapter. 
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Therefore, while this has not yet been formally tested, the structure, 
presentation, instructions and hardware all remain the same as the version with 
high reliability.  
Affective Bias task 
The Affective Bias task was taken from the EMOTICOM cognitive test battery 
(Bland et al., 2016), and was administered approximately 195 minutes post-
dose. In this task participants see a face appear on the screen for 
approximately half a second and are asked to indicate which emotion the face 
was expressing from a choice of happy, sad, fear or anger. For each emotion 
there are nine levels of intensity. Control conditions of faces of different ages 
were presented at the half way point in the task. There were 20 presentations of 
each emotion and 20 control faces.  
Multifaceted Empathy Test 
The Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET; Dziobek et al., 2011, 2008) is a task able 
to assess cognitive and affective empathy separately, and has been used in 
MDMA studies previously (Hysek et al., 2013; Kuypers et al., 2014; Schmid et 
al., 2014). The MET was administered approximately 180 minutes post-dose. 
The MET uses 40 images of people in ecologically valid, naturalistic situations. 
In 40 trials participants are asked to identify the emotion the person may be 
feeling out of a choice of four (cognitive empathy), and in 40 other trials they are 
asked to rate how much they empathise with the person depicted on a scale of 
one to nine (affective empathy). Cognitive empathy is given a score out of 40, 
and affective empathy is the average rating out of nine. 
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Reward sensitivity  
In order to test if MDMA was altering participant’s sensitivity to reward, they 
were asked to complete a modified reaction time (RT) task. In this task 
participants saw four circles on the screen, in the layout of the arrow buttons on 
a standard keyboard, within a rectangular box. On each trial a circle would be 
highlighted indicating that the participants should press the corresponding arrow 
button as quickly and accurately as possible. Trials were presented in four 
blocks. For the first and third block the rectangular outline was blue, and for the 
second and fourth block it was red. During the red block, if participants 
responded faster than their average RT from the previous blue block, three 
times in a row, a pound coin appeared on the screen to indicate they would be 
rewarded for their performance. 
Calculating the difference in average RT between rewarded and non-rewarded 
blocks gave a measure of reward sensitivity, and by calculating the difference in 
this measure across experimental sessions we were able to ascertain whether 
MDMA altered reward sensitivity. 
Questionnaires 
We had participants fill in five subjective rating questionnaires at the end of the 
experimental session. Two are relevant for this thesis: the Social Value 
Orientation questionnaire (SVO; Van Lange, 1999) and the Social Reward 
Questionnaire (SRQ; Foulkes et al., 2014). 
The SVO is a nine-item questionnaire which requires respondents to state 
preferences of resource distribution, and is a validated measure of prosociality 
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with good test-retest reliability (Murphy et al., 2011; Murphy and Ackermann, 
2014). The SRQ is a 23-item rating scale (from strongly agree to strongly 
disagree) which maps onto six factors of social reward: admiration, negative 
social potency, passivity, prosocial interactions, sexual relationships, and 
sociability. These questionnaires can be found in Appendix D and Appendix E. 
4.4.3.3 Behavioural statistical analyses 
The Ultimatum Game 
Two outcome measures were collected from this task. The first were categorical 
(accept or reject) responses to monetary offers. The second were continuous 
data of monetary offers from the participants to other players. 
The categorical data were analysed using repeated-measures logistic 
regression, implemented with generalized estimating equations (GEE) using 
IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows (IBM Corp., 2012). This is a nonparametric 
test which takes into account the correlation of responses within subjects, and 
produces a chi-squared statistic (χ2), an odds ratio (OR) and its 95% confidence 
interval (CI), and a p-value. The odds ratio represents the change in probability 
of an event (in this case, a rejection) occurring with a change in condition 
(fairness, offer origin etc.). Responses were grouped together for unfair (10 – 
20% of the total stake), fair (45 – 50%) and hyper-fair (80 – 90%) offers.  
In all models, participant ID was defined as the subject variable so that each 
participant’s responses were nested together. As described in Section 4.4.3.2, 
there were two runs of this task to protect against task fatigue. As such it was 
important to test for differences across runs. Furthermore, this task was 
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designed to able to test for differential effects of high/low utility offers. To this 
end, a model was first defined testing for the main effects of utility and run. Two 
two-way interactions of utility*treatment and run*treatment were included in this 
model. The main effect of treatment was not tested in this model as the purpose 
of the analysis was to test for any effects of utility and run. Finally, a model was 
defined to test for the main effects of treatment, offer origin (FP, TP, GS), and 
fairness level (unfair, fair, hyper) and their three-way interaction. 
In addition to the GEEs described above, each offer made by the participant 
was converted to a percentage of the total stake, and the average taken for 
each session. A paired-sample t-test was then performed to examine the 
difference in offer amount across experimental sessions. 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Two outcome measures were collected from this task. The first were categorical 
(compete or cooperate) decisions and the second were trust ratings out seven. 
As with the UG, the categorical data were analysed using repeated-measures 
logistic regression, implemented with generalized estimating equations using 
IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows (IBM Corp., 2012). The odds ratio represents 
the change in probability of an event (in this case, a cooperate decision) 
occurring with a change in condition (trustworthiness, treatment etc.). 
In all models, participant ID was defined as the subject variable so that each 
participants’ responses were nested together. First, a model testing for a main 
effect of run and the run by treatment interaction was carried out. Following this, 
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a model testing the main effects of treatment and opponent (trustworthy, 
untrustworthy, game server), and their interaction, was analysed. 
Trust ratings were collected on each round, meaning a total of 15 ratings were 
collected for each opponent. In order to account for uncertainty at the beginning 
of each game, the mean of the last eight rounds was calculated as the rating for 
each opponent. For each type of opponent (trustworthy, untrustworthy, game 
server), this was averaged across runs. I then carried out a repeated-measures 
ANOVA to assess differences in trust rating across opponent type and 
experimental session, with post-hoc pairwise comparisons carried out where 
appropriate. 
Affective Bias 
The outcome measure for this task was the percentage correct for each 
emotion (fear, anger, happy, sad) and the control condition. Additionally, one 
can calculate an ‘affective bias’, defined by Bland and colleagues (Bland et al., 
2016) as the difference between happy and sad emotion accuracy. These 
outcome measures were compared across experimental sessions using 
repeated-measures ANOVA, followed up with post-hoc pairwise comparisons 
where appropriate. 
Multifaceted Empathy Test 
The Multifaceted Empathy Test gives the following outcome measures: a 
positive valence affective empathy measure, negative valence affective 
empathy measure, and three measures for cognitive empathy (total, positive 
affect, negative affect). Note that following advice from the group who created 
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the task, there is no pooled measure for total affective empathy (Dziobek, 
personal communication). Each of these was assessed with paired-samples t-
tests to assess differences across experimental sessions. 
Reward sensitivity 
The outcome measure of this task was the mean difference in RT from the 
rewarded to unrewarded trials. This was compared across experimental 
conditions using a paired-sample t-test. 
For each task, if the analysis relates to a directional hypothesis, one-tailed p-
values will be reported, and this will be indicated. 
4.4.3.4 MRI data acquisition and analysis 
Functional images were acquired with a General Electric MR750 3.0 Tesla (T) 
MR scanner using a 32-channel head coil. A T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging 
sequence was used, with the following parameters: TR: 2000 ms; TE: 30 ms; 
flip angle: 75°; slice thickness: 3 mm; field of view: 247mm; number of slices: 
41. For the Ultimatum Game, each run had 356 time points. The Prisoner’s 
Dilemma had 282 time points per run. We also acquired a structural 
Magnetization Prepared Rapid Gradient Echo (MPRAGE) image with the 
following parameters: TR: 7312 ms; TE: 3.02 ms; flip angle 11°; slice thickness: 
3 mm; 196 sagittal slices; field of view = 270mm. 
Data were pre-processed and analysed using SPM12 (Wellcome Department of 
Cognitive Neurology, London). Prior to first level modelling, fMRI data were 
reoriented, slice time-corrected and realigned initially to the first image and then 
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to the mean image. These were then co-registered to the T1 structural file. The 
structural data were segmented to aid special normalisation and a common 
group-specific template was created using DARTEL registration (Ashburner, 
2007). The functional files were then normalised to the MNI template using 
deformation flow fields and structural template created through DARTEL. 
Finally, functional images were smoothed using an 8mm FWHM Gaussian 
kernel. 
The first and second level analyses are described separately for the Ultimatum 
Game and Prisoner’s Dilemma below.  
The Ultimatum Game 
Both runs of the task were included in a single GLM first level model. Ten 
conditions of interest were defined. Nine of these made up the periods where 
participants were presented with the offer, and included each combination of 
offer definition (unfair, fair, hyper-fair) and condition (first person, third party, 
game server). Onsets were defined as the moment the offer appeared on the 
screen, with a duration of 3 seconds (the time the offers remained on the 
screen). The tenth condition contained the periods participants were asked to 
make an offer, with a duration of seven seconds. Seven movement parameters 
(six standard parameters as well as volume-to-volume movement) were 
included as regressors of no interest. Volumes where the volume-to-volume 
movement exceeded 1mm, as well the volume before and after, were also 
modelled as regressors of no interest. The decision button press was also 
modelled as a condition of no interest with duration of zero.  
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At the second level, three 2x2, flexible factorial ANOVA models were 
conducted, first as a whole brain analysis, then with small volume correction 
(SVC) using a mask produced from the meta-analysis reported in 0 (Gabay et 
al., 2014). 
The first flexible factorial was modelled to ascertain if the current study could 
replicate findings in the literature during the placebo session in terms of 
differences between responding to social (first person) or non-social (game 
server) players, and the difference between fair and unfair offers. The two main 
effects and the interaction were modelled. The first person condition was 
chosen to represent the social condition as this is the more common contrast 
investigated in the literature. 
The second model was designed to investigate any treatment effects on neural 
responses to fair and unfair offers in the first person condition. The main effect 
of treatment, the main effect of fairness, and their interaction were modelled. 
The third model investigated any differences between responding for the self or 
for a third party, and the treatment effect on these differences. The main effect 
of treatment, the main effect of offer origin (FP or TP) and their interaction were 
modelled. 
In addition to these, a paired-samples t-test was conducted to examine any 
differences in neural correlates of making an offer across treatment sessions. 
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The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Both runs of the task were included in a single GLM first level model. A simple 
model was defined with each condition (trustworthy, untrustworthy, game server 
opponents) by trial period (decision, feedback, trust rating) combination. The 
decision and feedback periods were defined with durations of three seconds 
and the trust rating with five seconds duration. As with the UG, seven 
movement parameters (six standard parameters as well as volume-to-volume 
movement) were included as regressors of no interest. Volumes where the 
volume-to-volume movement exceeded 1mm, as well the volume before and 
after, were also modelled as regressors of no interest 
At the second-level, a series of whole-brain analyses were carried out. First, 
three one-way repeated-measures ANOVAs were carried out on the placebo 
session data to examine differences in activation across opponents for each of 
the time periods (decision, feedback, trust rating). 
Next, a series of paired-samples t-tests were carried out, investigating any 
differences across experimental sessions for each time period (decision, 






4.4.4.1 Ultimatum Game behavioural results 
The figures in this section present boxplots of the ultimatum game rejection 
behaviour. It should be noted that while the statistical analysis of these results 
take into account responses of each trial, the data are represented in the figures 
as rejection rates, as these are more intuitively represented graphically.  
For one participant, the task did not run properly during scanning, rendering his 
data for this task unusable. As such, the analyses in this section are based on N 
= 19. 
Placebo session rejection behaviour 
In this section I will present the placebo session data to confirm that the task 
produces results in line with the version of the task validated in Section 4.3 and 
the literature. While the study presented in Section 4.3 validated the task, the 
version in this section had the addition of changes in overall stake size.  
Figure 4-11 displays the rejection rates for the placebo session across 
conditions. There was a main effect of both offer origin and fairness level 
(respectively: χ2(1,18) = 7.35, p = 0.025; χ
2  = 63.65, p < 0.001), with no 
statistically significant interaction. Compared to unfair offers, there was a lower 
probability of rejection of fair and hyper-fair offers (respectively: χ2(1,18) = 25.94, 
OR = 0.01 95%CIs 0.002 – 0.07, one-tailed p < 0.001; χ2(1,18) = 13.23, OR = 
0.03, 95%CIs 0.003 – 0.18, one-tailed p < 0.001). There was no statistical 
difference in rejection rates for fair versus hyper-fair offers (χ2(1,18) = 0.63, OR = 
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3.10, 95%CIs 0.19 – 50.67, p = 0.428). There was a statistically significant 
reduction in the probability of rejection in the game server condition compared 
to the first person condition (χ2(1,18) = 15.60, OR = 0.20, 95%CIs 0.09 – 0.45, 
one-tailed p < 0.001). Similarly, there was a decrease in the probability of 
rejection in the game server condition compared to the third party condition (χ
2
(1,18) = 14.17, OR = 0.22, 95%CIs 0.10 – 0.48, one-tailed p < 0.001). There was 
no statistical difference between first person and third party decisions (χ2(1,18) = 
0.52, OR = 0.894, 95%CIs 0.66 – 1.21, one-tailed p = 0.471).  
The effect of run and utility on rejection behaviour 
In order to assess if it is appropriate to combine data across runs within each 
session and across utility categories (i.e. combine all stake sizes), this section 
assesses the effects of run and utility, as well as their interaction with treatment. 
Figure 4-12A displays the overall rejection rates for each run in both 
experimental sessions. Figure 4-12B displays rejection rates for high and low 
utility in both experimental conditions, combined across runs. A GEE analysis 
showed that there was no effect of run or utility (respectively:  χ2(1,18) = 1.00, OR 
= 0.87, 95%CIs 0.67 – 1.14, p = 0.319; χ2(1,18) = 3.05, OR = 0.86, 95%CIs 0.73 
– 1.02, p = 0.081), although utility did approach statistical significance, such that 
there was a lower probability of rejecting high utility offers than low utility offers. 
Neither run nor utility showed a statistically significant interaction with treatment 
(ps > 0.25). 
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These results confirm that it is appropriate to combine data across within-
session runs. Additionally, as the effect of utility did not reach statistical 




Figure 4-11: Boxplots displaying rejection rates across conditions in the placebo session. A) First 











The effect of MDMA on the Ultimatum Game 
Figure 4-13 displays the rejection rates across conditions and treatment 
sessions, as well as the change in rejection rate for each offer level across 
treatment sessions. 
A GEE analysis found no main effect of treatment (p = 0.888), but a main effect 
of offer origin, fairness, and a three-way treatment by fairness by offer origin 
interaction (all ps < 0.009). Closer examination of the parameter estimates 
revealed the following. There was a lower probability of rejecting unfair offers in 
the first person condition under the influence of MDMA compared to placebo (χ
2
(1,18) = 11.02, OR = 0.57, 95%CIs 0.41 – 0.80, one-tailed p < 0.001). The same 
effect of MDMA was found in the third party condition (OR = 0.68, 95%CIs 0.51 
– 0.90). There was no statistical difference between these two effect sizes (p = 
0.254). No effect of treatment was seen for unfair offers from the game server 
(OR = 0.85, 95%CIs 0.56 – 1.30), indicating a significant interaction (p = 0.034). 
There were no other statistically significant treatment effects on rejection 
behaviour in the UG. 
A paired t-test revealed a statistically significant increase in average percentage 
offer from the participants during the MDMA session compared to the placebo 
session (placebo mean offer = 48.2%; MDMA mean offer = 55.7%); mean 
difference = 7.5, SD = 10.25, t(18) = 3.17, one-tailed p = 0.003, Cohen’s d = 
0.82). Morris and DeShon (2002) recommend a correction to Cohen’s d 
calculations based on the correlation between scores when using a repeated-
measures design intended to assess treatment effects across a sample, and 
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this correction has been used here. The correlation of mean offer level across 




Figure 4-13: Boxplots displaying rejection rates. The left column displays both the placebo session 
(green dots) and MDMA session (orange dots) for each condition. The right column represents the 
change in rejection rate from placebo to MDMA session. A) Unfair offers, B) Fair offers, C) Hyper-




4.4.4.2 Ultimatum Game fMRI results 
Placebo session 
The first fMRI analysis was designed to assess the task effects in the placebo 
condition. A flexible factorial model was defined with fairness (fair, unfair) and 
offer origin (first person, game server) as within-subject factors. 
There were no statistically significant clusters (threshold of p < 0.05 FWE-
corrected) in the main effects of fairness or offer origin,or interaction contrasts. 
This was true for the whole-brain analysis and the small volume corrected 
(SVC) analysis using the mask obtained from the meta-analysis carried in 0.  
The effect of MDMA on the neural correlates of unfairness 
In order to assess the effect MDMA on the neural correlates of receiving unfair 
offers, a flexible factorial model was defined with fairness (fair, unfair) and 
treatment (placebo, MDMA) as within-subject factors. This analysis was 
restricted to the first person condition. 
In the whole brain analysis there was a main effect of fairness (see Table 4-6 
and Figure 4-14), such that when compared to receiving unfair offers, fair offers 
produced higher activation in the posterior superior temporal gyrus. There was 
no main effect of treatment nor an interaction. There were no significant clusters 
when the same analysis was performed with SVC. 
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The effect of social partner 
In order to assess differences in neural effects of receiving offers directed at the 
self or a third party a flexible factorial model was defined with treatment 
(placebo, MDMA) and offer origin (first person, third party) as factors. This 
analysis was restricted to unfair offers, as we had hypothesised a difference in 
rejection rates of unfair offers between first person and third party conditions. 
There were no main effects or an interaction for both the whole brain analysis 
and the SVC analysis. 
 
Table 4-6: fMRI activations in the fairness by treatment 2x2 flexible factorial model, restricted to the 
FP condition. Regions identified by the Harvard-Oxford probabilistic atlas (Desikan et al., 2006) 








z-value  Cluster size 
x y z 
Main effect of fairness       
Posterior superior 
temporal gyrus 
0.006 228 63 -16 2 4.13 Posterior 
superior 
temporal gyrus 
   66 -28 5 4.00 





Figure 4-14: Main effect of fairness in treatment x fairness ANOVA restriced to FP condition. Colour 
bar represents Z values. Image thresholded at height threshold of FEW-corrected p < 0.05 
 
 
As the meta-analysis in 0 suggested, there are robust findings in the literature 
regarding the neural correlates of receiving unfair offers in the UG (Gabay et al., 
2014) and our task was based on those presented in the meta-analysis. These 
include increased activation in the insula, medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and 
the cingulate gyrus. Given the strong behavioural results, both in the placebo 
condition alone as well as the effect of MDMA, it is surprising that significant 
clusters were only found in one analysis, and that none of these were in the 
hypothesised regions. Appendix F details a set of analyses carried out on the 




4.4.4.3 Prisoner’s Dilemma behavioural results 
All analyses in this section are based on N = 20. 
Trust ratings 
Figure 4-15 displays the mean trust rating for each type of opponent across 
experimental sessions. A 2 (treatment: placebo, MDMA) x 3 (Trustworthiness: 
trustworthy, untrustworthy, game server) repeated-measures ANOVA revealed 
a main effect of trustworthiness (F(2,38) = 25.39, p < 0.001, ή
2 = 0.57), but no 
main effect of treatment, nor an interaction (respectively: F(1,19) = 1.53, p = 
0.232, ή2 = 0.07; F(2,38) = 0.08, p = 0.928, ή
2 < 0.01). Post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons found a statistically significant difference in trust ratings between 
trustworthy and untrustworthy opponents (mean diff = 2.8, 95% CIs 1.9 – 3.6, p 
< 0.001) and between trustworthy and game server opponents (mean diff = 1.8, 
95% CI 0.6 – 3.0, p = 0.003). The difference between untrustworthy and game 
server opponents did not reach statistical significance (mean diff = 1.0, 95% CI -






Figure 4-15: Barplots displaying the mean trust rating for each opponent type across experimental 




First, I carried out an analysis to assess the impact of completing the task 
across two runs. A GEE analysis tested the main effect of run and its interaction 
with treatment session. No main effect of run was found, but there was a 
treatment by run interaction (respectively: χ2(1,19) = 0.26, p = 0.614; χ
2 = 7.70, p 
= 0.021), such that there was an increase in the probability of a cooperate 
decision in the second run during the MDMA session compared to the first run 
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(OR = 1.28, 95% CIs 1.01 – 1.58). This may reflect a change in subjective 
effects of the drug. However, since the effect is restricted to this treatment 
session, the following analyses will combine data across runs. 
Figure 4-16 displays the percentage of cooperate decisions when playing each 
opponent, across treatment sessions.  
There was a statistically significant main effect of treatment, trustworthiness and 
their interaction (all ps < 0.005). MDMA increased the probability of a 
cooperative decision when playing a trustworthy player (χ2(1,19) = 15.33, OR = 
2.01 95% CI 1.42 – 2.84, p < 0.001), but not when playing an untrustworthy 
player (OR = 1.37 95% CI 0.78 – 2.30) or the game server (OR = 1.03 95% CI 
0.71 – 1.48). 
In order to further explore this, the data were plotted on a round-by-round basis 
(see Figure 4-17). Since the positioning of the opponents decisions were jittered 
across runs, each run was truncated by one decision. An example of this is 
shown in Figure 4-17A. For each round, each participant was scored with either 
a zero (if they had competed at this point on both runs of the session), a one (if 
they had cooperated on both runs), or 0.5 (if they had competed on one run and 
cooperated on the other). For each round, this was then averaged across 
participants, giving a mean proportion of cooperative decisions for each round 






Figure 4-16: Boxplots displaying A) Prisoner's Dilemma Cooperation rates with each type of 
opponent. Green dots: placebo session, orange dots: MDMA session. B) Change in rates of 
cooperation from placebo to MDMA. NB: These plots present the percentage of cooperate 
decisions because they are graphically intuitive. The analysis described in this section is not 




Figure 4-17: Breaking down PD behaviour trial by trial. A) Lining up decisions across runs: in order 
to account for the jitter in opponent responses the last trial of the first run and first trial of the final 
run were removed. ‘C’ indicates where opponents were congruous with their trustworthiness. ‘D’ 
indicates where they deviated from this. B) Proportion of cooperate decisions on each round, 
averaged across participants, for the trustworthy opponent. C) Proportion of cooperate decisions 
on each round, averaged across participants for the untrustworthy opponent. D) Proportion of 
cooperate decisions on each round plotted as scatterplots with the line of best fit for each session; 
for the trustworthy opponent, there is a steady decline in cooperative decisions during the placebo 
session, which does not occur during the MDMA session (see text below; GEE round-by-
experimental session interaction: χ2(1,19) = 16.79, OR = 1.08, 95% CI 1.043 – 1.13, p < 0.001). Error 
bars: ±1SE 
 
With visual examination of Figure 4-17B and C, it is clear that there is much 
greater variation in how participants behaved in the untrustworthy condition 
compared with the trustworthy condition. Furthermore, Figure 4-17C shows a 
steady decline in cooperation over the course of the game with untrustworthy 
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opponents in both experimental sessions. Visual inspection of Figure 4-17B 
shows that following the first decision to compete by the usually trustworthy 
opponents, participants consistently cooperated more in the MDMA session 
than the placebo session. Furthermore, while there are clear effects of the 
decisions to compete, it looks feasible that the overall steady decline in 
cooperation over rounds of the game may differ across sessions in this 
condition. This is represented in Figure 4-17D, which plots the points in Figure 
4-17B and C as a scatterplot, with a line of best fit running through these points. 
To test this statistically, a different model was analysed in the GEE framework. 
Restricting the analysis to each opponent in turn (trustworthy, untrustworthy, 
game server), the round number was included as a covariate, and the main 
effect of round as well as the round-by-experimental session interaction were 
modelled. This is the equivalent of statistically comparing the beta coefficients 
to assess a difference in the slope of a relationship in a parametric regression; 
but here it is for repeated-measurements of binary decision data. Again, it is 
important to note that the visual representations presented here show 
proportions of cooperate decisions for 14 of the 15 rounds, whereas the 
analysis is based on trial by trial binary responses for all trials. 
For all three opponents there was a statistically significant main effect of round 
such that there was a decreased probability of a cooperate decision as the 
game progressed (trustworthy: χ2(1,19) = 15.06, OR = 0.90, 95% CI 0.87 – 0.93, 
p < 0.001; untrustworthy: χ2(1,19) = 48.04, OR = 0.84, 95% CI 0.79 – 0.89, p < 
0.001; game server: χ2(1,19) = 8.41, OR = 0.94, 95% CI 0.90 – 0.97, p = 0.004). 




(1,19) = 16.79, OR = 1.08, 95% CI 1.043 – 1.13, p < 0.001). Whilst the effect size 
here is small, it suggests that, as seen in Figure 4-17D, the effect of MDMA 
seen in the main analysis may be understood as a maintained level of overall 
cooperation for the duration of the game with this opponent, which is not seen in 
the placebo session. 
The relationship between trust and cooperative behaviour 
In order to assess the relationship between trust and cooperative behaviour, a 
new GEE model was defined. In this model, treatment and opponent were 
defined as factors, and the previous round’s trust rating was defined as a 
continuous covariate. The model was tested for the main effect of the covariate 
and the covariate-by-treatment interaction. 
There was a main effect of previous trust rating on decision (χ2(1,19) = 68.31, p < 
0.001). There was no treatment by previous trust rating interaction (χ2(1,19)
 = 
1.89, p = 0.170). This indicates that across conditions, controlling for 
correlations between repeated measurements, the greater the previous round’s 
trust rating, the greater the probability of a cooperate decision. The lack of 
interaction effect shows that this relationship was not affected by treatment 
session. 
4.4.4.4 Prisoner’s Dilemma fMRI results 
Placebo session 
No effects were found (threshold of FWE-corrected p < 0.05) in three one-way, 
within-subject ANOVAs, looking at the effect of opponent type (trustworthy, 
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untrustworthy, game server) on each period of the trial (decision, feedback, trust 
rating). 
The effect of MDMA  
Paired-sample t-tests revealed no differences in neural activity across 
experimental sessions for the decision period or trust rating period, regardless 
of opponent type. The same was true of the feedback period for untrustworthy 
opponents and the game server. 
During the feedback period when playing a trustworthy opponent, there was 
increased activation during the MDMA session in the following clusters (see 
Table 4-7 and Figure 4-18): i) two clusters encompassing bilateral central 
opercular cortex/posterior insula. On the left this cluster has a peak in the 
inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis. Bilaterally this cluster extends to the 
anterior insular, and on the right the putamen; ii) bilateral mid-cingulate cortex, 
extending into the supplementary motor area; iii) a cluster encompassing the 
right posterior superior temporal sulcus and lateral occipital cortex. 
Participants received feedback that the other player cooperated on 12 out of 15 
rounds when playing the trustworthy opponent, and feedback that they had 
competed 3 of the 15 rounds. In order to assess what was driving the difference 
in activation in this condition across sessions, a new first level model was 
defined with onsets of cooperative feedback and competitive feedback defined 
separately. At the second level, the effect of treatment was assessed with a 
paired-sample t-test. It is acknowledged that the low number of competitive 
feedback trials would not allow a clear determination of their contribution and 
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therefore the analysis on the cooperate trials were considered confirmatory if 
the results overlapped, or were greater. When comparing just the rounds with 
cooperative feedback, there was a large overlap of these increased activations. 
This suggests that these results were due to MDMA-induced changes in 
response to cooperative rather than competitive feedback. When removing the 
competitive feedback, the clusters became larger – of particular note was an 





Table 4-7: fMRI activations in the for the PD. Regions identified by the Harvard-Oxford probabilistic 
atlas (Desikan et al., 2006) 












x y z 
MDMA > placebo, Feedback period with the trustworthy opponent 
Left inferior Frontal 
gyrus 
< 0.001 356 -52 22 7 5.14 Inferior frontal 
gyrus 
   -49 -15 17 4.49 Central 
operculum 
   -45 -22 20 4.41 
Right central 
operculum 
< 0.001 388 52 -4 -3 4.02 Planum polare 
   45 -22 17 3.91 Parietal 
operculum 




0.001 231 -11 -8 40 4.56 Mid-cingulate 
sulcus 
   15 -26 43 3.90  




0.004 176 45 -64 3 4.16 Posterior 
superior 
temporal sulcus 
   60 -34 3 3.82  






Figure 4-18: Increased activations in the MDMA compared to placebo session when receiving 
feedback from the trustworthy opponent. Colour bar represents Z values. Image thresholded at 
FWE-corrected p < 0.05 
 
 
4.4.4.5 Affective Bias 
The Affective Bias task examined facial affect recognition across four different 
emotional states: happy, sad, fear, anger. There was a control condition of 
assessing which of four age-groups a face belonged. The results from this task 
are displayed in Figure 4-19.  
A paired-sample t-test showed no effect of treatment on the control condition 
(mean difference = -4.8, SD = 12.6, t(17) = -1.64, p = 0.120). This shows that 
MDMA did not alter participants’ ability to recognise and make judgments on 
faces in general. A 2 (treatment: placebo, MDMA) x 4 (emotion: happy, sad, 
fear, anger) repeated-measure ANOVA found a no main effect of treatment 
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(F1,17) = 2.56, p = 0.128, ή
2 = 0.13), but both a main effect of emotion (F3,51) = 
29.22, p < 0.001, ή2 = 0.63) and a treatment*emotion interaction (F1,17) = 3.56, p 
= 0.029, ή2 = 0.16). 
Post-hoc comparisons found that participants were more accurate in identifying 
happy emotions when compared to all others (all Bonferroni-corrected ps < 
0.003); anger was identified less accurately than all other emotions (all 
Bonferroni-corrected ps < 0.001); there was no difference in accuracy in 
identifying sad compared to fearful faces. The interaction appears to be driven 
by a reduced accuracy in identifying fear and anger during the MDMA session 
compared to the placebo (see  
Table 4-8). Bland et al (2016) define the affective bias as being the difference in 
accuracy between happy and sad emotions. A paired-sample t-test found no 











Table 4-8: Post-hoc paired t-tests comparing facial affect recognition across experimental sessions 
for each emotion 
Emotion Mean difference, % 
(MDMA-placebo) 
Std deviation t(17) Uncorrected-p 
Happy 0.8 10.9 -0.325 0.749 
Sad 0.2 14.5 -0.069 0.946 
Fear -8.3 16.0 2.211 0.041 





4.4.4.6 The Multifaceted Empathy Test 
The Multifaceted Empathy Test gives the following outcome measures: a 
positive valence affective empathy measure, negative valence affective 
empathy measure, and three measures for cognitive empathy (total, positive 
affect, negative affect). Unfortunately we had missing data for five participants 
for the affective empathy, and four participants for cognitive empathy; therefore 
these analyses are based on N = 15 and N = 16, respectively. Figure 4-9 
displays the mean and standard deviation for each of these outcome measures. 
Paired-samples t-tests show that there were no differences across treatment 
sessions for any comparison across treatment sessions (all ps > 0.193).  
Table 4-9: Mean (SD) of the MET scores 
 Placebo MDMA 
Cognitive empathy   
All stimuli 29.07 (2.84) 29.0 (3.14) 
Positive stimuli 15.53 (1.19) 15.20 (1.74) 
Negative stimuli 13.53 (2.53) 13.80 (2.57) 
Affective empathy   
Positive stimuli 5.57 (1.24) 6.03 (0.83) 




4.4.4.7 Reward sensitivity 
This task was designed to establish if MDMA altered participants’ sensitivity to 
reward. The task produced reaction time (RT) measurements for rewarded and 
unrewarded trials. A repeated-measures ANOVA showed that there was a main 
effect of trial type such that in both experimental sessions participants’ 
responded faster for the rewarded trials compared to the unrewarded trials 
(mean diff = -77.52ms, F(1,19) = 8.04, one-tailed p = 0.006, ή
2 = 0.30). There was 
no main effect of treatment session, nor a session by trial type interaction 
(respectively: mean diff = -4.93, F(1,19) = 0.28, one-tailed p = 0.603, ή
2 = 0.12; 
F(1,19) = 0.021, one-tailed p = 0.888, ή
2 < 0.01). 
While there was no change in mean ‘reward sensitivity’ (the difference in RT 
between rewarded and unrewarded blocks), it is worth assessing whether the 
variance in the change in reward sensitivity could account for the findings in the 
UG and PD (although it should be noted that the PD involved non-monetary 
rewards). To this end, I carried out two bivariate correlation analyses. There 
was no significant correlation of the change in reward sensitivity with the 
change in rejection rates in the FP condition of the UG (r = 0.02, p = 0.924) or 
with the change in cooperation rates when playing trustworthy opponents in the 
PDG (r = -0.03, p = 0.897). 
These results show that participants were sensitive to reward, willing to put 
more effort into improving their reaction time in the rewarded trials, but that 




Social Value Orientation 
The SVO (Van Lange, 1999) showed that the vast majority (80%) of the 
participants could be considered prosocial rather than egoistic when 
considering resource distribution in the placebo condition. Two repeated-
measures t-tests showed that neither prosocial nor egoistic responses changed 
across experimental sessions (respectively: t19) = -1.38, p = 0.138; t(19) = 0.99, p 
= 0.337). 
Social Reward Questionnaire 
The SRQ (Foulkes et al., 2014) has six subscales: Admiration; Negative social 
potency; Passivity; Prosocial interactions; Sexual relationships; Sociability. A 
repeated-measures t-test was carried out for each subscale separately, to test 
for changes across experimental session. Only the prosocial interactions 
subscale showed a statistically significant change, such that there was an 
increase in score during the MDMA session compared to placebo session (t(19) 
= -3.19, Bonferroni-corrected for the six subscales p = 0.03). 
Given this change in the SRQ’s prosociality measure, I next carried out two 
post-hoc regression analyses to examine if the variance in the change in this 
measure could explain either the change in rejection rates in the UG or the 
change in cooperation rates in the PD. There was a significant relationship 
between the change in SRQ prosociality subscale and rejection of unfair FP UG 
offers, but not with the change in cooperation rates with trustworthy PD 
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opponents (respectively: beta = -0.51, R2 = 0.26, p = 0.025; beta = 0.313, R2 = 
0.10, p = 0.191; p-values uncorrected).  
 
4.4.5 Discussion 
This study presents a detailed and wide-ranging exploration of the role of 
serotonin (5-HT) in social cognition, using the serotonergic compound 3,4-
methylenedioxy-methamphetamine (MDMA). We investigated the effect of this 
drug on behaviour in two well-known social decision-making tasks, the 
Ultimatum Game and Prisoner’s Dilemma, as well as on facial affect recognition 
and empathy. There were clear effects of MDMA on social decision-making. In 
the UG, there was reduced rejection of unfair offers when acting as the 
responder in the social conditions (first person and third party), but not the non-
social condition (game server). There was also an increase in offer value when 
acting as the proposer. When responding to offers in the first person condition, 
there was greater activation in response to fair offers than unfair offers in the 
superior temporal gyrus (STG) across treatment sessions. In the PD, the effect 
of MDMA was to increase cooperation with trustworthy opponents but not 
untrustworthy opponents or the game server. This was accompanied, when 
receiving feedback of the trustworthy players’ decisions, by increased activation 
in social cognition regions during the MDMA session. These included the 
posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), mid-cingulate cortex and the 
supplementary motor area (SMA), as well as the posterior insula/opercular 
cortex and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). In the other tasks MDMA reduced 
recognition of negative facial affect, but had no effect on either cognitive or 
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affective empathy. MDMA increased scores on the prosociality subscale of the 
Social Reward Questionnaire (Foulkes et al., 2014), but had no effect on the 
Social Value Orientation questionnaire (Van Lange, 1999). 
The following discussion will be formed of a number of parts. First I will discuss 
the social decision-making results; the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) followed by the 
Ultimatum Game (UG). I will then discuss the tasks for which we did not obtain 
neuroimaging data, the Affective Bias task and the Multifaceted Empathy Test 
(MET). The questionnaires will be referred to in the context of the other tasks. 
The discussion will end with a final consideration of the pharmacological 
mechanisms underlying the findings reported in this chapter, building on those 
discussed in the other sections. 
 
4.4.5.1 The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Discussion of Prisoner’s Dilemma behaviour 
In both single-shot and finitely-repeated games, mutual defection is the game 
theoretic, ‘rational’ outcome in the PD (Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Axelrod and 
Hamilton, 1981; Colman, 2003; Cooper et al., 1996). Despite this, a meta-
analysis of over 30 years of research found that studies most frequently 
reported 30-40% cooperation rates (Sally, 1995). High cooperation rates have 
continued to be seen in recent PD research (e.g. McClure et al., 2007; Rilling et 
al., 2002; Wood et al., 2006). This was also seen in the current analysis, with 
participants’ cooperation rates centred around approximately 40% even when 
they were playing with an untrustworthy opponent. At its core, this appears to 
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suggest that the social norm is to cooperate with other people to obtain mutually 
beneficial outcomes. 
Higher cooperation rates with trustworthy opponents than with untrustworthy 
opponents were paralleled by differences in average trust rating for each 
opponent type. Indeed, the finding that there was a statistically significant 
relationship between round-by-round trust ratings and decisions showed that 
one of the potential mechanisms underlying peoples’ decisions on whether or 
not to cooperate is how much they trusted their opponent at that particular 
moment. While this may appear obvious, to my knowledge it is the first time this 
has been directly tested in the PD. As shown by the regression analysis at the 
end of Section 4.4.4.3, this relationship was not affected by the administration of 
MDMA; neither were the mean trust ratings of each opponent. This was counter 
to what was hypothesised and suggests that MDMA did not alter participants’ 
concept of what constitutes trustworthy behaviour, while altering cooperation 
rates. As reported in Section 4.3.4.2, the mean trust ratings had high test-retest 
reliability (ICC range across opponent types: 0.76 – 0.96). As such, non-MDMA-
related between-session variability should have been low, maximising the 
power to detect an effect if it was present, sample-size notwithstanding. With 
this is mind, it suggests that any change in cooperative behaviour was not due 
to an MDMA-based disruption of the conceptualisation of trustworthiness, but 
must be due to some other mechanism.  
Also counter to our hypothesis, MDMA increased cooperation only when playing 
with trustworthy players. Had the amount of cooperation increased with both 
trustworthy and untrustworthy opponents, it would have been interpretable as 
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MDMA causing participants to cooperate more regardless of the other player’s 
behaviour. Instead, it appears that the MDMA effect is more nuanced, and 
context-specific. When the other player showed an overall lack of cooperation, 
participants behaved similar on the drug and placebo, protecting themselves 
against being taken advantage of by the opponent. When playing mostly 
cooperative players, however, it appears that following an opponent’s compete 
decision, there was quicker and greater recovery of cooperation in the MDMA 
session, leading to an overall greater cooperation rate. This is visualised in 
Figure 4-17D, with the shallower slope for the MDMA session than placebo 
session in the trustworthy condition. It is likely that this ‘recovery’ of cooperation 
is the trust-independent mechanism underlying the differences seen in overall 
cooperation across treatment sessions. 
It is important to refer to the test-retest reliability of the PD decisions reported in 
Section 4.3.4.2. This aspect of the PD showed poor reliability (range of 
repeatability estimates across opponents: 0.26 – 0.48). Two considerations can 
be taken from this. First, for an effect to have been detected for the trustworthy 
opponent there must have been a consistent effect. Second, the variance in the 
proportion of cooperative decisions with the untrustworthy opponent was large. 
As such, if the MDMA effect in this condition was subtle, the low test-retest 
reliability would have reduced the sensitivity to find it. 
Discussion of Prisoner’s Dilemma fMRI results 
For each period of the task (decision, feedback, trust rating), no differences in 
brain activity during the placebo session were found when compared across 
opponent types. When examining the PD imaging literature, one finds that most 
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studies do not report simple task effects at decision or feedback stages of the 
task. Rather, comparisons between treatment and placebo or between different 
types of outcome are reported (cooperate-cooperate vs cooperate-defect, for 
example) (e.g. Chen et al., 2017; Feng et al., 2015; Rilling et al., 2002; Sun et 
al., 2016). In an exception to this, Lambert et al reported neuroimaging results 
for the decision period of repeated, single-shot games (Lambert et al., 2017). 
The equivalent in the current study would be to compare the first round of each 
game across opponent types; a comparison we did not have sufficient statistical 
power to carry out. Those authors reported activity in the cingulate cortex, 
insula, inferior frontal gyrus and precuneus during the decision phase.  
It is perhaps unsurprising to not find simple differences in the main task effects 
for the decision period across opponent types, as any differences are more 
likely represented through incorporation of previous rounds’ responses over the 
course of the game. Such differences would be better detected using 
computational models. The same could be true for the trust rating period. More 
surprising is the lack of differences in the feedback period. However, as 
mentioned above, most other studies compare outcome types. The analysis 
presented here will have incorporated a range of different types of feedback in 
each condition, thus increasing the variance of signal within each factor in the 
analysis. Comparing across experimental session is able to detect the effect of 
treatment regardless of this within factor variance. 
The analysis across experimental sessions identified MDMA-induced 
differences in brain activity when receiving feedback during games with 
trustworthy opponents. This suggests that the behavioural differences described 
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above may be due to differences processing social feedback, and how this 
feedback is integrated in subsequent behaviour. These differences may 
underlie the recovery of cooperative behaviour described in the preceding 
section. The broad network of areas found in this contrast have been strongly 
implicated in social cognition (Adolphs, 2003; Molenberghs et al., 2016; Schurz 
et al., 2014; Van Overwalle, 2009). While discussing these findings in light of 
the existing literature, I will argue that the neuroimaging data obtained in the 
current study represent a greater social engagement with the other players, 
which in the trustworthy condition led to increased cooperative behaviour. 
The pSTS is frequently implicated in theory of mind (ToM) and attribution of 
intention to others (Deen et al., 2015; Kestemont et al., 2015; Schurz et al., 
2014; Van Overwalle, 2009). As described in 0, ToM is the ability to infer the 
thoughts and intentions of another agent (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). That 
changes in behaviour in the PD could be driven by ToM processes is feasible. 
Indeed, a number of studies specifically looking at interpersonal interactions 
have highlighted the role of the pSTS in strategic games using computational 
modelling techniques (Bault et al., 2015a; Hampton et al., 2008; Haruno and 
Kawato, 2009). Hampton et al (2008) had participants play a strategic game in 
which they were awarded money based on the combinations of their own and 
an interacting partner’s decisions, not unlike the PD. Using a computational 
model they found that a region of the STS slightly more posterior to that 
reported here was involved in processing the influence of one’s own strategy on 
the behaviour of their partner. Crucially, this occurred during the feedback stage 
of the task. Haruno and Kawato (2009) used a reinforcement learning model to 
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provide evidence that during the PD, a region of the pSTS, slightly deeper in the 
sulcus than that reported here, was involved in predicting the partner’s strategy 
during one’s own decision phase. It is important to note however that in this 
study, participants were not led to believe they were playing human partners.  
Bault et al (2015) tested a computational model which attempted to explain the 
development of ‘social tie’ over the course of a two-player public goods game. 
They claim that this represents the history of the interaction over multiple 
rounds, in the form of reactions to the other’s behaviour. They found that this 
was encoded in a region of the right pSTS slightly lateral to that reported in the 
current analysis. Furthermore, they modelled an ‘impulse’ factor, which 
represented the impact of the other player’s choice on the participant’s own 
behaviour, and informed the development of the social tie. Their analysis 
suggested that this impulse factor was also encoded in the pSTS during the 
feedback period of the task.   
To summarise, the studies outlined above provide strong evidence that ToM 
processing in the pSTS can involve complex computations of both self and 
other during interpersonal interactions. Any of the processes described above 
could be expected to be taking place in the iterated PD reported here. The 
findings in the present study could extend these by suggesting a serotonergic 
effect underlying these processes. For example, if MDMA were to alter the 
processing of the impact of the other player’s choice during feedback, leading to 
a differential encoding of the connection, or ‘social tie’, with the other player 
(Bault et al., 2015a), this could influence the recovery of cooperation. 
Furthermore, a greater engagement with how one’s own strategy will influence 
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the other player’s strategy (Hampton et al., 2008) could also underlie the 
changes seen in the behavioural data presented here. While this hypothesis 
would need to be tested explicitly, with a task designed to enable computational 
modelling, it points to the possibility that the effects of MDMA on ToM 
processing in the pSTS act to increase social engagement in the task and with 
the other player.  
Two clusters encompassing bilateral posterior insula/central opercular cortex 
were also found in the current analysis to be more active when receiving 
feedback from trustworthy players in the MDMA session compared to placebo 
session. A large activation likelihood estimation meta-analysis of neuroimaging 
studies investigating functional parcellation of the insula cortex highlighted a 
posterior region as being activated in studies utilising empathy tasks (Kurth et 
al., 2010). This emphasises that although this area is typically known to be 
largely involved with interoception (Craig, 2002; Kurth et al., 2010), there is 
evidence of its involvement in other processes, including socio-cognitive 
processes. Indeed, a study investigating the role of perspective-taking and 
cognitive appraisal in empathy found involvement of this region (Lamm et al., 
2007). I will provide further evidence of this region being in involved in cognitive 
appraisal below, and hypothesise a role for this in the current findings.  
Two non-social reward studies implicate these posterior insula/opercular 
regions in tasks which could be relevant to the current study. Tanaka et al 
(2004) provided evidence that this region was involved in a reinforcement 
learning paradigm in which participants completed a task where accepting 
immediate losses could lead to longer term gains. The authors claimed a role 
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for the posterior insula/opercular region in reward prediction at different time 
scales. Wittmann et al (2007) also found strong activations of bilateral posterior 
insula/opercular regions in a delay discounting task when participants chose a 
delayed reward rather than immediate reward. These authors claim that 
posterior insula is key part of a decision-making network. It must be 
acknowledged that the paradigms employed by these studies are very different 
from the PD, but they do act to illustrate a possible role of this region in 
decision-making.  
Further studies have implicated the posterior insula/opercular regions in social 
decision-making during the UG. Güroğlu et al (Güroğlu et al., 2010; Kirk et al., 
2011b) highlighted activation of this region when accepting, rather than 
rejecting, unfair offers in the UG. Kirk et al (Güroğlu et al., 2010; Kirk et al., 
2011b) found that experienced meditators, who accepted more unfair offers 
than controls, showed increased posterior insula activation in response to unfair 
offers than controls. Furthermore, Kirk et al (2016) found that mindfulness 
training resulted in decreased rejection rates, as well as increased connectivity 
between the posterior insula/opercular region and a septal seed region. The 
authors discuss this in light of evidence that suggests this seed region is 
implicated in prosocial behaviours.   
Wright et al (2011) altered the context of objectively moderate unequal offers 
(30%) in the UG by including them in groups of offers which differed by the size 
of the other offers in the group. 30% offers could therefore be ‘fair’ in the context 
of the other offers predominantly being lower, or ‘unfair’ in the context of the 
other offers predominantly being higher. They claimed that objective inequality 
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and social context were integrated in the posterior insula/opercular region. 
Finally, Grecucci et al (2013) carried out a UG study in which participants were 
trained in emotional reappraisal of the intentionality of unfair offers. They found 
that such reappraisal strategies not only altered rejection rates, but that activity 
in the posterior insula/opercular region was modulated by these regulation 
strategies. These authors suggested that differential processing of visceral 
interoceptive representations could be a mechanism by which the reappraisal 
strategies affected the emotional perception of the other players’ behaviour. 
Indeed, a dual fMRI meta-analysis/lesion study approach has recently argued 
that the insula cortex and its networks play a role of integrating bodily signals for 
the emergence of social and affective behaviours (Adolfi et al., 2017).  
In summary, the studies discussed in the preceding paragraphs paint a possible 
picture of a nuanced role of the posterior insula/opercula region in changes to 
social decision-making seen in the current study. All of the UG studies outlined 
above have in common alterations to behaviour in response to norm violations, 
and concurrent changes in activation of this region. The same is true for the 
current study – a quicker and greater recovery of cooperative behaviour 
following norm violations by trustworthy opponents. Speculatively, reappraisal of 
the social context in which these violations occur (i.e. an acknowledgment that 
the opponent is mostly trustworthy) may underlie the changes seen in 
behaviour. To test this we would have needed to have an explicit fixed 
questionnaire or interview after the tasks that attempted to delve further into the 
motivations underlying participants’ behaviour in the tasks.  
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There are of course other possible, non-task-related interpretations of MDMA-
induced activity in an area involved with interoception  (Craig, 2002; Kurth et al., 
2010). MDMA is known to affect the sympathetic nervous system, as well as 
increase blood pressure, heart rate and peripheral body temperature (Clark et 
al., 2014; Liechti et al., 2000; Mithoefer et al., 2011). Any of these could feasibly 
alter interoception, and therefore lead to changes in the posterior 
insula/opercular region. However, this does not explain why such changes were 
not seen across opponent types when comparing the MDMA session to the 
placebo session. Indeed, why any of the changes in neural activity were not 
seen across opponent types is an interesting question, and will be addressed 
later in this discussion. 
The cingulate cortex is frequently implicated in social cognition (Apps et al., 
2016; Bernhardt and Singer, 2012; Fan et al., 2011; Gabay et al., 2014; 
Rushworth et al., 2013). It has been argued that the anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) and anterior parts of the mid-cingulate cortex (aMCC) are involved in 
processing values and outcomes, and how these outcomes influence 
subsequent behaviour (Behrens et al., 2008; Kolling et al., 2016). Furthermore, 
recent research has attempted to differentiate between the role of cingulate 
gyrus and cingulate sulcus, and argues that while both are involved in 
reinforcement learning, the cingulate gyrus tracks the motivation of others 
during interactive tasks ( Apps et al., 2013; Apps et al., 2016; Lockwood, 2016).  
In the results presented in the current study, the change in cingulate activation 
spanned both the mid-cingulate gyrus and mid-cingulate sulcus. The analysis 
presented here does not enable a nuanced assessment of the contribution 
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made by the change in activity in the mid-cingulate to the decision-making 
process. By producing a reinforcement learning model of the task, it may be 
possible to disentangle the relative contributions of areas within this cluster, but 
this is beyond the scope of the current analysis.  
The research described above highlights cingulate areas more anterior to those 
see here, although some are only marginally so. The changes in activation seen 
in the current study are in a region which has been proposed to make up part of 
a cingulate motor area (Beckmann et al., 2009; Liberg et al., 2014; Wadsworth 
et al., 2017). To my knowledge, this is the first time this region of the cingulate 
cortex has been implicated in social decision-making. It is possible that when 
receiving feedback of the other player’s decision, the participant immediately 
begins to consider their next decision. As such, response to the feedback and 
action planning could both be represented in the changes in activation captured 
in this contrast.  
A recent, comprehensive review of studies investigating the MCC, incorporating 
functional imaging, cytoarchitectural and histological studies, argues for a 
functional delimitation into anterior and posterior MCC regions (aMCC and 
pMCC, respectively; Vogt, 2016). The cluster reported here spans this 
boundary. Vogt argues that aMCC is highly innervated with dopamine DA1 
receptors and plays a role in action selection based on the rewarding or 
aversive properties of the action. Furthermore, the review makes the case that 
this region plays a key role in feedback-mediated decision-making. The case is 
made that pMCC is involved in rapid, reflexive action. In the current study, this 
latter explanation does not easily sit with the finding of pMCC during the 
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feedback period of the PD. Speculatively, the MCC changes could represent 
alterations to the incorporation of feedback into the planning of the next 
decision, and its associated action.  
To conclude this section I will briefly summarise the discussion of the PD data 
thus far. Prior to discussing the fMRI findings of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, I 
speculated that the increased cooperation seen with the trustworthy player 
during the MDMA session compared to placebo session was due to a quicker 
and greater recovery of cooperation following a compete decision by the other 
player. In the preceding paragraphs I have argued that the neuroimaging results 
potentially support an interpretation that this is due to greater social 
engagement with the task and other player. I have argued that ToM regions 
may differentially regulate the social connection with the other player, including 
how one’s own actions will affect those of the other. This could influence or be 
influenced by different activation of the posterior insula/opercular regions which 
may inform the reappraisal of the other player’s intentionality and their effect on 
the player’s own emotional response to their behaviour.  
The difference between trustworthy and untrustworthy opponents 
It is interesting that MDMA-related changes were only seen when playing the 
PD with trustworthy players. This behavioural finding was supported by the 
equivalent finding in the neuroimaging results, and suggests that participants 
did not differ in their ability to recognise untrustworthy players. Indeed, this is 
supported by the fact that trust ratings did not change across experimental 
sessions. The design of the task was such that untrustworthy players always 
competed for the first two or three rounds of the game. Perhaps these opening 
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decisions are enough for the player to establish that the other player is unlikely 
to be persuaded into cooperating, and this process is unaffected by the 
mechanisms underlying the effect of MDMA. Future research would do well to 
investigate this further, by having untrustworthy opponents cooperate at the 
beginning of the game. Perhaps this change would introduce enough 
uncertainty that the MDMA effect would lead to greater cooperation rates. 
It is important to note that there was large variation in how participants 
responded to untrustworthy players in both treatment sessions (see Figure 
4-17). This variation may be hiding distinct strategic groups in the sample, with 
some who did in fact cooperate more in the untrustworthy condition during the 
MDMA session. If this were the case, the improved power provided by 
increased sample size, or by increasing the number of opponents each 
participant faces, would allow an analysis of the fMRI data which could attempt 
to clarify differences in processing of these different groups. The data is 
currently being analysed further to establish if a reinforcement learning model 
can be applied to the data to tease apart such differences in strategy. If so, 
parameters from this model could be included in the fMRI analysis to potentially 
reduce the unexplained variance in the BOLD signal, thus improving the 





4.4.5.2 The Ultimatum Game 
Discussion of Ultimatum Game behaviour 
In the placebo session, participants’ Ultimatum Game (UG) behaviour 
conformed to that which was expected; namely, that there would be greater 
rejection of unfair offers in the first person (FP) and third party (TP) conditions 
than in the game server (GS) condition. Furthermore, that there would be 
greater rejection of unfair offers than fair and hyper-fair offers.  
With regard to the effect of MDMA on this behaviour, our hypotheses were only 
partially supported. There was a lower probability of rejecting an unfair offer in 
the social conditions (FP and TP) during the MDMA session than the placebo 
session. However, there was no difference in the MDMA effect between the 
social conditions – we had hypothesised that MDMA would not alter TP 
rejection rates. 
The results of the current study extend those of other studies which have 
investigated the serotonergic underpinnings of UG behaviour (Crockett et al., 
2008; M. J. Crockett et al., 2010, 2013). These studies manipulated serotonin 
levels with the administration of SSRIs and acute tryptophan depletion, and 
found, respectively, decreased and increased rejection of 30% offers. Rejection 
of more extreme unfair offers (10-20%) remained unchanged. The current 
findings, of reduced rejection rates across all unfair offers, establish that those 
studies may have been limited by the potency of the serotonergic manipulations 
employed, but supports their overall findings.  
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In the UG, rejection behaviour is often considered altruistic punishment – the 
costly punishment of an other’s violation of social norms – and is a well-
replicated finding (Civai et al., 2013; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004b; Gabay et 
al., 2014; Güth et al., 1982; Sanfey, 2003). The modulation of UG behaviour by 
serotonergic manipulation has been discussed by Crockett et al. (2013) as 
being indicative of serotonin’s role in impulsive choice and reactive aggression, 
and they suggest that a reduction in rejection rates of unfair offers with 
increased serotonin is due to harm aversion brought on by greater deliberation 
(i.e. less impulsive choices) (Crockett, 2009; Crockett et al., 2013; Crockett et 
al., 2010). When discussing a different series of studies, Civai et al (Civai et al., 
2010a; Civai, 2013b; Civai et al., 2013, 2015) argues against the idea that 
rejection behaviour is solely due to negative emotional reaction to unfairness. 
They claim that the finding that people reject unfair offers in TP conditions (as 
seen in the present study), when they are not affected by the outcome, is 
evidence of inequality aversion over and above reactive negative emotion.  
In order to interpret the results from the present study, it is important to first 
point out that reduction in rejection rates was not due to a change in reward 
sensitivity. The design of the version of the UG used in this study included a 
range of stake sizes, such that unfair offers could range from an absolute value 
of £1.00 to £9.50. As such, if participants were to become either more or less 
sensitive to monetary reward, it is possible this would be reflected by a 
differential change in rejection at different levels of absolute value. This was not 
the case. Furthermore, we explicitly tested for reward sensitivity in a reaction 
time task after the scanning session, and this too did not suggest participants 
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had a greater desire for monetary reward during the MDMA session. 
Furthermore, the variance in changes in reward sensitivity did not explain the 
variance in change in rejection rates in the FP condition. As such, the reduction 
in rejection rates seen in the FP condition cannot be interpreted simply as an 
increased sensitivity to monetary payoff. While one must be cautious when 
interpreting null results, this is further supported by the finding that when 
participants made offers to other players, their percentage offer increased 
during the MDMA session compared to the placebo session. 
One possible interpretation of these results is that participants were willing to 
accept lower offers due to higher loss aversion during the MDMA session. 
Crocket et al (2015) specifically included a loss aversion parameter in a 
computational model of ‘moral’ decision-making, and found that increasing 
serotonin with SSRI treatment did not change this. Murphy et al (2009) carried 
out an experiment which used tryptophan supplements to increase serotonin 
availability during a paradigm designed to investigate decision-making under 
uncertainty. The authors reported a reduction in loss aversion with increased 
serotonin. In a pharmacological study, Macoveanu et al (2013) found that 
blockade of the 5-HT2A receptor with ketanserin, made participants more risk-
averse. Risk aversion has been highly correlated to loss aversion, albeit with a 
much more economics-focused viewpoint (Goldstein et al., 2008). Finally, a 
review of the literature looking at monoamine influence on risk in decision-
making concluded that serotoninergic neurotransmission may ease loss 
aversion rather than increase it (Takahashi, 2012). Taken together, the 
273 
 
evidence suggests an MDMA-induced increase in personal loss-aversion is 
unlikely to account for the reduction in rejection rates seen in the current study. 
The finding that FP and TP rejection rates both decreased during the MDMA 
session could suggest that there was an overall decrease in equality 
considerations. Such an interpretation would support Civai’s (2013) 
interpretation that rejection behaviour in the UG goes beyond emotion reactivity 
and takes into account fairness preferences and inequality aversion. However, 
the finding that the vast majority of participants scored as ‘prosocial’ in the 
social value orientation questionnaire (SVO; Van Lange, 1999) in the placebo 
session, and that this did not change in the MDMA session, suggests that there 
was no reduction in overall fairness preferences. Again, one must be cautious 
interpreting null results, although the finding of an increase in the prosocial 
subscale of the Social Reward Questionnaire (SRQ; Foulkes et al., 2014) does 
not support an interpretation that participants cared less for equality and 
fairness. This subscale includes the following questions, amongst others: 
i) I enjoy treating others fairly; 
ii) I enjoy making someone feel happy; 
iii) I enjoy feeling emotionally connected to others. 
Not only does this directly reference fairness considerations, these speak to the 
sense that the effect of MDMA increased the feeling of connectedness to other 
people. When discussing behaviour in the tasks at the end of each session, 
participants often said, during the MDMA session, such statements as: “It didn’t 
seem fair to deprive the other person of any money”; “I didn’t know his situation 
– maybe he needed the money more than I did.” In light of these qualitative 
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statements, the harm aversion model of serotonergic influence on the UG 
appears to be supported by the present study, albeit tentatively. Taking into 
account the finding that the individual increases in the prosociality measure on 
the SRQ predicted the magnitude of the decrease in rejection rates in the FP 
condition, I would argue that in the case of MDMA administration, this harm 
aversion was facilitated by an increased concern for the direct relationship with 
the other players, and that this concern was more motivating than fairness and 
equality considerations. The inclusion of an impulsive choice task, such as that 
used by Crockett et al (2010), would have enabled us to establish if decreased 
rejection behaviour was mirrored by a decrease in impulsive choice behaviour. 
If not, it would provide stronger evidence for the argument given above. 
It should be noted that the previous paragraph does not speak against Civai’s 
(2013) interpretation of the concepts underlying rejection behaviour under 
normal conditions. Indeed, if TP unfair offers do not cause direct emotional 
arousal, as suggested by Civai et al (2010; 2012), the fact that there was a 
decrease in rejection in both conditions still supports the argument that rejection 
behaviour is due to more than mere emotional reactivity. Indeed, the current 
findings possibly extend this to suggest that serotonergic modulation of UG 
behaviour by MDMA also moves beyond a change in emotional reactivity to 
being treated unfairly. 
Ultimatum Game fMRI results 
The fMRI analysis of the UG did not confirm any of our hypotheses. One 
analysis, which was restricted to the FP condition, found a main effect of 
fairness across treatment sessions, such that there was a higher activation of 
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posterior superior temporal gyrus (pSTG) in response to fair, compared to 
unfair.  
As outlined in the meta-analysis reported in 0 (Gabay et al., 2014), there are 
robust findings of anterior insula, ACC, SMA, mPFC, putamen and cerebellar 
activations in neuroimaging studies of the UG. The lack of findings when 
comparing unfair to fair offers in the placebo condition in the current analysis is 
particularly surprising given the fact that the task design was very close to those 
studies included in the meta-analysis. Furthermore, there were clear 
behavioural changes across conditions. In order to explore the data and effect 
of task, a number of analyses were carried out. 
First, the effect of responding in the placebo condition was analysed. This 
tested for activations at the time of selecting the response, regardless of 
whether it was to accept or reject, across all conditions during the placebo 
session. Very large clusters incorporating occipital, cerebellar and motor areas 
provide a sanity-check that the task is showing some neural activity due to 
responding to the task. Next, all assumptions were removed from the expected 
shape of the neural response to the task, by defining a finite response impulse 
(FIR) model. This model revealed some changes in activity of three clusters as 
the trial progressed. However, the timing of these changes (decreases in 
activity 14 seconds after the beginning of the trial) does not seem to relate to 
task stimuli. 
The finding of pSTG activation for fair versus unfair offers is a reasonable 
finding, but it is difficult to trust given the lack of other results in the presence of 
clear behavioural differences across conditions and experimental sessions. 
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Behaviourally, the task was validated with a test-retest reliability study and was 
based on similar tasks in the literature. Furthermore, one could argue, it was 
better controlled than many of the tasks in the literature, given the control for 
stake sizes. One possible explanation for the lack of neural results is the 
frequency with which offers were presented – approximately one every ten 
seconds. This could mean that the neural responses are correlated across 
conditions, although the conditions were randomised in an event-related design, 
which should have protected against this possibility.  
Greater exploration of this task design will be required in order to refine it for 
future studies (see Appendix F for some of these). Systematically varying 
different aspects of the timing will hopefully produce a task that is able capture 
the neural responses to unfairness. By establishing the neural correlates of the 
behavioural changes seen with MDMA, it will hopefully be possible to further 
elucidate the cognitive mechanisms underlying these changes. 
 
4.4.5.3 Affective bias  
In this study we have replicated the finding that MDMA reduces accuracy in 
identifying negative facial expressions (Bedi et al., 2010; Hysek et al., 2012, 
2013; Matthew G Kirkpatrick et al., 2014; Schmid et al., 2014). The results in 
the literature are mixed, however. Two of these studies reported reduced anger 
and fear recognition, as seen in the present study (Hysek et al., 2013; Matthew 
G Kirkpatrick et al., 2014). Bedi et al (2010), however, only found a reduction in 
the recognition of fearful expressions. Furthermore, Schmid et al (2014) only 
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saw reductions in recognition of sad expressions. Hysek et al (2012) reported 
improvements in positive affect recognition. 
On balance, the literature appears to support the decrease in negative affect 
recognition following administration of MDMA. Interestingly, the effects of other 
serotonergic manipulations are far less clear-cut. In a review of the literature 
Merens et al (2007) reported on studies that found both increases and 
decreases in fear, anger and happiness recognition, across a variety of different 
methods, including ATD and acute SSRI treatment. The studies reviewed, 
however, did have a large variation in the demographic characteristics of their 
samples.  
MDMA has been shown to increase plasma oxytocin levels (e.g. Kamilar-Britt 
and Bedi, 2015; Kirkpatrick et al., 2014; Kuypers et al., 2014; Wolff, 2005). One 
possible reason for the apparent consistency of MDMA effects on emotion 
recognition compared to other serotonergic manipulations could be that it is 
mediated in part by this oxytocin effect. However, a small meta-analysis of 
oxytocin effects on facial affect recognition found an overall improvement in 
recognition across both negative and positive emotions (Shahrestani et al., 
2013). This is at odds with the results of the present study. 
The effects seen in this study do not match the effects seen with SSRIs or 
oxytocin, both components of MDMA mechanisms. MDMA also acts on the 
dopamine (DA) and noradrenaline (NA) neurotransmitter systems (de la Torre 
et al., 2004; Green et al., 2003). As discussed below in Section 4.4.5.5, there is 
limited evidence that pharmacological manipulation of these systems, 
particularly the NA system, may alter emotion processing including facial affect 
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recognition. It is not possible to parse the relative contribution of the different 
MDMA-modulated mechanisms with the data presented here. We did collect 
plasma oxytocin samples and analysis of this data will help to inform the 
interpretation of these findings.  
  
4.4.5.4 Multifaceted Empathy Test 
The current study did not replicate previous findings with regard changes in 
empathic processing with MDMA administration. A pooled analysis of six 
studies investigating the effect of MDMA on the MET has recently been 
published (Kuypers et al., 2017). This analysis found that MDMA increased both 
explicit and implicit affective empathy. The version of the MET used in the 
current study tested only explicit affective empathy, and no changes were found 
across experimental sessions.  
This task was conducted near the end of the period in which participants felt 
subjective effects, but a lack of sensitivity based on the timing of the test does 
not explain the difference with other studies because this task was always 
conducted just prior to the Affective Bias task which demonstrated alterations in 
negative affect recognition. Furthermore, the timing of completing this task was 
comparable to the studies discussed above. 
Looking at the details of the other studies finding MDMA-mediated differences 
in empathy, the effects of treatment on affective empathy appear subtle.  For 
example, looking at Table 2 of Kuypers et al (p. 594; 2017), the mean of the 
differences between MDMA and placebo sessions for positive valence, affective 
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stimuli across the six studies is 0.52. The rating scale in the task is out of nine. 
The current study found a comparable mean difference of 0.46 for positive 
valence images. It is possible the sample size of the current study did not 
provide sufficient power to detect this size of effect. The sample sizes of the 
studies included in the pooled analysis ranged between 16 and 30. Also worth 
considering are the scores themselves. Again taking positive valence, explicit 
affective empathy as an example, the studies included in the analysis by 
Kuypers et al reported mean scores ranging from 4.23 to 5.61 in the MDMA 
session. The current study found a mean score of 5.57 in the placebo session. 
Across the range of outcome measures, the sample in the current study scored 
higher in the placebo session than most samples during the MDMA session in 
the pooled analysis reported by Kuypers et al. Therefore, the possibility exists 
that the sample tested in the current study had particularly high baseline 
empathic responses, and as such were less likely to have a discernible increase 
following MDMA administration. 
Also worth noting is the slightly different version of the MET used in the current 
study to that used in those discussed above. The current study used a short 
form of the task circulated by the researchers who designed the original. To my 
knowledge no validation of the newer version has yet been published, although 
a personal communication stated it had been validated internally (Dziobek, 




4.4.5.5 Pharmacological mechanisms underlying the effect of MDMA  
MDMA pharmacology is complex. It acts to increase the synaptic availability of 
serotonin through the reversal of the 5-HT transporters, as well as acting as a 
direct agonist at the 5-HT2A receptor. In addition to this, it increases the 
availability of dopamine (DA) and noradrenaline (NA; de la Torre et al., 2004; 
Green et al., 2003). While the magnitude of the 5-HT effect is larger than the DA 
and NA effects, their role in the MDMA response seen here should not be 
discounted without appropriate consideration. 
Few studies have specifically examined the role of these neurotransmitters in 
social cognition. The dopaminergic compound d-amphetamine has been shown 
to have a subtle effect on emotion recognition, such that there was an increase 
in sensitivity to subtle emotional expressions; this increase was not specific to 
any emotion (Wardle and de Wit, 2012). Schmid et al (2014) found no effect of 
the dopaminergic compound methylphenidate on emotion recognition, empathy 
or ‘moral’ cognition. In this same study, MDMA produced changes in both 
emotion recognition and affective empathy. 
Some changes in socio-cognitive processing has been seen in studies 
investigating NA (e.g. Brühl et al., 2011; Harmer et al., 2008). Brühl et al (2011) 
found fMRI activity changes in response to negative emotional stimuli following 
administration of reboxetine, a reuptake inhibitor of NA. Harmer et al (2008) 
found that reboxetine enhanced recognition of disgusted and happy 
expressions. In the current study it is not possible to differentiate between the 
NA and 5-HT effects of MDMA on facial affect recognition.  
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As mentioned above, MDMA has multiple serotonergic effects. As such, it is not 
possible to draw firm conclusions as to the 5-HT mechanisms underlying the 
results reported here. However, a recent study has produced a high-resolution 
atlas of the distribution of different serotonergic receptors in the human brain 
(Beliveau et al., 2017). Figure 4-20 is a reproduction of Figure 2 from this 
publication. The highest densities of 5-HT2A receptors are seen in some of the 
regions found in the PD fMRI data: lateral temporal cortex including the pSTS, 
and the MCC. Indeed, the density of 5-HT2A receptors in these regions is 
substantially higher than the other 5-HT receptor subtypes. The density of 5-
HT4 receptors also approaches its highest in the lateral temporal lobe; the 
overlap with the PD imaging findings in this chapter suggests a more direct 
exploration for the role of these receptors in social cognition, which is currently 
completely unexplored. Furthermore, areas of highest density of 5-HT 
transporters include the insula cortex, suggesting high serotonergic innervation 
of this region. Therefore, the insula activations reported here are potentially the 
result of increased serotonin release. 
Overall, these comparisons do suggest that the PD results reported here are 
due to MDMA’s potent 5-HT activity. One must be cautious when drawing 
conclusions from this, but given the known receptor mechanisms of MDMA, it 
does provide tentative evidence that the effects seen in the current study may 
have a 5-HT2A specific component. Given the studies discussed in previous 
sections, it is reasonable to postulate similar pharmacological mechanisms 





Figure 4-20: reproduced with permission from Beliveau et al (2017): Average density (Bmax) maps 
for five 5-HT targets on the common FreeSurfer surface (left hemisphere; lateral view, upper and 




A limitation of the current study is the use of an inactive placebo. Given the 
potent subjective effects of MDMA, participants became aware that they had 
been given the active compound. This is a recognised challenge amongst 
researchers investigating compounds with potent subjective effects, and will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.  
As discussed above, one must be cautious in attributing the MDMA effects seen 
in this study to changes in serotonergic activity. Better characterisation of the 
receptor mechanisms could be achieved through ‘pharmacological substraction’ 
approaches. For example, a three-arm study could be carried out which 
included pre-treatment with the 5-HT2A receptor antagonist ketanserin. 
Alternatively, to establish if MDMA’s dopaminergic modulation was an 
underlying mechanism to the results seen here, one could include a pre-





This study has been the first to demonstrate clear effects of MDMA on the 
social decision-making tasks the Ultimatum Game (UG) and Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (PD). I have argued that underlying the increased cooperation seen 
with trustworthy players in the PD is a quicker and greater recovery of 
cooperation following decisions by the opponent to compete, and that this is 
driven by an increased social connected-ness to the other player. This is 
possibly driven by reappraisal of negative emotions elicited by norm violations. I 
have also argued that changes in the UG may be due to an increased harm 
aversion, again driven by an increased social connection to the other players, 
whose motivational effect trumps that of fairness considerations, which do not 
appear to be affected by MDMA. This study also replicated findings that MDMA 
reduces recognition of fear and anger, while being unable to replicate findings 
of changes in affective empathy. 
Taken together it appears that the serotonergic effect of MDMA causes 
profound changes in how participants behave during interpersonal interactions. 
These changes may be context specific, and do not impede the individual from 
making appropriate judgements when they are being treated ‘unfairly’ by 
another agent.  
Future work should attempt to elucidate the serotonergic mechanisms by which 
MDMA has its effect on social decision-making, through the use of other 
pharmacological agents to either block specific serotonin receptor subtypes, or 






Chapter 5 Overall discussion 
5.1 Overview of the work reported in this thesis 
The aim of this thesis was to present a thorough exploration of the 
psychopharmacology of specific aspects of social cognition. Deficits of social 
cognition have been shown to be a key aspect of a number of psychiatric 
conditions, and has been highlighted as an area requiring greater research in 
schizophrenia (see 0, Sections 1.3 and 1.4; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Collin et 
al., 2013; Dziobek et al., 2011; Kupferberg et al., 2016; Nuechterlein et al., 
2004). Deficits in facial affect recognition and empathy have long been 
established across psychiatric conditions (e.g. Bora and Pantelis, 2016; Dalili et 
al., 2015; Dziobek et al., 2011, 2008; Kohler et al., 2010; Lozier et al., 2014; 
Mazza et al., 2014), and there is also evidence for alterations in social decision-
making (see 0, Section 1.5.3; e.g. Csukly et al., 2011; de la Asuncion et al., 
2015; Radke et al., 2013; Scheele et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2014; Wischniewski 
and Brüne, 2011). As such, this thesis has concentrated on these aspects of 
social cognition: social decision-making, facial affect recognition and empathy. 
The work on which this thesis is based began with establishing the need for 
better treatment options for these deficits, highlighted by the case of facial affect 
recognition in schizophrenia (see 0, Section 1.4; Gabay et al., 2015). I then 
carried out a meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies investigating the Ultimatum 
Game (UG) (see Chapter 2; Gabay et al., 2014). This provided evidence of a 
network of brain regions underlying UG behaviour and provided a detailed 
discussion of the hypothesised roles of these regions. Following completion of 
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this analysis, I carried out two studies employing different serotonergic 
manipulations to investigate their effect on social cognition. The first, reported in 
0, investigated the effect of the psychedelic compound psilocybin on social 
decision-making and facial affect recognition, and the potential for a src-kinase 
inhibitor to attenuate these effects. The second, reported in 0, investigated the 
effect of 3,4-methylenedioxy-methamphetamine (MDMA) on facial affect 
recognition, empathy, and behaviour in two social decision-making tasks, the 
UG and Prisoner’s Dilemma.  
While there was a comprehensive discussion of those studies in their respective 
chapters, there was no consideration of how each could inform the other. In the 
following sections I present a discussion of the results in this light. Since the 
Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET) was only carried out in the MDMA study and 
has no crossover to the other tasks, these results will not be discussed further 
below. 
5.2 The effect of MDMA and psilocybin on social decision-making 
Taken together, the two studies presented in Chapters 3 and 4 confirm the role 
of serotonin (5-HT) in social decision-making, using two tasks: the Ultimatum 
Game (UG) and the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). In the UG, increased 5-HT 
activity led to greater rejection rates of unfair offers when they were directed 
both at the self (in both studies) and to a third party (only tested in the MDMA 
study). The evidence from the psilocybin study suggests that this is likely due to 
agonism at the 5-HT2A receptor. In the PD, participants cooperated more with 
trustworthy players, but not untrustworthy players, following administration of 
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MDMA. This was due to a greater ‘recovery’ of cooperation following 
uncooperative decisions by these opponents compared to the placebo session. 
Since the PD was not completed by the participants in the psilocybin study 
reported in 0, we cannot conclude that this was due to agonism at the 5-HT2A 
receptor rather than some other serotonergic effect, although MDMA does act 
as a direct agonist at this receptor (de la Torre et al., 2004; Green et al., 2003). 
In both studies, the central operculum/posterior insula region was implicated. In 
the MDMA study, this region showed greater activity during the MDMA session 
compared to the placebo session, when receiving feedback from trustworthy 
players – the same condition where participants showed greater cooperation. In 
the psilocybin study, there was greater connectivity of this region to the anterior 
cingulate gyrus (ACCg) during the Psilo session compared to the Psilo+ 
session. In the Psilo+ session, saracatinib appeared to attenuate the psilocybin-
induced reduction in rejection rates during the UG. Building on previous 
research (Grecucci et al., 2013; Güroğlu et al., 2011; Kirk et al., 2011, 2016; 
Wright et al., 2011), I have argued that this region may have been involved in 
the reappraisal of the other players’ behaviour. In the MDMA-PD task this may 
have been required for the faster re-emergence of cooperative behaviour. The 
ACCg has been strongly implicated in the processing of interacting partners’ 
motivations during decision-making (Apps et al., 2016; Apps and Sallet, 2017; 
Lockwood, 2016), and the increased connectivity between these regions in the 
psilocybin study, during the session with lower rejection rates, may support the 
interpretation that reappraisal of the partners’ motivations played a role in the 
behavioural changes seen.  
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The finding of increased superior temporal sulcus (STS) activity during 
feedback from trustworthy players during the MDMA session of the MDMA-PD 
task also supports the idea that participants incorporate other player’s thoughts, 
beliefs and intentions when playing more cooperatively (Bault et al., 2015b; 
Hampton et al., 2008; Haruno and Kawato, 2009). 
Brain regions and cognitive mechanisms do not function in isolation. Both 
studies highlighted the involvement of regions implicated in reward processes. 
In the MDMA-PD task, the anterior mid-cingulate cortex showed greater activity 
during the MDMA session when receiving feedback from trustworthy players, 
possibly implicating reward-based action planning. In the psilocybin study, 
connectivity between the anterior insula (implicated in signalling UG social norm 
violations; e.g. Civai et al., 2013; Sanfey, 2003) and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) 
increased in line with greater rejection rates from the Psilo to Psilo+ session. 
One could interpret these findings as evidence that not only do other-facing 
processes underlie social decision-making decisions, but also the integration of 
these with how rewarding the outcomes are to the self. Indeed, behaviours in 
social decision-making are often counter intuitive, such that they go against 
game-theoretic, self-interest-driven predictions (Camerer, 2003; Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2004b; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Güth et al., 1982). As such, for 
these behaviours to evolve, one could expect the underlying mechanisms to link 
to reward processing on some level. Indeed, Bhanji and Delgado (2014) argue 
that while there does not appear to be a specific ‘social reward pathway’, 
reward processing plays a role in a number of social processes. The studies 
presented in this thesis appear to support a role for integrating reward with 
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social cognitive processes, and that manipulation of the 5-HT system can 
modulate this. 
5.3 The effect of psilocybin and MDMA on facial affect recognition  
Both of the studies reported in this thesis had participants complete the 
Affective Bias task (Bland et al., 2016). This task examines accuracy in 
identifying four different emotions (happy, sad, anger, fear), and includes a 
control condition of identifying which age-group faces belong to (child, young 
adult, middle-aged adult, older adult). No difference was seen across sessions 
in the psilocybin study. In the MDMA study, there was a reduction in recognition 
of fearful and angry expressions in the MDMA session. 
Taken at face value, these results suggest that serotonergic modulation of facial 
affect recognition is not achieved through 5-HT2A receptor activity, and that the 
findings of the MDMA study can be explained through increased activity at other 
5-HT receptors. This could be directly tested by investigating the effect of 
administering the 5-HT2A antagonist ketanserin prior to MDMA to see if this 
blocked the reduction in fear and anger recognition.  
The effect of ketanserin alone on facial processing has been investigated 
(Hornboll et al., 2013). These authors reported that 5-HT2A blockade altered 
functional connectivity between the orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala in 
response to fearful faces. This was not an overt emotion recognition task; 
rather, participants were asked to judge the gender of the stimulus face. There 
was no difference in error across sessions, but ketanserin increased reaction 
times. This does suggest some role of these receptors in facial affect 
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processing. Kometer et al (2012) also suggested a role for the 2-HT2A receptor 
when they found evidence that ketanserin attenuated the effect of psilocybin on 
facial affect recognition reported in that study.  
The findings of these two studies counter the lack of an effect in the psilocybin 
study reported in 0. However, as discussed in that chapter, it could be that the 
visual disturbances induced by psilocybin disrupted affect recognition in the 
Kometer et al (2012) study, and not 5-HT2A agonism per se. In the study 
reported in Chapter 3, this would not have been the case because the task was 
carried out sometime after the most acute effects of the drug had passed. 
Furthermore, one must be cautious when interpreting the acceptance of the null 
hypothesis. This study may not have been powered appropriately to detect an 
effect; specifically the variance in the psilocybin response could have been such 
that any changes seen were not consistent enough across participants, 
although effects were seen in the UG performed at about the same time. 
5.4 Limitations 
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, there is recognition in the field of psychedelic 
research that inert placebos do not sufficiently blind participants to the treatment 
they receive. One method of addressing this issue would be the introduction of 
a third arm to the study, administering an active placebo. However, choice of an 
active placebo is not straight forward for the two compounds under investigation 
in the studies reported in this thesis. 
Psilocybin was administered in an open-label manner for the study reported in 
Chapter 3. However, if one were to consider using an active placebo-controlled 
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design, it is difficult to know what would be an appropriate compound to use, as 
psychedelic drugs have profoundly potent subjective effects. Administration of a 
very low, but still active dose is one possibility. Another would be to use a 
compound which acts on a different neurotransmitter system, such as the 
glutamatergic NMDA receptor antagonist, ketamine, which has dissociative 
effects. However, the participants recruited in this study had previous 
experience of psychedelic compounds, so would likely recognise the difference 
in subjective effects of the two drugs. 
An inert placebo was used for the study investigating MDMA. One possibility for 
an active placebo would be methylphenidate, which produces some mild 
stimulant effects. These two compounds have been used in comparative 
studies investigating aspects of social cognition (Hysek et al., 2014; Schmid et 
al., 2014). Some social effects were seen with methylphenidate, so this would 
need to be a three-arm study to parse the MDMA effects as compared to 
inactive placebo. Another possibility for an active placebo in this study would be 
a lower dose of MDMA. Oehen et al (2013) reported that participants were 
successfully blinded to a dose of 25mg MDMA compared to 125mg. 
Investigation of the dose-response relationship would have been beneficial to 
both studies reported in this thesis. The benefits of this are two-fold. First, in the 
absence of true blinding to the active compound, assessment of the dose-
response of the cognitive tasks would aid in separating the true effects of the 
treatment from any placebo effect. Second, use of multiple doses could help 
establish whether null results are due to particular doses being outside the 
window of effect for certain cognitive processes. 
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5.5 Implications and future directions 
Whilst the research reported in this thesis is an important step, future studies 
should improve upon the design of those reported here. By incorporating a 
dose-response design or employing the use of specific receptor antagonists, the 
hypothesis that serotonergic mechanisms underlie the changes in behaviour 
seen here can be tested. 
Future studies should continue to establish what underlies social decision-
making behaviour in the healthy population. In this thesis I have attempted to 
highlight the psychopharmacological mechanisms. Equally important are the 
psychological mechanisms underlying the differences in behaviour across the 
population. By exploring the reasons behind the differences seen in the general 
population, one may be able to create a framework for explaining who would 
respond to pharmacological manipulations. 
In Chapter 4 I advanced the hypothesis that a greater ‘social tie’ was 
responsible for the recovery of cooperation seen in the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
during the MDMA session. This could be explicitly tested with a small alteration 
of the task to make it longer and therefore more suitable for fitting a 
computational model. Doing so would enable one to apply the model used by 
Bault et al (2015) to the PD in an MDMA study, thus further characterising the 
social cognitive effects of the compound. 
The significance of the research reported in this thesis is the further 
characterisation of the role of the serotonergic neurotransmitter system in social 
cognition. This work has suggested that underlying responses to dynamic social 
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situations are complex mechanisms that are driven by alterations in serotonin 
receptor activity. Social decision-making is a burgeoning field, and as outlined in 
0 is increasingly being investigated in relation to psychiatry. Doing so can help 
to clarify how higher-level cognitive processes are disrupted in these conditions, 
and the research presented here further establishes the underlying neural 
mechanisms in healthy participants.  
In Section 1.5.3 of Chapter 1, I reviewed evidence for altered UG behaviour in 
patients with depression. While there is some heterogeneity in the findings 
reported, there does appear to be an increase in rejection of unfair offers in 
these patients. In this thesis I have argued that the reduction in rejection 
behaviour seen in the two studies may be due to increased aversion to causing 
harm to a directly interacting partner, motivated by a greater social engagement 
with that partner. With evidence suggesting that patients with depression show 
reduced social engagement (Achterberg et al., 2003; Setterfield et al., 2016), 
the current presentation may provide a cognitive mechanism by which this 
deficit occurs. None of the reviewed studies showing these differences tested 
un-medicated patients, but rather patients medicated largely with SSRIs. The 
results from the current thesis suggest that treatments for depression which 
more specifically target 5-HT2A receptors as agonists may help to ‘normalise’ 
these behaviours in social decision-making, by promoting a greater 
engagement in social aspects of the tasks.  
On the other hand, the evidence reviewed in Chapter 1 suggests that there is a 
reduction in rejection of unfair offers in patients with schizophrenia. This is 
difficult to interpret in light of the results presented in this thesis, particularly as 
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the studies finding differences included patients mostly medicated with atypical 
antipsychotics, which act as antagonists at the 5-HT2A receptor (Seeman, 
2004). Schizophrenia is a complex condition, and antipsychotic medication acts 
on a number of different neurotransmitter systems and receptors (Seeman, 
2004), the interactions between which are not fully characterised.  
Those studies that found differences in PD behaviour between patients and 
healthy controls reported reduced cooperation in borderline personality disorder 
and depression. In light of the current findings, this may be due to changes in 
the underlying mechanisms incorporating intentionality, appraisal and reward. 
Again, treatments with specific 5-HT2A agonism may help to ‘normalise’ 
behaviour in these tasks. An important finding from the MDMA study is that 
changes were not seen during interactions with uncooperative partners. If this is 
borne out through replication, it suggests that treatment in psychiatry has the 
potential for context-sensitive social cognitive benefits. 
The work presented here can be extended in several ways. Computational 
modelling of complex cognitive processes is a technique which shows growing 
promise in characterising the nuances of the neural mechanisms underlying 
them. By applying these modelling techniques in an attempt to characterise 
psychopharmacological mechanisms, not only could we identify brain networks 
involved in specific aspects of social decision-making, we could also attempt to 
establish receptor subtype contributions.  
Further psychopharmacological research could attempt to validate the findings 
here. The use of specific receptor antagonists such as ketanserin would help to 
establish receptor mechanisms underlying the PD. Indeed, it would also be 
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interesting to investigate the effect of the src-kinase inhibitor saracatinib on the 
MDMA effects reported in this thesis.  
A number of studies have recently begun to establish the efficacy of compounds 
such as psilocybin and MDMA as an adjunct to psychotherapy for conditions 
including depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (e.g. Amoroso and 
Workman, 2016; Carhart-Harris et al., 2016; Sessa, 2016; Yazar-Klosinski and 
Mithoefer, 2017). By establishing specific effects of these compounds on the 
social cognitive mechanisms underlying trust, cooperation and social norm 
processing, the results presented in this thesis may shed light on the efficacy in 
the above treatments. 
A weakness of the current thesis is that there is no direct neuroimaging 
comparison across the two studies. Such a comparison would have helped to 
identify whether there are similar mechanisms underlying changes in task 
behaviour. Resting state data was acquired during the MDMA study, analysis of 
which has not been reported here. A collaboration has been initiated to analyse 
this data, which will enable us to establish how the different serotonergic 
mechanisms differentially affect network connectivity.  
 
5.6 Overall conclusion 
The work presented in this thesis has shown for the first time that MDMA and 
psilocybin can alter behaviour in social decision-making. Furthermore, it 
suggests that these changes come about largely through 5-HT2A receptor 
activity, although this needs to be clarified in the case of the Prisoner’s 
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Dilemma. I have argued that changes in social decision-making come about 
through greater social engagement with the other players, and that underlying 
this is altered appraisal of the intentions and motivations of other players. This 
allows for the context-specific effects seen in the PD, where MDMA altered 
behaviour with trustworthy, but not untrustworthy opponents. Recruitment, and 
changes in connectivity, of brain regions involved in theory of mind, cognitive 
reappraisal and reward processing may be modulated by 5-HT manipulation. 
This suggests that alterations in this neurotransmitter system, specifically at the 
5-HT2A receptor, may underlie differences in how people respond to norm 
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Appendix A Methods for Chapter 1, 
Section 1.4 
A literature search was carried out using PubMed and Web of Knowledge 
databases, entering the search term “schizophrenia AND facial AND emotion 
AND antipsychotic” in May 2014. In addition, a manual search was carried out 
of reference sections of papers returned.  We included English-language 
studies that 1) used a task investigating facial emotion processing, 2) 
specifically investigated the effects of antipsychotic medication, 3) provided pre- 
and post-medication data and 4) included patients with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia.  Nine studies met these inclusion criteria, confirmed by two of 
the authors (ASG and MAM; see Figure 1). 
Studies employed a range of tasks, with the predominant outcome measure 
being number of correct/incorrect responses (n=8).  The outcome measure from 
one study (Cabral-Calderin et al., 2010b) was number of phases of facial 
morphing before a correct response.  Where data was not available in an 
appropriate form, authors were contacted requesting additional information.   
For studies investigating multiple antipsychotics, each drug was entered into the 
meta-analysis separately.  These were independent samples. In addition to 
analysing all antipsychotics together, we also performed subgroup analyses of 
typical and atypical antipsychotics. Atypical antipsychotics are second 
generation medications which differ from first generation (typical antipsychotics) 
in their improved side-effect profile, including reduced extrapyramidal symptoms 
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(Meltzer, 2004). Hedge’s g and its 95% confidence intervals (CI) were 
calculated for each study and each drug.  Hedge’s g is a measure of effect size 
similar to Cohen’s d, but corrected for small sample size (Ellis, 2010).  A 
random effects meta-analysis, subgrouped by typical and atypical 
antipsychotics, was carried out using Review Manager 5.2 (The Nordic 
Cochrane Centre, 2012), using an inverse variance weighted model. Between-
study heterogeneity was assessed using the I2 statistic.  Egger’s intercept and 
visual inspection of funnel plots was used to assess evidence of publication bias 
(Matthias Egger et al., 1997).  We also carried out meta-regression analyses 
using the metareg module in Stata Statistical Software (Harbord and Higgins, 
2008; StataCorp, 2011) to assess the influence of symptoms, age and gender 
on task performance. 
One study (Cabral-Calderin et al., 2010b) reported subscales of tasks with no 
overall score.  The total score and standard deviation (SD) for these subscales 
were calculated, using an estimation of the correlation coefficient between 
subscales as 0.8 in order to sum the SDs.  Sensitivity analyses were carried out 










Table A-1: Details of studies included in the meta-analysis of antipsychotic treatment effects on 
facial affect processing in schizophrenia 
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Results of literature search 
After 57 duplicates were removed, 84 studies were returned by the original 
search.  Of these, nine studies met the inclusion criteria, investigating six 
antipsychotics (haloperidol, perphenazine, perazine, riseridone, quetiapine, 
olanzapine)(Bediou et al., 2007; Behere et al., 2009; Cabral-Calderin et al., 
2010b; Daros et al., 2014; Harvey et al., 2006; S. Lewis and Garver, 1995; 
Penn et al., 2009; Sergi et al., 2007; Wölwer et al., 1996) in 1152 patients with 
schizophrenia (see Table 1 for study details).  Overall there was no bias with 
regard to which emotions were examined.  Two studies (Daros et al., 2014; 
Harvey et al., 2006) only focused on two emotions – the range of intensity from 
very happy to very sad;  four studies (Behere et al., 2009; Cabral-Calderin et al., 
2010b; S. F. Lewis and Garver, 1995; Wölwer et al., 1996) investigated 
processing of happiness, disgust, sadness, surprise, anger and fearful 
expressions; one study (Bediou et al., 2007) investigated processing of neutral, 
happiness, disgust, fear and anger; two studies investigated processing of 
happiness, sadness, anger, surprise, fear and shame (Penn et al., 2009; Sergi 




Appendix B Task instructions 
Chapter 3 Ultimatum Game instructions (test retest and psilocybin study) 
You are going to take part in a two-player game. 
In this game, the first player is given £20 and is instructed to split it with the 
second player. If the second player accepts how the money has been split, then 
both players receive the amount of money decided by the first player. On the 
other hand, if the second player rejects the proposed split, neither of them will 
receive any money at all for that round. 
Here is an example: Player one is given £20 to split with player two. Player one 
offers player two £8. If player two accepts this offer, player two receives the £8 
and player one keeps the remaining £12. If player two rejects the offer, the full 
£20 is taken back from player one and neither player receives any money from 
that round. 
Do you have any questions about the rules of the game? 
In a moment you will play this game against other people. You will sometimes 
be making decisions for yourself, and sometimes your decision will be on behalf 
of another person. 
The other people are from an event we recently held, where a group of people 
played this game. It was set up so that each player had the opportunity to play 
the game with every other person, both as player one and player two. For each 
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interaction, players were asked to make a second offer, intended for the 
participants in this study.  
When you play the game, you will sometimes play as player two: you will be 
presented with an offer taken from this previous event, and you will be asked to 
accept or reject it. On other trials it will be the same, except you will be 
responding on behalf of another player. In this case you will see what player 
one offered player two, and you will be asked to accept or reject that offer on 
behalf of player two. Sometimes, you will be presented with an offer which has 
been randomly generated by a computer, and asked whether you want to 
accept or reject it. 
When you have completed the whole study, you will receive a proportion (1%) 
of the money earned based on the decisions you have made on your own 
behalf. The players from the group event will also be paid depending on how 
you and other participants in this study respond to their offers. 
All names of the other players have been randomly assigned to protect the 
anonymity of our research participants. 
Chapter 4 instructions (test retest) 
In this study you will be logging onto a shared network which we have 
developed with Imperial College London and University College London. When 
logged on to this network you will be connected to other participants at one of 
these sites. They may or may not be involved in a drug study or even an MRI 
study, but will be participating in research where the researchers are interested 
in the same social processes as we are. Whenever you connect to another 
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player you will be given a name for them. All names of the other players have 
been randomly assigned to protect the anonymity of our research participants. 
 You will be playing two different types of game with the people you connect 
with, which I will explain to you now. 
Prisoner’s Dilemma 
In the ‘compete or cooperate’ game you will connect to another player and play 
repeated rounds with the same person. On each round you will each, 
simultaneously be asked to Compete or Cooperate with the other player, and 
will then be awarded points depending on the combination of your responses. If 
you both choose to Cooperate, you will receive 90 points each. If you both 
choose to Compete, you will receive 60 points each. If one of you chooses to 
Cooperate and the other chooses to Compete, the cooperator will receive 30 
points while the competor will receive 120. So it is clear that the best for 
everyone is to cooperate, but that opens oneself up to being taken advantage of 
by the other person competing. 
You will play between eight and 15 rounds with each player. On each round you 
will be given three seconds to decide to Compete or Cooperate. You will then 
be given feedback as to what the other player chose, and how the points will be 
distributed. You will then be asked to rate your trust in the other player, from 
one to seven. When rating your trust in the other player, don’t necessarily just 
base it on their most recent decision, but consider all the rounds you’ve played 
with that player. You have five seconds to rate your trust, before the next round 
with that player starts. When you have completed all rounds with that player, 
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you will see “Your game with XXX has finished”, and the server will then look for 
another player to connect to. 
You will play two ‘runs’ of this game. On each run you will play multiple rounds 
with three other players. The middle player of each run will in fact be a 
computer programme which will randomly decide whether to Compete or 
Cooperate on each round. Its decision will not be affected by your own 
behaviour. Other than that, the gameplay is exactly the same as when you are 
connected to other players. 
Ultimatum Game 
An important thing to remember when playing this game is that you will only 
interact with each other player once. That means that neither you nor they can 
learn from the others behaviour. You play one round with one player and are 
then connected to a different player. In the real world, we can never be sure 
exactly how many people are logged on to the network at any one time, so it is 
possible that you will in fact reconnect with a player twice, but you will never 
know because each time you connect with someone they are assigned a new, 
random name; so treat each decision as independent.  
In this game, the first player is given £20 and is instructed to split it with the 
second player. If the second player accepts how the money has been split, then 
both players receive the amount of money decided by the first player. On the 
other hand, if the second player rejects the proposed split, neither of them will 
receive any money at all for that round. 
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Here is an example: Player one is given £20 to split with player two. Player one 
offers player two £8. If player two accepts this offer, player two receives the £8 
and player one keeps the remaining £12. If player two rejects the offer, the full 
£20 is taken back from player one and neither player receives any money from 
that round. 
When you play the game, you will sometimes play as player two: you will be 
presented with an offer taken from this previous event, and you will be asked to 
accept or reject it. On other trials it will be the same, except you will be 
responding on behalf of another player. In this case you will see what player 
one offered player two, and you will be asked to accept or reject that offer on 
behalf of player two. Sometimes, you will be presented with an offer which has 
been randomly generated by a computer, and asked whether you want to 
accept or reject it. Sometimes you will also be asked to play as player one, and 
make an offer to another player. 
When you have completed the whole study, you will receive a proportion (1%) 
of the money earned based on the decisions you have made on your own 
behalf. 
Chapter 4 instructions (MDMA study) 
(NOTE: The instructions for the Prisoner’s Dilemma remained the same as the 
test retest instructions above. For the Ultimatum Game, there was a slight 
change in the task, such that the total stake varied. The below instructions 
reflect this change.) 
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An important thing to remember when playing this game is that you will only 
interact with each other player once. That means that neither you nor they can 
learn from the others behaviour. You play one round with one player and are 
then connected to a different player. In the real world, we can never be sure 
exactly how many people are logged on to the network at any one time, so it is 
possible that you will in fact reconnect with a player twice, but you will never 
know because each time you connect with someone they are assigned a new, 
random name; so treat each decision as independent.  
In this game, the first player is given a sum of money and is instructed to split it 
with the second player. If the second player accepts how the money has been 
split, then both players receive the amount of money decided by the first player. 
On the other hand, if the second player rejects the proposed split, neither of 
them will receive any money at all for that round. 
Here is an example: Player one is given £20 to split with player two. Player one 
offers player two £8. If player two accepts this offer, player two receives the £8 
and player one keeps the remaining £12. If player two rejects the offer, the full 
£20 is taken back from player one and neither player receives any money from 
that round. 
When you play the game, you will sometimes play as player two: you will be 
presented with an offer taken from this previous event, and you will be asked to 
accept or reject it. On other trials it will be the same, except you will be 
responding on behalf of another player. In this case you will see what player 
one offered player two, and you will be asked to accept or reject that offer on 
behalf of player two. Sometimes, you will be presented with an offer which has 
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been randomly generated by a computer, and asked whether you want to 
accept or reject it. Sometimes you will also be asked to play as player one, and 
make an offer to another player. The total amount of money being split will not 
always be the same. It ranges from around £1 to approximately £100. 
When you have completed the whole study, you will receive a proportion (1%) 






Appendix C Full list of offers in the 
Ultimatum Game version used in the 
MDMA study 
 
Table B-1: Full list of UG offers presented in the MDMA study. Ordered by condition and then 
percentage of the total stake. Shading reflects unfair (10-20%), fair (45-50%), and hyper-fair (80-
90%) offers. FP: first person; TP: third-party; GS: game server 
Offer from… % of total stake Total stake Utility 
Run one 
FP 10 30 Low 
FP 10.94 32 Low 
FP 11.96 46 High 
FP 13.04 11.5 Low 
FP 13.05 38.3 High 
FP 17.11 38 High 
FP 20 5 Low 
FP 20 37.5 High 
FP 46.15 6.5 Low 
FP 46.67 7.5 Low 
FP 47.06 8.5 Low 
FP 47.62 10.5 High 
FP 48.15 13.5 High 
FP 49.18 12.2 High 
FP 50 2 Low 
FP 50 3 Low 
FP 80 2.5 Low 
FP 81.08 3.7 Low 
FP 82.35 8.5 High 
FP 84.62 6.5 High 
FP 86.36 11 High 
FP 86.67 7.5 High 
FP 90 5 Low 
FP 90.91 1.1 Low 
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TP 11.97 58.5 High 
TP 13.05 38.3 High 
TP 13.16 19 Low 
TP 14.04 28.5 Low 
TP 17.91 33.5 High 
TP 19.15 23.5 Low 
TP 20 37.5 High 
TP 20 5 Low 
TP 46.67 7.5 Low 
TP 47.37 9.5 Low 
TP 47.62 10.5 High 
TP 48.15 13.5 High 
TP 50 19 High 
TP 50 15 High 
TP 50 3 Low 
TP 50 2 Low 
TP 80 5 Low 
TP 82.35 8.5 High 
TP 83.33 3 Low 
TP 83.33 6 High 
TP 85.71 7 High 
TP 88.24 1.7 Low 
TP 88.89 9 High 
TP 90.91 1.1 Low 
GS 10 30 Low 
GS 11.97 58.5 High 
GS 13.04 11.5 Low 
GS 13.05 38.3 High 
GS 14.04 28.5 Low 
GS 17.02 47 High 
GS 17.91 33.5 High 
GS 20 5 Low 
GS 46.67 7.5 Low 
GS 47.06 8.5 Low 
GS 47.62 10.5 High 
GS 49.02 5.1 Low 
GS 49.18 12.2 High 
GS 50 16 High 
GS 50 19 High 
GS 50 2 Low 
GS 80 5 Low 
GS 80 2.5 Low 
GS 83.33 6 High 
GS 84.62 6.5 High 
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GS 88.24 8.5 High 
GS 88.89 9 High 
GS 90 5 Low 
GS 90.91 1.1 Low 
Run two 
FP 11.97 58.5 High 
FP 13.16 19 Low 
FP 14.04 28.5 Low 
FP 17.02 47 High 
FP 17.91 33.5 High 
FP 17.92 53 High 
FP 18.35 10.9 Low 
FP 19.15 23.5 Low 
FP 44.44 4.5 Low 
FP 47.37 9.5 Low 
FP 47.83 11.5 High 
FP 48.28 14.5 High 
FP 49.02 5.1 Low 
FP 50 19 High 
FP 50 16 High 
FP 50 15 High 
FP 80 5 Low 
FP 83.33 6 High 
FP 83.33 3 Low 
FP 85.37 4.1 Low 
FP 85.71 7 High 
FP 88.24 8.5 High 
FP 88.24 1.7 Low 
FP 88.89 9 High 
TP 10 30 Low 
TP 10.94 32 Low 
TP 11.96 46 High 
TP 13.04 11.5 Low 
TP 17.02 47 High 
TP 17.11 38 High 
TP 17.92 53 High 
TP 18.35 10.9 Low 
TP 44.44 4.5 Low 
TP 46.15 6.5 Low 
TP 47.06 8.5 Low 
TP 47.83 11.5 High 
TP 48.28 14.5 High 
TP 49.02 5.1 Low 
TP 49.18 12.2 High 
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TP 50 16 High 
TP 80 2.5 Low 
TP 81.08 3.7 Low 
TP 84.62 6.5 High 
TP 85.37 4.1 Low 
TP 86.36 11 High 
TP 86.67 7.5 High 
TP 88.24 8.5 High 
TP 90 5 Low 
GS 10.94 32 Low 
GS 11.96 46 High 
GS 13.16 19 Low 
GS 17.11 38 High 
GS 17.92 53 High 
GS 18.35 10.9 Low 
GS 19.15 23.5 Low 
GS 20 37.5 High 
GS 44.44 4.5 Low 
GS 46.15 6.5 Low 
GS 47.37 9.5 Low 
GS 47.83 11.5 High 
GS 48.15 13.5 High 
GS 48.28 14.5 High 
GS 50 3 Low 
GS 50 15 High 
GS 81.08 3.7 Low 
GS 82.35 8.5 High 
GS 83.33 3 Low 
GS 85.37 4.1 Low 
GS 85.71 7 High 
GS 86.36 11 High 
GS 86.67 7.5 High 





Appendix D Social value orientation 
questionnaire (Van Lange, 1999) 
In this set of questions, we ask you to imagine that you have been randomly paired 
with another person, whom we will refer to simply as the “other.” Other is someone 
you do not know and that you will not meet in the future. Both you and Other will be 
making choices by circling either the letter A, B, or C. Your own choices will produce 
points for yourself and Other. Likewise, Other’s choice will produce points for him/her 
and for you. Every point has value: The more points you receive, the better for you, 
and the more points Other receives, the better for him/her. 
Here’s an example of how this task works. 
 A B C 
You Get 500 500 550 
Other Gets 100 500 300 
 
In this example, if you chose A you would receive 500 points and Other would receive 
100 points; if you chose B, you would receive 500 points and Other 500; and if you 
chose C, you would receive 550 points and Other 300. So, you see that your choice 
influences both the number of points you receive and the number of points the other 
receives. 
Before you begin making choices, keep in mind that there are no right or wrong 
answers – choose the option that you, for whatever reason, prefer most. Also, 
remember that the points have value: The more of them you accumulate, the better 
for you. Likewise, from the Other’s point of view, the more points s/he accumulates, 




For each of the nine choice situations below, circle A, B or C, depending on which 
column you prefer most. Please proceed in the order the choices appear. 
1. 
 A B C 
You Get 480 540 480 
Other Gets 80 280 480 
 
2. 
 A B C 
You Get 560 500 500 
Other Gets 300 500 100 
 
3. 
 A B C 
You Get 520 520 580 
Other Gets 520 120 320 
 
4. 
 A B C 
You Get 500 560 490 
Other Gets 300 500 90 
 
5. 
 A B C 
You Get 560 500 490 
Other Gets 300 500 90 
 
6. 
 A B C 
You Get 500 500 570 






 A B C 
You Get 510 560 510 
Other Gets 510 300 110 
 
8. 
 A B C 
You Get 550 500 500 
Other Gets 300 100 500 
 
9. 
 A B C 
You Get 480 490 540 





Appendix E Social reward questionnaire 






Appendix F Exploratory analyses on the 
UG fMRI data 
 
To further explore the Ultimatum Game (UG) fMRI data, an additional analysis 
was carried out on the placebo data. First, a new first level model was defined 
to test for the effect of making a response, regardless of condition. To do this, 
the button response was modelled as an effect of interest, and a one-sample t-
test carried out at the group level. There were three large clusters which 
incorporating occipital, cerebellar and post-central cortices. Additionally, 
bilateral insula, supplementary motor area (SMA), putamen and the cingulate 
cortex showed activation in this analysis. Figure E-1 displays these results. 
 
 




Occipital, cerebellar and post-central cortices could be expected as part of the 
button press response, as they can be expected to be involved in the visual and 
motor response to the cue to make choice. Cingulate, SMA and insula are 
regions which were hypothesised to be involved in the cognitive response to the 
task. However, these regions are also part of the salience network which would 
be expected to be engaged when responding to an instruction to act (Fox et al., 
2005; Geng et al., 2016). To establish if perhaps the activity of these regions in 
the current analysis could represent cognitive responses to the task, I modelled 
an extended offer period to include the time up until the button press of the 
response. At the second level I re-ran the drug-by-fairness ANOVA in the FP 
condition. The results were very similar as for the analysis reported in 0, with a 
cluster encompassing the superior temporal gyrus for the fairness contrast. 
The analyses described above modelled the BOLD signal using the canonical 
haemodynamic response function (HRF), as is the default in SPM. Figue E-
2provides a reminder of the timeline of each trial, which had four distinct 
periods. First, the condition was revealed (first person, third party, game 
server), followed by the offer, which in turn was followed by the decision period. 
The trial ended with a variable length spinning wheel to indicate a new partner 
was being found. The analyses used thus far defined the offer period as the 
period of interest where the onset of the HRF was modelled. To remove the 
assumption that, a) all the variation in BOLD signal could be captured with the 
canonical HRF, and b) that this could be found following the onset of the offer, 




Figure E-2: Timings of the each trial in the UG task. First, where the offer originates is revealed (i.e. 
FP, TP or GS), then the offer is displayed for three seconds, before participants are asked to decide 
whether to accept or reject the offer 
 
An FIR model imposes no assumption on the shape of the expected BOLD 
response (Henson et al., 2001). In this FIR analysis, eight two-second bins were 
defined, with the first starting at the beginning of each trial (when the condition 
was revealed). At the first level, first person unfair offers were contrasted with 
first person fair offers. At the group level, a within-subjects one-way ANOVA 
was carried out with an F-contrast looking for voxels with a difference in BOLD 
signal across conditions in any time bin. 
There were three clusters were significantly difference across bins. These were 
in the superior frontal gyrus, middle frontal gyrus and middle occipital gyrus. 
Examination of the contrast values shows that these differences were driven by 
lower activation in the unfair compared to fair condition 14 seconds post-trial 
onset. This is a difference unlikely to have been captured by an HRF modelled 
with an onset when the offer appeared (2 seconds post-trial onset). However, it 
is also a difference which is difficult to explain given the trial timeline and 
expected task effects.  
These results are discussed further in 0, Section 4.4.5.2.   
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CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES 
 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet 
and/or listened to an explanation about the research. 
 
Title of Study: Test-retest stability of cognitive tasks 
 
King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref: PNM/14/15-10  
 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising 
the research must explain the project to you before you agree to take part. If 
you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation 
already given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether to 
join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent Form to keep and refer to at any 
time. 
 
I confirm that I understand that by ticking/initialling each box I am 
consenting to this element of the study. I understand that it will be 
assumed that unticked/initialled boxes mean that I DO NOT consent to 
that part of the study. I understand that by not giving consent for any one 





1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet 
dated 27/07/14 (Version 1) for the above study. I have had the 
opportunity to consider the information and asked questions which 
have been answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason. Furthermore, I 
understand that I will be able to withdraw my data prior to it being 
anonymised. A deadline for withdrawal of consent to use my data 
has been given to me.   
 
3. I consent to the processing of my personal information for the 
purposes explained to me.  I understand that such information will 
be handled in accordance with the terms of the UK Data Protection 
Act 1998. 
 
4. I understand that my information may be subject to review by 
responsible individuals from the College for monitoring and audit 
purposes. 
 
5. I understand that confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained 








6. I understand that I have been asked to participate in 1/2/3* testing 
sessions. 
 
7. I understand that I will/will not* be rewarded with a financial incentive. 
 
8. I agree to the researchers sharing my anonymised data for the purpose 
of further analysis. 
 
 
9. I agree that the research team may use my data for future research. 
 
 
10. I understand that the information I have submitted will be published as a 
report and I wish to receive a copy of it. 
 
11. I understand that I must not take part if I fall under the exclusion criteria 
as detailed in the information sheet and explained to me by the 
researcher. 
 
12. I agree to be contacted in the future by King’s College London 
researchers who would like to invite me to participate in follow up studies 
to this project, or in future studies of a similar nature. 
 
 




__________________               __________________              
_________________ 
Name of Participant                 Date        Signature 
 
 
__________________               __________________              
_________________ 





INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
REC Reference Number: PNM/14/15-10 
 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 














What is the purpose of the study? 
 
Brain imaging research often uses psychological tests which have come from 
other areas of research.  In some cases, these tasks need to be adapted to be 
suitable for use in brain imaging.  On other occasions, for example when an 
experiment is designed to investigate a drug, a participant may be required to 
complete a task on more than one occasion, separated by a week or more.  
Therefore, a researcher may need to test the adapted version of the task, or 
test for consistency in its results over multiple time-points before using the task 
in a larger research programme. The purpose of this study is to test adapted 
tasks for their suitability in further research. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
Participation in this study is voluntary.  It is not obligatory.  We will explain the 
nature of the study, provide you a copy of this information sheet, and address 
any questions you may have.  If you decide to participate, we will ask you to 
sign a consent form to show that you have agreed to take part.  You are free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason.  If you wish to withdraw any 
data already collected, this will need to be done before the data is anonymised, 
as after this point, your specific data is not identifiable, even to the researchers.  
This will typically be one month after your final visit. 
 
We would like to invite you to take part in a research study being conducted by the 
Department of Neuroimaging at the Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology & 
Neuroscience, King’s College London.  You have been given this document to provide 
you with information about what the research is about, and what would be involved 
should you decide to take part.  Please take the time to read the following information 
carefully before deciding whether you would like to participate.  If you have any further 
questions, please do not hesitate to contact the project’s researcher team via email or 
telephone: **@kcl.ac.uk, 020********** 
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What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
The study will involve a number of visits to the Centre for Neuroimaging 
Sciences.  The researchers will inform you of the exact number of visits for the 
specific study you are taking part in.  Each visit will last no more than an hour 
and a half.  At each session you will be asked to complete some tasks.  The 
tasks will vary depending on the specific study you are taking part in, but will 
typically involve being presented with a stimuli (visual, auditory or tactile) and 
will require a response, either verbal or written, or via a button-press or joystick. 
The specific tasks you will be participating in will be explained in detail and you 
will have ample opportunity to ask questions before deciding whether to take 
part.  
 
At the start of each visit, you will be briefed with full details of the tasks, and will 
be given an opportunity to carry out a small practice session to ensure you are 




Some tasks will involve a financial reward.  The researchers will inform you of 
any financial incentives for participation in this study. 
 
What are the possible risks of taking part? 
 
We do not foresee any risks of taking part in this study. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
You will not directly benefit by taking part in this research beyond any financial 
incentives as outlined above. 
 
Will my taking part be kept confidential? 
 
All personal information will be kept in a secure location at the Institute of 
Psychiatry, Psychology & Neuroscience.  Your data will be anonymised prior to 
analysis, so it will not be traceable to you.  
 
How is the project being funded? 
 
There is no specific funding for this project, which is supported by the 





What will happen to the results of the study? 
 
The results of this study will be used to validate or improve tasks designed for 
neuroimaging research.  In some cases the results will be disseminated at 
meetings at the Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology & Neuroscience, academic 
conferences, or published in academic journals.  You will not be identified in any 
report of publication that results from this study. 
 
Who should I contact for further information? 
 
If you have any questions or require more information about this study, please 
contact me using the following contact details:  
 
Dr. Mitul Mehta, Department of Neuroimaging (PO89), Institute of Psychiatry, 
Psychology & Neuroscience, King’s College London SE5 8AF. Tel: 
02032283053. Email: Mitul.mehta@kcl.ac.uk 
 
What if I have further questions, or if something goes wrong? 
   
If this study has harmed you in any way or if you wish to make a complaint 
about the conduct of the study you can contact King's College London using the 
details below for further advice and information:  
  
Dr. Mitul Mehta, Department of Neuroimaging (PO89), Institute of Psychiatry, 
Psychology & Neuroscience, King’s College London SE5 8AF. Tel: 





Thank you for reading this information sheet and for considering taking part 








Dr Mithul Mehta 
Centre for Neuroimaging Sciences (P089) 
Institute of Psychiatry 
King's College London 
London SE5 8AF 
 
 
18 September 2014 
 
 
Dear Mithul,  
 
PNM/14/15-10 Test-retest stability of cognitive tasks 
 
Review Outcome: Full Approval 
 
Thank you for submitting your application for ethical approval.  This was reviewed by the PNM 
RESC on 16 September 2014.  As a result, the Committee has granted full ethical approval for 
your study. 
Provisos 
Your approval is based on the following provisos being met: 
1. Section 4: Please inform the Research Ethics Office of any significant changes to the 
study. 
2. Section 7.2 and Information Sheet: The Committee recommends that you specify a 
standard deadline for withdrawal of participant data.  This might be, for example, one 
week after data-collection.   
3. Section 7.3: The Committee recommends that participants subject to any level of 
deception are appropriately debriefed.   
4. Information Sheet:  
I. Please remove inapplicable template text from the sheet. 
II. Please replace any remaining references to the Institute of Psychiatry 
(specifically in the 1st paragraph) with Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology & 
Neuroscience 
 
You are not required to provide evidence to the Committee that these provisos have been met, 
but your ethical approval is only valid if these changes are made. You must not commence your 
research until these provisos have been met. 
 
Please ensure that you follow all relevant guidance as laid out in the King's College London 
Guidelines on Good Practice in Academic Research 
(http://www.kcl.ac.uk/college/policyzone/index.php?id=247). 
 
For your information ethical approval is granted until 18 September 2017. If you need approval 
beyond this point you will need to apply for an extension to approval at least two weeks prior to 
this explaining why the extension is needed, (please note however that a full re-application will 
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not be necessary unless the protocol has changed). You should also note that if your approval is 
for one year, you will not be sent a reminder when it is due to lapse. 
 
Ethical approval is required to cover the duration of the research study, up to the conclusion of 
the research. The conclusion of the research is defined as the final date or event detailed in the 
study description section of your approved application form (usually the end of data collection 
when all work with human participants will have been completed), not the completion of data 
analysis or publication of the results.  
For projects that only involve the further analysis of pre-existing data, approval must cover any 
period during which the researcher will be accessing or evaluating individual sensitive and/or un-
anonymised records.  
Note that after the point at which ethical approval for your study is no longer required due to the 
study being complete (as per the above definitions), you will still need to ensure all research 
data/records management and storage procedures agreed to as part of your application are 
adhered to and carried out accordingly. 
 
If you do not start the project within three months of this letter please contact the Research Ethics 
Office.  
 
Should you wish to make a modification to the project or request an extension to approval you will 
need approval for this and should follow the guidance relating to modifying approved applications: 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/support/ethics/applications/modifications.aspx  
 
Please would you also note that we may, for the purposes of audit, contact you from time to time 
to ascertain the status of your research.  
 
If you have any query about any aspect of this ethical approval, please contact your 
panel/committee administrator in the first instance 
(http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/support/ethics/contact.aspx) 
We wish you every success with this work. 
 
Yours sincerely,  
 
 
James Patterson - Senior Research Ethics Officer 
For and on behalf of  
Professor Gareth Barker, Chairman 
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CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES 
 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet 
and/or listened to an explanation about the research. 
 
Title of Study: MICA: SRC inhibitors as potential antipsychotics: human testing 
with psilocybin 
 
King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref:   PNM 14/15 - 11 
 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising 
the research must explain the project to you before you agree to take part. If 
you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation 
already given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether to 
join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent Form to keep and refer to at any 
time. 
 
I confirm that I understand that by ticking/initialling each box I am 
consenting to this element of the study. I understand that it will be 
assumed that unticked/initialled boxes mean that I DO NOT consent to 
that part of the study. I understand that by not giving consent for any one 





1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet 
dated V3.1 – 29/02/2016 for the above study. I have had the 
opportunity to consider the information and asked questions which 
have been answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason. Furthermore, I 
understand that I will be able to withdraw my data up to 01/03/16 
 
3. I consent to the processing of my personal information for the 
purposes explained to me.  I understand that such information will 
be handled in accordance with the terms of the UK Data Protection 
Act 1998. 
 
4. I understand that my information may be subject to review by 
responsible individuals from the College for monitoring and audit 
purposes. 
 
5. I understand that confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained 











6. I understand that relevant sections of my data may be looked at by 
individuals from Imperial College and Kings College London. My 
personal data will be stored securely on University computers. All data 
obtained from my involvement in the study will be anonymised. I give my 
permission for this. 
 
7. I agree that my data/sample(s) can be transferred to other researchers 
for purposes connected with my participation in this study but that this 
will be anonymised. This data will be published in scientific journals and 
presented at conferences or meetings. 
 
8. I understand and agree that the MRI brain scan is not a diagnostic 
procedure. Should there be any concerns with what is found however, I 
consent to my scans being forwarded to the appropriate specialist for 
review and reporting. I further consent to the results of this report being 
disclosed to my General Practitioner and the research team. 
 




10. I agree that the research team may use my data for future research and 
understand that any such use of identifiable data would be reviewed and 
approved by a research ethics committee. (In such cases, as with this 
project, data would/would not be identifiable in any report). 
 
11. I agree to be contacted in the future by King’s College London 
researchers who would like to invite me to participate in follow up studies 
to this project, or in future studies of a similar nature. You are not obliged 
to participate in any future research. 
 
12. I understand that the information I have submitted will be published as a 
report and I wish to receive a copy of it. 
 
13. I understand that I must not take part if I fall under the exclusion criteria 
as detailed in the information sheet and explained to me by the 
researcher. 
 
14. I agree that my GP may be contacted, and the research team informed, if 







__________________               __________________              
_________________ 
Name of Participant                 Date        Signature 
 
 
__________________               __________________              
_________________ 









INFORMATION SHEET FOR HEALTHY VOLUNTEERS 
 
STUDY TITLE 




A study conducted by the Centre for Neuroimaging Sciences at the Institute of 
Psychiatry, Psychology & Neuroscience, King’s College London and sponsored by 
Imperial College.  One of the drugs used in this study is being supplied in kind by 
AstraZeneca, a pharmaceutical company.  
  
Principal Contact for general queries or in the event of adverse effects:  
 
Dr Mitul Mehta 
Centre for Neuroimaging Sciences, Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology & Neuroscience, 
King’s College London, London SE5 8AF 
Telephone: 020 3228 3053/3058 
 
We would like to invite you to take part in a research study at the Centre for Neuroimaging 
Sciences. Before deciding to take part it is important to understand why the research is 
being done and what it would involve for you. Please take time to read the following 
information carefully. You may talk to others about the study if you wish. The information is 
separated into two parts. Part 1 tells you the purpose of this study and what will happen to 
you if you take part. Part 2 gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the 
study. Please ask if anything is unclear or if you would like more information. Take time to 
decide whether or not you wish to take part. If you do decide to take part, you will be given 
a copy of this document to take home with you. Please contact Anthony Gabay for further 
details on taking part: anthony.a.gabay@kcl.ac.uk / 07444321618 
 
PART I 
Purpose of the research 
Brain imaging is currently used for a number of reasons including understanding where in 
the brain medicines act. The purpose of this study is to use brain imaging to test a 
mechanism by which a novel drug has effects in the brain. In order to achieve this we will 
use an existing drug, psilocybin (an active component of Magic Mushrooms) to see whether 
it will activate particular regions of your brain. This is an established model for looking at 
features such as hallucinations.that occur in psychiatric illnesses. We plan to assess the 
sensitivity of different brain imaging techniques to psilocybin and test the reversal of 
psilocybin’s effects with a novel, experimental drug called saracatinib. This drug has 
previously been used in cancer research. We are doing this study to help us determine how 
useful these brain imaging methods may be for assessing the effects of future medicines 
on brain function in patients. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
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Participation in the study is voluntary. It is not obligatory. We will describe the study to you, 
go through this information sheet and provide a copy for you to keep. We will then ask you 
to sign a consent form to show you have agreed to take part. You are free to withdraw at 
any time, without giving any reason.  If you do decide to withdraw from the study we will 
ask you if you also wish to withdraw your data collected to date, in which case this will need 




What is involved? 
The study will involve three separate visits to the Centre for Neuroimaging Sciences. The 
first will last about 2-3 hours and the other two will last about 8 hours each. Each visit will 
be separated by at least one week.  Your involvement in this study will take between 4 and 
8 weeks (depending on your availability and the sessions available at the research centre). 
The overall study will be on-going for approximately 12 months. We aim to have 24 
volunteers complete the study. 
 
About the medication:  
Psilocybin is a short-acting psychedelic (‘mind-manifesting’) or hallucinogenic drug, which 
works by acting on the serotonin system. Serotonin is a chemical that naturally exists in the 
brain, low levels of which have been associated with depression. All volunteers will receive 
the psilocybin infusion. Information on safety and side effects is given below. 
 
Saracatanib is an experimental medication which has been used in clinical research to 
investigate its anti-cancer properties. It has been shown to block a particular biochemical 
pathway in living cells in the body (a tyrosine kinase pathway). This same pathway is 
considered to be activated by psilocybin and is responsible for its characteristic 
psychological effects, some of which appear to transiently mimic those seen in 
schizophrenia. If this pathway can be blocked by saracatinib and result in the reversal of 
psilocybin’s effects, this may offer an additional or alternative means by which we can help 




The two drug combinations that all patients will receive is 
1. oral placebo and psilocybin infusion 
2. oral saracatanib and psilocybin infusion  
 
You will not know which combination of treatments you receive at each visit. Neither you 
nor the investigators will know what you have taken on each day, although we can find out 
quickly if needed in the case of an emergency.  
 
 
First Visit: Screening Visit (2-3hours) 
 
Physical examination: 
The first visit is a screening visit. The study will be explained to you and you will be asked 
to sign the consent form. A copy of this form will be given to you to keep. The screening 
visit will include answering questions about your health, a physical examination, checking 
your blood pressure and pulse rate, taking a recording of your heart called an ECG 
(electrocardiogram) and measuring your weight. Samples of your blood and urine will also 
be taken which will be tested in the laboratory for any drugs of abuse. We will also test your 
breath for alcohol. These tests are important to gain an understanding of your state of 
health and confirm that your body will handle the study medication we give you in a normal 
manner. The samples we collect from you will only be used for the purposes described and 




Mental health status and scanning procedures: 
On the screening visit we will also request that you take part in a structured clinical 
interview, which will include questions about your mental health, and complete some 
subjective questionnaires about your mood. The purpose is to ensure all volunteers are 
suitable for the study.  
 
The study will be using a magnetic field to help generate pictures of your brain, therefore 
you must not have a scan if you have received metal-associated injuries to your eyes, had 
metallic objects (including clips) inserted into your body during an operation, or if you have 
received a gun-shot injury or have a heart pace maker.  The study physician will go through 
a list of possible risks with you at screening as will the person conducting the scan before 
you go into the scanner. You will also be given the opportunity to lie in a mock scanner at 
the Centre for Neuroimaging Sciences before lying in the real scanner. This will help you 
become accustomed to the scanning environment. 
 
Computer tasks: 
If you take part in the study you will be asked to complete some tasks on the computer. 
During screening there will be a practice session of these tasks in which you will receive 
instructions on what you will be asked to do while you are in the scanner. You will be asked 
to look at a computer screen and move a joystick in response to certain images.  
 
These screening assessments, together with specific questions we will ask, will confirm 
your eligibility for participation in the study. 
 
 
Second and Third Visits: Study days (8hours each) 
 
If you are eligible to participate in the study we will invite you to take part in two subsequent 
scanning visits on two separate occasions at least one week apart. We will arrange these 
dates so that they are convenient for you. Each of these two study visits will include 
identical study assessments and procedures. Only the oral drugs that you receive will differ.  
 
On each visit we will first give you a brief interview to confirm that you are still suitable to 
take part, explain again the study procedures, conduct a brief physical examination, test 
your urine for drugs of abuse and check the alcohol levels in your breath. If these are all 
normal we will continue with the visit.  
 
On each scanning visit, an hour after arriving, you will receive a single dose of one of the 
following tablets – placebo (inert or dummy substance) or saracatinib. Neither you nor the 
investigators will know which of these you have been given on each day since it is decided 
by a random code. We’ll also put a cannula (small plastic tube) into one of the veins in your 
arm. This may cause slight discomfort at the insertion site and occasionally bruising. 
 
Approximately 4 hours after the tablet we will give you psilocybin, which will be delivered 
directly into the blood via the cannula by a programmable intravenous infusion pump. The 
pump controls the rate at which you will receive psilocybin to ensure everyone receives the 
same amount of drug at the same rate. We will plan the infusion to delivery approximately 




Scanning will take place before and after you have been given the psilocybin dose. The 
scans will take place approximately four hours after giving you the oral tablet of placebo or 
saracatinib. In this time period you will be provided with something to eat and you will also 
be asked to complete some brief questionnaires which assess your subjective feelings 




Each scanning session will consist of two parts, in each part you will undergo the same 
procedures and be asked to complete the same computer tasks. In the first part, which will 
last approximately one hour, we will collect pictures (scans) of your head while you are 
resting and whilst you are performing a computer task which will entail fixing your gaze onto 
a computer-generated pattern of dots on a screen. You will not be given any psilocybin 
during this first part. For the second part we will scan you during the psilocybin infusion and 
continue to scan for about 30 minutes. We will collect pictures of your head again, while 
you are alternately resting and again performing the task.  The total time you will be in the 
scanner will be about 90 minutes. We will also ask you to provide us with a score that 
denotes the intensity of the subjective experience whilst under the influence of psilocybin. 
After the scanning we will ask you to perform some computerised games to test your ability 
to recognise emotions and make simple decisions. These games will last about 30minutes 
and we will show you how they work on your screening visit. 
 
What is scanning? 
We use a very modern method of scanning known as Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI).  
This technique is commonly used to diagnose a number of diseases, but in this case it has 
been adapted to take images of which parts of your brain are active when you at rest or 
performing a task.  When a part of your brain is more active, more blood flows to that 
region and this change is captured on the images that we take. We will make a map of 
which parts of your brain has more blood flow than others.  
 
In order for us to take pictures of your brain, you will have to lie as still as possible in the 
MRI scanner.  The scanner consists of a powerful magnet, but you will not feel any force or 
special sensation inside a magnetic field because your body is insensitive to it.  Because of 
the magnetic field, you must not have a scan if you have received metal injuries to your 
eyes, had metallic objects (including clips) inserted into your body during an operation, or if 
you have received a gun-shot injury or have a heart pace maker.  The radiographer will go 
through a list of possible risks with you before you go into the scanner. Please note that 
MRI scans do not involve any form of ionising radiation (X-rays), but the scanner itself can 
be quite claustrophobic; therefore please inform us if you have a fear of enclosed spaces. 
 
All the time you are in the scanner there will be a microphone switched on so you can talk 
to us. We will talk to you regularly to explain what will happen next. Some people find the 
machine a little noisy, but the headphones we provide allow adequate noise protection for 
most people.   
 
During each study visit we will take 5 blood samples. These will be used to measure the 
levels of psilocybin and saracitinib in your body. One of these samples will be collected 
while you are lying in the scanner.  These samples will either be collected by a simple 
needle into a vein or through the cannula in your arm (described above on page 3). The 
samples we collect from you will only be used for the purposes described and will not be 
stored. While you are in the scanner we will also monitor your heart rate and respiration 
rate. At intervals throughout the day we will also check your blood pressure and heart rate 
outside the scanner while you are lying down and again while you are standing up, and ask 
you to rate how you are feeling using some questionnaires. If you feel unwell for what-ever 
reason during the course of the day you should let one of the study team know. 
 
Before and after your scan 
If you decide to take part in this research study we ask that you visit the Centre for 
Neuroimaging Sciences on 3 separate occasions, one for screening and two study visits. 
Before each visit we ask that you: 
 do not drink alcohol, take products containing caffeine or engage in strenuous 




For the two study visits we ask that you also: 
 eat nothing but a light breakfast (e.g. bowl of cereal, or two pieces of toast, nothing 
high in fat) between midnight and your arrival at the centre for neuroimaging 
sciences on the study days (not screening) and  
 abstain from nicotine- or tobacco- containing products for at least 4 hours before 
arrival at the Centre 
 
During the study day we will provide food but we do ask you to abstain from nicotine-, 
tobacco- or caffeine- containing products until you are discharged home. After each study 
day we will ask you to avoid alcohol and driving or operating heavy machinery for at least 
24 hours after receiving each dose because small levels of psilocybin and saracatinib may 
still be present in your system.  
 
You will need to provide us with a contact number. We will contact you the following day 
and again a week after your last visit to ensure that you are well and not experiencing any 
untoward effects. If necessary a physician will be available to review you in person at the 
study centre. We will provide you with contact numbers for the research team should you 
want to get in touch with us. 
 
If you fall ill or need to take any medication through the course of the study you should 
notify the researcher as soon as possible.   
 
Importantly, if you have private health insurance you should contact the company to 
inform them that you are taking part in a research study to ensure it does not affect 
your cover. 
 
Will I experience any side effects? 
 
Taking blood or inserting the cannula are well-tolerated procedures, although you may 
experience some minor discomfort, minimal bleeding or bruising in your arm.   
Psilocybin is referred to as a psychedelic (meaning ‘mind-manifesting’) or hallucinogenic 
drug and is the active ingredient in magic mushrooms. You should be aware that these 
mushrooms are used socially and their consumption is against the law. Psilocybin can affect 
your blood pressure and heart-rate so you will not be included in the study if you have a 
history of high blood pressure or other heart problems. When on the drug you may feel your 
heart beating faster. Psilocybin can cause strange and unusual experiences (such as 
changes in the way things look e.g. the size and shape of things can appear distorted, walls 
may appear to move, shapes and colours may be seen on surfaces the room may appear to 
get bigger or brighter and time may appear to pass more slowly), which you will be familiar 
with since you have used psychedelics before. However since we will be administering 
psilocybin intravenously, the effects will be much more short-lived when compared to 
consuming magic mushrooms orally. Importantly the doses to be used in this study have 
been used in our studies previously with healthy volunteers and are well-tolerated. Our 
group has much experience working with psilocybin and have administered it to over 50 
healthy volunteers. Anxiety is a rare side-effect that usually responds well to support and 
reassurance. Should you find these experiences unpleasant and frightening the scanning 
can be stopped immediately and any strange experiences should fade over the next hour – 
during this time you will be constantly monitored. A qualified physician will be present 
throughout the study periods and will examine you before you leave for the day. We will 
arrange for a taxi to take you home. In the unlikely event that you are unfit to leave the 




Saracatinib is an experimental drug, has only been used in clinical research to date and is 
therefore not licensed to treat any health condition presently. So far saracatinib has been 
given to over 50 healthy volunteers and the most likely side-effects are headache, 
diarrhoea, nausea and vomiting. Some volunteers experience a flu-like illness 
characterised by feeling hot, muscle aches and tiredness. 
 
If you do experience any side effects please contact Dr. Mitul Mehta on 0203 228 
3084/3053 or the study physician on  07444321618  immediately.  
 
Will I benefit from my participation? 
We do not expect that you will draw any specific personal benefit apart from a payment of 
£20 per hour to compensate for your time, which if you complete the study will amount to 
£350. If we decide that you are not suitable during the screening session we will pay you 
£30 for your time. Travel expenses will also be reimbursed. 
 
What do I do if I want to withdraw from the study? 
From our previous experience in studies of this type we do not anticipate that you will have 
any problems. However if you do, we want to assure you that you are free to withdraw from 
the study at any time.  You will not be required to give us any reasons for withdrawal from 
the study but please inform us as soon as possible if you wish to do so.  If you do decide to 
withdraw from the study we will ask you if you also wish to withdraw your data collected to 
date.  
 
Will my participation be kept confidential? 
You will be identified in our computers by a number instead of your name.  All records 
obtained while you are in this study, including related health records, will remain strictly 
confidential at all times. An exception is disclosure of information that indicates you are at 
serious harm to yourself or others, in which case your GP and a psychiatrist may be 
informed. A copy of this ‘Information Sheet’ and of the signed ‘Consent Form’ will be given to 
you to keep. A copy of your consent may be made available to others working on the study 
at the Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology & Neuroscience, King’s College London and 
Imperial College, the Independent Ethics Committee members. More information on 
confidentiality is given in Part II of this information sheet. 
If you have any questions about matters related to the study please contact Dr. Mitul Mehta 




What if relevant new information becomes available? 
Sometimes we get new information about medicines being used in research. If this 
happens, a member of the research team will tell you and discuss whether you should 
continue in the study. If you decide to continue in the study, he/she may ask you to sign an 
updated consent form. If the study is stopped for any other reason, we will tell you and 
explain the reasons why this has occurred.  
 
Although unlikely, it is possible that whilst performing normal medical checks we may 
identify a significant abnormality that you didn’t realise you had. If this occurs, a study 
doctor will discuss the finding with you and we will inform your GP. Imperial College (the 
Sponsor) may stop the study or your participation in the study at any time, for any reason, 
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without your consent.  This may be due to an adverse reaction or other factors that relate to 
your safety or well-being.  A full explanation will be given to you should this be necessary. 
MRI scans will be reviewed by a specialist and any significant abnormalities will be reported 
to your GP and the study investigators.  
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study?  
If you withdraw from the study we will retain and continue to use any data collected before 
such withdrawal of consent unless you request that you do not want us to use any data 
collected from you. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
While we do not expect you to suffer any health problems by taking part in this study, 
Imperial College, the study’s sponsor, may compensate anyone whose health suffers as a 
result of participation.  You do not have to prove it was anyone’s fault; if the health problem 
arose because of your participation in this study, you will be compensated. 
If this study has harmed you in any way or if you wish to make a complaint about the 
conduct of the study you can contact Imperial College London for further advice at:  AHSC 
Joint Compliance Office, Imperial College, 510C, 5th Floor, Charing Cross Hospital W6 
8RF*** OR King's College London using the details below for further advice and 





There is no information about the effect of saracatinib or psilocybin on the development of 
the foetus in humans or on the risk associated with your partner being exposed to 
saracatinib or psilocybin by the drug being passed on through your ejaculate. Therefore, it 
is important that your partner is not exposed to the study drugs, and does not become 
pregnant during the study and for a total period of three months after the receiving the last 
dose of the study drug. 
You must inform the study team or the sponsor if your partner becomes pregnant within 
three months of you receiving the last dose of study drug. For the sake of safety it is 
important to follow-up on any such pregnancies. 
 
As a precaution, you should use an effective means of contraception (condom and 
spermicide) 
(irrespective of whether your female partner is sterile or not) during the time interval 
between taking the first dose and three months following the last dose. In addition, your 
female partner must use another form of effective contraception e.g. intra-uterine device 
(IUD; “coiI”), barrier methods (e.g. condom or occlusive cap [diaphragm or cervical 
vault/caps] used with spermicidal gel, foam, cream, film or suppository), or use of oral, 
injected, or implanted hormonal methods of contraception. 
 
If your partner is already pregnant before your study admission, you should still use 
condoms 
or another barrier contraceptive between taking the first dose of study drug and for 3 
months after. You should not donate sperm for 3 months. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
All information obtained during the study, as well as related health records, will remain 
strictly confidential at all times.  However, these may need to be made available to others 
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working at the Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology & Neuroscience, King’s College London 
or Imperial College’s behalf, the Ethics Committee members.  
 
By signing the consent form you agree to this access for the current study and any further 
research that may be done.  However, the Institute of Psychiatry and Imperial College will 
take steps to protect your personal information and will not include your name on any 
sponsor forms, reports, publications, or in any future disclosures.  If you withdraw from the 
study, we will no longer collect your personal information, but we may need to continue to 
use information already collected. The study information collected may be sent to other 
locations outside of the UK, but you will not be referred to by name or identified in any report 
or publication nor could the information be traced back to you.  This will be for healthcare 
and/or medical research purposes only. Your data will only be shared with countries where 
data protection laws are comparable to those in the UK.  However, the Institute of 
Psychiatry, Psychology & Neuroscience, King’s College London and Imperial College 
maintain high standards of confidentiality and protection.  
 
Under the data protection laws Imperial College is the controller of your personal data. 
Imperial College will take steps to ensure your personal data is protected. 
 
You may withdraw your permission at any time by providing written notice to the study 
team.  The study doctor and staff would then no longer use or share your personal health 
information in connection with this study; unless it is essential to ensure that the study is 
scientifically reliable.  However, we would still use study data that was collected before you 
withdrew your permission.  In addition, you would no longer be able to participate in the 
study. 
 
If you agree to take part in the study we may use the data collected in the following ways: 
1. Your study data, either alone or combined with data from other studies, may be shared 
with collaborators from other countries in order to address scientific questions. Any data 
shared will be anonymized and will remain under the control of the sponsor. 
2. Study data that does not identify you may be published in medical journals or shared 
with others as part of scientific discussions. 
 
You have the right to see and copy your personal health information related to the research 
study for as long as the study doctor or research institution holds this information.   
However, to ensure the scientific integrity of the study, you will not be able to review some 
of your personal health information related to the study, until after the study has been 
completed. 
 
YOUR RIGHTS UNDER ANY APPLICABLE DATA PROTECTION LAWS ARE NOT 
AFFECTED 
 
What will happen to any samples I give? 
We will ask you to provide a number of urine and blood samples for this study. During the 
screening visit we will take up to 20mL (about 3.5 teaspoons) of blood from a vein in your 
arm and a urine sample. During subsequent visits we will take no more than 48mL (about 8 
teaspoons) of blood across all time points to measure the drug levels in your body. Overall 
we will not take more than 116mL (about 19 teaspoons) of blood over the course of the 
three visits of the study. Once the samples have been analysed, they will be destroyed.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
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The results of this research will be published as scientific reports and maybe presented at 
meetings within the Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology & Neuroscience, King’s College 
London or Imperial College or at international scientific meetings. You will not be identified 
in any report or publication that results from this study. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research?  
The research is being organized as a collaborative study between the Institute of 
Psychiatry, Psychology & Neuroscience, King’s College London and Imperial College, 
who is sponsoring the study. The study is funded by the Medical Research Council, UK. 
One of the study drugs is being provided under a collaboration agreement by AstraZeneca 
Pharmaceuticals. The researchers involved in conducting this study do not receive any 
financial incentives for including you in this study and do not benefit financially from this 
study. 
 
Who has reviewed the study?  
This research study has been looked at by two independent groups of people. The first is 
the Medical Research Council (UK) who determined the scientific merits of this study. The 
second is a Research Ethics Committee, who reviewed the study and documentation to 
protect your safety, rights, wellbeing and dignity. This study has been reviewed and given 
favourable opinion by the Psychiatry, Nursing and Midwifery (PNM) Research Ethics 
Committee at King’s College London. 
 
If you have any questions about matters related to the study please contact Dr. Mitul Mehta 








Dr Mitul Mehta 
Centre for Neuroimaging Sciences (P089) 
Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Nursing  
King's College London 
London SE5 8AF 
 
 





PNM/14/15-11 MICA: SRC inhibitors as potential antipsychotics: human testing with 
psilocybin 
 
Review Outcome: Full Approval 
 
Thank you for sending in the amendments/clarifications requested to the above project. I am 
pleased to inform you that these meet the requirements of the PNM RESC and therefore that full 
approval is now granted. 
Provisos 
 
Please ensure that you follow all relevant guidance as laid out in the King's College London 
Guidelines on Good Practice in Academic Research 
(http://www.kcl.ac.uk/college/policyzone/index.php?id=247). 
 
For your information ethical approval is granted until 06 January 2016. If you need approval 
beyond this point you will need to apply for an extension to approval at least two weeks prior to 
this explaining why the extension is needed, (please note however that a full re-application will 
not be necessary unless the protocol has changed). You should also note that if your approval is 
for one year, you will not be sent a reminder when it is due to lapse. 
 
Ethical approval is required to cover the duration of the research study, up to the conclusion of 
the research. The conclusion of the research is defined as the final date or event detailed in the 
study description section of your approved application form (usually the end of data collection 
when all work with human participants will have been completed), not the completion of data 
analysis or publication of the results.  
For projects that only involve the further analysis of pre-existing data, approval must cover any 
period during which the researcher will be accessing or evaluating individual sensitive and/or un-
anonymised records.  
Note that after the point at which ethical approval for your study is no longer required due to the 
study being complete (as per the above definitions), you will still need to ensure all research 
data/records management and storage procedures agreed to as part of your application are 
adhered to and carried out accordingly. 
 





Should you wish to make a modification to the project or request an extension to approval you will 
need approval for this and should follow the guidance relating to modifying approved applications: 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/support/ethics/applications/modifications.aspx  
 
Please would you also note that we may, for the purposes of audit, contact you from time to time 
to ascertain the status of your research.  
 
If you have any query about any aspect of this ethical approval, please contact your 
panel/committee administrator in the first instance 
(http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/support/ethics/contact.aspx) 
We wish you every success with this work. 
 
Yours sincerely,  
 
 









Appendix I Consent form, information 




CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES 
 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet 
and/or listened to an explanation about the research. 
 
Title of Study: The psychopharmacology of social and emotional cognition  
 
King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref: PNM 14/15 - 32 
 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising 
the research must explain the project to you before you agree to take part. If 
you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation 
already given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether to 
join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent Form to keep and refer to at any 
time. 
 
I confirm that I understand that by ticking/initialling each box I am 
consenting to this element of the study. I understand that it will be 
assumed that unticked/initialled boxes mean that I DO NOT consent to 
that part of the study. I understand that by not giving consent for any one 





1. *I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet 
dated Version 1 – 14/10/2014 for the above study. I have had the 
opportunity to consider the information and asked questions which 
have been answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. *I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason. Furthermore, I 
understand that I will be able to withdraw my data up to the point at 
which data collection ceases (approximately October 2016) 
 
3. *I consent to the processing of my personal information for the 
purposes explained to me.  I understand that such information will 
be handled in accordance with the terms of the UK Data Protection 
Act 1998. 
 
4. *I understand that my information may be subject to review by 
responsible individuals from the College for monitoring and audit 
purposes. 
 
5. I understand that confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained 








6. I agree that my data/sample(s) can be transferred to other researchers 
for purposes connected with my participation in this study but that this 
will be anonymised. This data will be published in scientific journals and 
presented at conferences or meetings. 
 
7. I understand and agree that the MRI brain scan is not a diagnostic 
procedure. Should there be any concerns with what is found however, I 
consent to my scans being forwarded to the appropriate specialist for 
review and reporting. I further consent to the results of this report being 
disclosed to my General Practitioner and the research team. 
 
8. I agree to be contacted in the future by King’s College London 
researchers who would like to invite me to participate in follow up studies 
to this project, or in future studies of a similar nature. 
 
9. I agree that the research team may use my data for future research and 
understand that any such use of identifiable data would be reviewed and 
approved by a research ethics committee. (In such cases, as with this 
project, data would not be identifiable in any report). 
 
10. I understand that the information I have submitted will be published as a 
report and I wish to receive a copy of it. 
 
11. I understand that I must not take part if I fall under the exclusion criteria 
as detailed in the information sheet and explained to me by the 
researcher. 
 
12. I agree that my GP may be contacted if any unexpected results are found 




__________________               __________________              
_________________ 
Name of Participant                 Date        Signature 
 
 
__________________               __________________              
_________________ 






INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
REC Reference Number: PNM/14/15-32 
 



















What is the purpose of the study? 
 
The processing of social and emotional information is an integral part of everyday 
human experience.  They are processes which are disrupted in a number of psychiatric 
disorders, and urgent research is needed to improve the quality of life of patients 
experiencing these disorders.  In order to develop treatments it is vital to first fully 
understand how social and emotional information is processed in the healthy brain, by 
identifying the neurochemical mechanisms responsible.  The purpose of this study is to 
establish, using functional brain imaging, the mechanisms by which a recreational drug 
known to affect these processes, alters social and emotional processing.  
 
Why have I been invited to take part? 
 
You have been invited to take part in this study because you have expressed an 
interest after seeing an advert or hearing about it from a friend.   
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
Participation in this study is completely voluntary.  We will explain the nature of the 
study, provide you a copy of this information sheet, and address any questions you 
may have.  If you decide to participate, we will ask you to sign a consent form to show 
that you have agreed to take part.  You are free to withdraw at any time, without giving 
any reason.  We will ask if you wish us to destroy any data already collected.  Should 
this be the case, it will need to be done before the data is anonymised, as after this 




We would like to invite you to take part in a research study being conducted by the 
Department of Neuroimaging at the Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology & 
Neuroscience, King’s College London.  You have been given this document to provide 
you with information about what the research is about, and what would be involved 
should you decide to take part.  Please take the time to read the following information 
carefully before deciding whether you would like to participate.  If you have any further 
questions, please do not hesitate to contact the project’s researcher team via email or 
telephone: anthony.a.gabay@kcl.ac.uk, 020 3228 3095 
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What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
The study will involve three visits to the Centre of Neuroimaging Sciences.  The first 
visit will be a screening visit and will last about 2.5 hours and the other two (study days) 
will last about five hours each.  Each visit will be separated by at least a week.  Further 
information about each visit is provided below.  The schedule for both study days will 
be identical, with only the drug you are given being different.  You will either be given 
an inactive placebo, or 100mg MDMA (3,4-methylenedioxy-N-methylamphetamine). 
 
MDMA is a compound which has been used recreationally for its euphoric effects for 
many years. It is the main ingredient in what is commonly known as ecstasy. It was first 
synthesised in the early 20th century, and was widely investigated in the mid-20th 
century for its possible psychotherapeutic effects.  Recently MDMA has been studied in 
clinical trials for post-traumatic stress disorder and in studies similar to this one - to 
understand its effects on brain function.  MDMA produces its subjective effects by 
acting on the brain’s serotonin system.  Further detail about safety and sides effects is 
given below. 
 
First visit: Screening visit (approximately 2 hours) 
 
Physical and mental health screening: 
The first visit is a screening visit. The study will be explained to you and you will be 
asked to sign the consent form. A copy of this form will be given to you to keep. The 
screening visit will include answering questions about your health, a physical 
examination, checking your blood pressure and pulse rate, taking a recording of your 
heart called an ECG (electrocardiogram) and measuring your weight. Samples of your 
blood (12ml, approximately two teaspoons) and urine will also be taken which will be 
tested in the laboratory for any drugs of abuse. We will also test your breath for alcohol. 
These tests are important to gain an understanding of your state of health and confirm 
that your body will handle the study medication we give you in a normal manner. The 
samples we collect from you will only be used for the purposes described and will not 
be stored.   
 
On the screening visit we will also request that you take part in a structured clinical 
interview, which will include questions about your mental health, and complete some 
questionnaires.  We will also ask you questions about your lifetime use of illegal drugs.  
This information will be kept confidential and anonymised.  The purpose is to ensure 
that all volunteers are suitable for the study. 
 
The study will be using a magnetic field to help generate pictures of your brain, 
therefore you must not have a scan if you have received metal-associated injuries to 
your eyes, had metallic objects (including clips) inserted into your body during an 
operation, or if you have received a gun-shot injury or have a heart pacemaker.  The 
study physician will go through a list of possible risks with you at screening as will the 
person conducting the scan before you go into the scanner. You will also be given the 
opportunity to lie in a mock scanner at the Centre for Neuroimaging Sciences before 
lying in the real scanner. This will help you become accustomed to the scanning 
environment. 
 
During this visit you will also be introduced to all of the tasks and questionnaires used 





If you take part in the study you will be asked to complete some tasks on a computer. 
During the screening visit you will be introduced to these tasks, and given an 
opportunity to practice them.  You will be asked to look at a computer screen and make 
button-press responses to various stimuli.  
 
These screening assessments, together with specific questions we will ask, will confirm 
your eligibility for participation in the study. 
 
Second and Third Visits: Study days (5 hours each) 
 
If you are eligible to take part in the study, you will be invited to two subsequent study 
days.  These will be arranged at your convenience and will be at least one week apart.  
Each study day will be identical with just the drug you are given being different.  You 
will either receive an inactive placebo or 100mg MDMA. 
 
On each visit we will first conduct a short interview and urine drugs test to confirm that 
you are still able to take part.  We will take a sample of your blood to determine 
baseline levels of the hormone oxytocin.  You will then be given a capsule containing 
either placebo or MDMA – neither you nor the researcher will know what the capsule 
contains on each day.  However, should the need arise, the researcher can very 
quickly find out what the capsule contained. 
 
You will then be reminded of the tasks and given an opportunity to practice them.  
Approximately 60 minutes after taking the capsule, we will take another blood sample 
and you will be invited to enter the Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) machine for 
scanning (see below for details about MRI scanning).  The scanning procedure will 
take approximately 1 hour and a half in total.  While in the scanner we will first take 
some structural scans.  These will not require you to do anything other than lie very 
still.  You then be asked to complete two tasks.  These two tasks will involve making 
some simple decisions, via button presses, in the context of a simple game involving 
other people.  These tasks will be interspersed with some ‘resting state’ scans, during 
which all you have to do is stare at a fixation point.    
 
Once both tasks are completed, we will take you out of the scanner and we will collect 
a final blood sample.  You will then be asked to complete a small number of 
questionnaires.  We will then ask you to complete four further tasks, which will take 
about an hour and fifteen minutes in total.  Two of those tasks will involve looking at 
images of people on a computer screen and answering questions about their emotional 
state.   The third will involve making simple button press responses to visual stimuli.  
Finally, we will ask you to make some monetary offers to other players in the games 
you played in the scanner. 
 
The total amount of blood taken on each study day will be 36ml (about 6 teaspoons). 
 
About MRI scanning 
We use a very modern method of scanning known as Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
(MRI).  This technique is commonly used to diagnose a number of diseases, but in this 
case it has been adapted to take images of which parts of your brain are active when 
you at rest or performing a task.  When a part of your brain is more active, more blood 
flows to that region and this change is captured on the images that we take. We will 
make a map of which parts of your brain has more blood flow than others.  
 
In order for us to take pictures of your brain, you will have to lie as still as possible in 
the MRI scanner.  The scanner consists of a powerful magnet, but you will not feel any 
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force or special sensation inside a magnetic field because your body is insensitive to it.  
Because of the magnetic field, you must not have a scan if you have received metal 
injuries to your eyes, had metallic objects (including clips) inserted into your body 
during an operation, or if you have received a gun-shot injury or have a heart pace 
maker.  The radiographer will go through a list of possible risks with you before you go 
into the scanner. Please note that MRI scans do not involve any form of ionising 
radiation (X-rays), but the scanner itself can be quite claustrophobic; therefore please 
inform us if you have a fear of enclosed spaces. 
 
All the time you are in the scanner there will be a microphone switched on so you can 
talk to us. We will talk to you regularly to explain what will happen next. Some people 
find the machine a little noisy, but the headphones we provide allow adequate noise 
protection for most people. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part?   
 
We do not expect that you will draw any specific personal benefit apart from a payment 
of £20 per hour to compensate for your time on the study days, and £20 for the 
screening session.  If you complete the study this will amount to £220.  In addition, you 
will be paid a proportion of the money you earn through the monetary tasks. Travel 
expenses will also be reimbursed. 
 
If you wish to view a copy of any scientific reports resulting from this research, you may 
ask the researcher. 
 
What are the possible risks of taking part? 
 
During the screening session we will take a small amount of blood.  This is a well-
tolerated procedure, although you may experience some minor discomfort, minimal 
bleeding or bruising in your arm. 
 
MDMA is often used as a recreational drug and has been used a number of research 
studies in different countries.  You should be aware that its recreational use is against 
the law.  MDMA can affect your blood pressure and heart-rate, so you will not be 
included in the study if you have a history of high blood pressure or other heart 
problems.  When on the drug you may feel your heart beating faster.  Some people 
report experiencing mild anxiety after taking MDMA.  It is important to note that the 
dose being used in this study has been well-tolerated in a number of previous studies 
in healthy volunteers.  We will, however, have a study doctor on hand to provide 
support, reassurance, and medical assistance if required.  Should you find the 
experience distressing, the scanning can be stopped immediately, and any distressing 
feelings should pass within a couple of hours, during which time you will be monitored 
continually.   
 
At the end of the study day a doctor will carry out a series of short assessments to 
ensure you are fit to leave the study centre.  People sometimes report feeling ‘low’ for a 
few days after taking MDMA.  A member of the study team will phone you two days 
after each of the study days to see how you are getting on.  You should feel free to 
contact the study team if you are having distressing thoughts or feelings on 
07444321618. 
 
Sometimes the tests we perform reveal a significant abnormality. If this occurs we will 
inform your GP. The MRI scans will be reviewed by a specialist and any significant 





Will my taking part be kept confidential? 
 
If you choose to participate in this study you will be identified in our computers by a 
number instead of your name.  All records obtained while you are in this study, 
including related health records, will remain strictly confidential at all times. An 
exception is disclosure of information that indicates you are at serious harm to yourself or 
others, in which case your GP and a psychiatrist may be informed.  All participants having 
an MRI scan at the Department of Neuroimaging have their scans viewed by a clinical 
radiologist.  In the event that any abnormality is found, they will inform the research team 
and your GP, who will get in contact with you to discuss this.  
 
A copy of this ‘Information Sheet’ and of the signed ‘Consent Form’ will be given to you 
to keep. A copy of your consent form may be made available to others working on the 
study at the Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology & Neuroscience. 
 
 
How is the project being funded? 
 
This project is being funded by an IoPPN Excellence/MRC Postgraduate Studentship 
and the Department of Neuroimaging. 
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
 
The results of this study will be disseminated in academic journals and conferences 
and will also contribute to a PhD thesis. 
 
Who should I contact for further information? 
 
If you have any questions or require more information about this study, please contact 
me using the following contact details:  
 
Anthony Gabay 
Centre of Neuroimaging Studies, PO 89 De Crespigny Park 
London SE5 8AF 
Tel: 02032283095 / 07444321618 
Email: anthony.a.gabay@kcl.ac.uk 
 
What if I have further questions, or if something goes wrong? 
   
If this study has harmed you in any way or if you wish to make a complaint about the 
conduct of the study you can contact the Principal Investigator using the details below 
for further advice and information:  
 
 
Dr Mitul Mehta 
Centre of Neuroimaging Studies, PO 89 De Crespigny Park 
London SE5 8AF 
















Centre of Neuroimaging Sciences 
Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience 
King’s College London  
PO 089 
De Crespigny Park 
London SE5 8AF 
 
 





PNM/14/15-32 The psychopharmacology of social and emotional cognition 
 
Review Outcome: Full Approval 
 
Thank you for sending in the amendments/clarifications requested to the above project. I am 
pleased to inform you that these meet the requirements of the PNM RESC and therefore that full 
approval is now granted. 
 
Please ensure that you follow all relevant guidance as laid out in the King's College London 
Guidelines on Good Practice in Academic Research 
(http://www.kcl.ac.uk/college/policyzone/index.php?id=247). 
 
For your information ethical approval is granted until 06 January 2018. If you need approval 
beyond this point you will need to apply for an extension to approval at least two weeks prior to 
this explaining why the extension is needed, (please note however that a full re-application will 
not be necessary unless the protocol has changed). You should also note that if your approval is 
for one year, you will not be sent a reminder when it is due to lapse. 
 
Ethical approval is required to cover the duration of the research study, up to the conclusion of 
the research. The conclusion of the research is defined as the final date or event detailed in the 
study description section of your approved application form (usually the end of data collection 
when all work with human participants will have been completed), not the completion of data 
analysis or publication of the results.  
For projects that only involve the further analysis of pre-existing data, approval must cover any 
period during which the researcher will be accessing or evaluating individual sensitive and/or un-
anonymised records.  
Note that after the point at which ethical approval for your study is no longer required due to the 
study being complete (as per the above definitions), you will still need to ensure all research 
data/records management and storage procedures agreed to as part of your application are 
adhered to and carried out accordingly. 
 





Should you wish to make a modification to the project or request an extension to approval you will 
need approval for this and should follow the guidance relating to modifying approved applications: 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/support/ethics/applications/modifications.aspx  
 
Please would you also note that we may, for the purposes of audit, contact you from time to time 
to ascertain the status of your research.  
 
If you have any query about any aspect of this ethical approval, please contact your 
panel/committee administrator in the first instance 
(http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/support/ethics/contact.aspx) 
We wish you every success with this work. 
 
Yours sincerely,  
 
 
James Patterson – Senior Research Ethics Officer 






   
 
